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iAbstract
People tend to interact and communicate with others throughout their life. In the
age of pervasive computing, information and communication technology (ICT) that
is no longer bound to desktop computers enables digital cooperations in everyday
life and work in an unprecedented manner. However, the privacy and IT security
issues inherent in pervasive computing are often associated with negative conse-
quences for the users and the (information) society as a whole.
Addressing this challenge, this thesis demonstrates that carefully devised protec-
tion mechanisms can become enablers for multilaterally acceptable and trustworthy
digital interactions and cooperations. It contributes to the design of multilaterally
secure cooperative pervasive systems by taking a scenario-oriented approach.
Within our reference scenario of ICT-supported emergency response, we derive
the following scientific research questions. Firstly, we investigate how to enable
real-world auditing in pervasive location tracking systems, while striking a balance
between privacy protection and accountability. Secondly, we aim to support com-
munication between a sender and mobile receivers that are unknown by identity,
while end-to-end security is enforced. The required concepts and mechanisms de-
fine the scope of what we denote as multilaterally secure pervasive cooperation.
We take a novel integrated approach and provide the supporting security tech-
niques and mechanisms. The main contributions of this thesis are (i) pseudonyms
with implicit attributes, which is an approach to multilevel linkable transaction pseu-
donyms that is based on a combination of threshold encryption techniques, se-
cure multiparty computation and cryptographically secure pseudo-random num-
ber generators, (ii) multilaterally secure location-based auditing, a novel consideration
of auditing mechanisms in the context of real-world actions that reconciles privacy
protection and accountability while proposing location traces as evidence, (iii) a hy-
brid encryption technique for expressive policies, which allows encrypting under poli-
cies that include a continuous dynamic attribute, leveraging an efficient combina-
tion of ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption, location-based encryption and
symmetric encryption concepts, and (iv) end-to-end secure attribute-based messaging,
a communication mechanism for end-to-end confidential messaging with receivers
unknown by identity that is suitable also for resource constrained mobile devices.
Harnessing these buildings blocks, we present an integrated architecture that
supports location-aware first response. We therein consider location as the central in-
tegrating concept for pervasive cooperations. Both communication during incident
handling as well as ex-post auditing are conceived as being location-based.
Our research draws from experiences with potential real users (first responders
and emergency decision makers) and from an interdisciplinary study. We contribute
results derived from simulated court cases, indicating the trustworthiness and prac-
ticality of our proposal. Experiments conducted with prototype systems support
the claim that our concepts are suitable for resource-constrained devices. In a theo-
retical analysis, we show that our security requirements are fulfilled. Our proposals
have multiple further applications, e.g. to pseudonym-based access control.
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Zusammenfassung
In ihrem Alltagsleben interagieren und kommunizieren Menschen auf vielfältige
Weisen miteinander. Durch den Einsatz moderner Informations- und Kommunika-
tionstechnik (IKT) ist digitale Kooperation nicht mehr an eine stationäre Nutzung
gebunden, sondern auch mobil und allgegenwärtig möglich. Die dahinter stehen-
den technischen Entwicklungen werden häufig unter dem Begriff des Pervasive
Computing zusammengefasst. Als Kehrseite und Hemmnis der sich vollziehenden
"Computerisierung der Alltagswelt" werden oft die Auswirkungen auf die Privat-
sphäre des Einzelnen und Datenschutz- und Datensicherheitsprobleme im Allge-
meinen angeführt.
In diesem Spannungsfeld hat die vorliegende Dissertation das Ziel, Konzepte
und Mechanismen für eine mehrseitig sichere digitale Kooperation zu entwickeln. Es
werden neue Mechanismen vorgestellt, welche die Sicherheitsanforderungen aller
beteiligten Kooperationspartner berücksichtigen und somit auf einen ausgewoge-
nen Interessensausgleich abzielen. Dies dient als Grundvoraussetzung für eine ver-
trauenswürdige Kooperation.
Im Mittelpunkt der Arbeit stehen die folgenden Forschungsfragen: wie kann eine
datenschutzgerechte Auditierung von Vorgängen der realen Welt realisiert werden?
Insbesondere wird dabei der Aspekt berücksichtigt, wie mit dem Zielkonflikt zwi-
schen dem Schutz der Privatsphäre und der Zurechenbarkeit von Aktionen umge-
gangen werden kann. Weiterhin wird die komplementäre Fragestellung adressiert,
wie eine sichere Kommunikation mit mobilen Kooperationspartnern, deren Iden-
tität einem Sender unbekannt ist, realisiert werden kann. Ein Hauptaugenmerk
liegt dabei auf der Sicherstellung von Ende-zu-Ende Sicherheit auf Basis kryptogra-
phischer Techniken.
Die Inhalte der Arbeit werden szenarioorientiert motiviert und präsentiert. Als
Basis dienen dabei realitätsnahe Anwendungsfälle im IKT-unterstützten Katastro-
phenschutz. Die Handhabung von Großschadenslagen kann durch digitale Ko-
operation entscheidend verbessert werden. Die Anwendbarkeit der vorgestellten
Beiträge ist jedoch allgemeiner und nicht auf diese Domäne beschränkt.
Die Arbeit stellt einen neuartigen integrierten Ansatz für mehrseitig sichere digi-
tale Kooperation im Hinblick auf die genannten Forschungsfragen vor. Dabei wird
auch eine Systemarchitektur eingeführt, die am Anwendungsfall ortsbezogene Koor-
dinierung und Auditierung von Rettungseinsätzen illustriert wird.
Die technischen Hauptbeiträge sind (i) Pseudonyme mit impliziten Attributen, ein
Vorschlag zur Realisierung flexibel verkettbarer Transaktionspseudonyme, basie-
rend auf Schwellwertkryptographie, Berechnungen auf verschlüsselten Daten und
Zufallszahlengeneratoren; (ii) ein Ansatz zur mehrseitig sicheren ortsbezogenen Audi-
tierung, der einen fairen Interessensausgleich zwischen informationeller Selbstbes-
timmung, Nachvollziehbarkeit und Strafverfolgung durch transparente, pseudony-
me Auditierung bietet; (iii) eine ausdrucksstarke, hybride Verschlüsselungstechnik, die
kontinuierlich dynamische Attribute wie GPS-Informationen in kryptographischen
Operationen berücksichtigt, sowie (iv) Mechanismen für den Ende-zu-Ende sicheren
iv
attributsbasierten Nachrichtenaustausch, die eine gezielte und nachvollziehbare Kom-
munikation mit unbekannten Empfängern implementieren.
Abschließend werden Evaluationsergebnisse und sowohl theoretische als auch
praktische Sicherheitsanalysen der Beiträge vorgestellt. In einer Nutzerstudie mit
Mitgliedern des deutschen Katastrophenschutzes wurde die Praktikabilität der Kom-
munikationsmechanismen positiv evaluiert. Eine zweite Studie, die ebenfalls präsen-
tiert wird, hat noch stärkeren interdisziplinären Charakter: auf Basis simulierter
Gerichtsverfahren wurden die Rahmenbedingungen für den Einsatz der vorgeschla-
genen Auditierungsmechanismen bestimmt. Als weiterer Bestandteil der Evalua-
tion wird die Prototyp-Implementierung vorgestellt und gezeigt, dass der Ressour-
cenverbrauch der entwickelten Konzepte auch für mobile Endgeräte angemessen
ist. Zur Abrundung werden weitere Anwendungsmöglichkeiten der entwickelten
Beiträge diskutiert, diese liegen beispielsweise auf dem Gebiet der pseudonymba-
sierten Zugriffskontrolle.
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1Introduction
Computerization is robbing individuals of the ability to monitor and control the ways
information about them is used. [...] As computerization becomes more pervasive, the
potential for these problems will grow dramatically.
David Chaum, 1985 [44]
1.1 Motivation
People tend to interact and communicate with others throughout their daily lives.
In the last decades, oral and postal communications have been complemented by
digital approaches. In particular, electronic mail has been adopted by tremendously
large user groups. Recently, also mobile communication devices, powerful net-
worked computing facilities and personalized information services have started to
support digital cooperations in everyday’s life and work in an unprecedented man-
ner.
Today, information and communication technology (ICT) is no longer bound to
desktop computers; we are closely approaching the age of Pervasive Computing [194].
This post-desktop era of computing is attended by a large scale collection, distribu-
tion and aggregation of information related to individuals and their activities.
As with most things, there is always a second side of the coin, also with technolog-
ical progress. Already more than a century ago, the rise of photographs combined
with media that was able to widely spread the pictures taken amplified discussions
of the concept of privacy [228]. Means for restricting and controlling the ways that
personal information is used by others were demanded.
From the beginning of pervasive computing research [44, 244], its inherent pri-
vacy issues and the associated unforeseeable consequences for the individual were
mentioned. Throughout the last years, the actual demand for security mechanisms
and privacy protection principles that are compatible with pervasive ICT has in-
creased the same way as ICT application scopes have broadened [221].
It is therefore a fundamental conviction of the research community [39, 77, 8] that,
in the long run, assurance has to be provided that digital interactions bear little
additional risks and threats. A major challenge is thus to design the multiple ways
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of pervasive information brokering in a manner that is multilaterally acceptable by
the users and the (information) society as a whole .
1.2 Object of Research
With pervasive computing becoming reality, the usage of ICT naturally tends to
happen as part of real life contexts. In particular, it can also be associated to orga-
nizational liabilities or engagements. Especially, it takes place within legal frame-
works. This indicates that digital protection concepts applicable to pervasive sys-
tem do not only have to consider the privacy protection of individuals. Also, they
need to adhere to the broader perspective of multilateral security [183]. Multilateral
security aims at reconciling contrary security interests, which is a prerequisite that
parties can concentrate on reaching a common goal.
Effectively, in a vision of a multilaterally secure pervasive computing environ-
ment, the possibly conflicting security interests of all legitimately concerned parties
would a) be thoroughly considered, and b) fairly balanced, while c) system func-
tionality would not be confined.
This thesis contributes to the understanding and design of multilaterally secure
cooperative pervasive systems.
1.3 Thesis Goals and Research Questions
The main objective of this thesis is to demonstrate that pervasive computing and
communication concepts can be realized such that a multilaterally acceptable and
thus trustworthy cooperation between different players can be supported. In partic-
ular, we consider this objective in the face of highly demanding and even conflicting
IT security and privacy requirements, as explained in the following.
Figure 1.1: Research challenge
In most cooperative systems, the mechanisms that support efficient and secure
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Figure 1.2: Goals and research questions
communication, privacy protection and accountability are considered as major func-
tional parts. In pervasive systems, these functionalities are facing an extension of
their scopes. This includes new facets of privacy protection, accountability for digi-
tally recorded real-world actions and novel forms of communication.
Thus, a major research challenge is to devise solutions that face the constraints
dictated by the embedding of ICT in the real world. In particular, system design
has to take into account conflicting security interests, resource constraints of mobile
devices and wishes of end users, without restraining functionalities. This challenge
is summarized in Figure 1.1.
In this thesis, we address it by specifically aiming to
• enable real-world auditing in and by pervasive location tracking systems, and
• enable end-to-end secure communication between a sender and mobile, name-
less receivers as well as dynamic groups.
For this thesis, the required concepts and mechanisms define the scope of what
we denote as multilaterally secure pervasive cooperation. In order to implement these
enablers, we have to address the following identified research questions, that are
also summarized in Figure 1.2:
• In order to support auditing of real-world actions, novel auditing mechanisms
are required. We investigate how to audit mobile users that are participants
of a location tracking system. Additionally, in order to achieve acceptance
of such a novel auditing approach, we investigate how to fairly balance the
inherently conflicting security requirements of (location) privacy protection
and accountability.
• Communication in pervasive computing settings has to consider that receivers
are mobile and nameless or parts of dynamic groups. Thus, we investigate
how to realize communication mechanisms suitable for targeted one-to-many
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Figure 1.3: Integrated architecture in overview
communication given the fact that identities of the receivers are unknown.
Additionally, we investigate how to achieve end-to-end security for this kind
of communication, which is a security requirement relevant to many forms of
communication.
1.4 Approach and Scientiﬁc Contributions
This thesis follows a scenario-oriented approach. We derive the introduced research
questions within a specific reference application scenario; we also generalize our
findings. In particular, our research is instantiated within the challenging context
of ICT-supported emergency response. We stress that pervasive ICT may enhance
rescue efforts in the face of large scale emergencies, which can only be handled by
multiple parties that cooperate.
In this setting, communication has to be end-to-end secure due to legal require-
ments, and real-world accountability is a key means for handling liability issues
that may arise during rescue missions.
In order to mitigate the acceptance issues of pervasive computing systems in such
challenging real-world contexts, we develop and contribute a novel integrated ap-
proach to multilaterally secure pervasive cooperation; it is depicted within the use
case of location-aware first response.
Our approach builds upon two main principles:
• Firstly, we propose to make mobile users implicitly addressable for secure
communication on a different level of abstraction than identity. In particu-
lar, this is realized by means of attributes that represent the user properties,
including the current location.
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Figure 1.4: Overview of contributions and thesis contents
• Secondly, we propose that a every user regularly provides location updates
along with transaction pseudonyms. Since we employ particular pseudonyms
that are flexibly linkable by authorized parties, we thus enable a real-world
auditing. Based on stored pseudonymized location information, location traces
can be created, re-identified and used as evidence in disputes.
In particular, we propose and describe an integrated architecture that supports
end-to-end secure one-to-many communication and multilaterally secure auditing
of rescue missions. An overview of this architecture is provided in Figure 1.3.
On a technical level, we additionally develop several novel security techniques
and mechanisms that are suitable for the given reference scenario and a range of
further applications. Our main contributions are
• Pseudonyms with implicit attributes, a novel approach for multilevel linkable
transaction pseudonyms. We extend the work by Juels and Pappu [125] on
encryption-based transaction pseudonyms, by developing new mechanisms
for controlled pseudonym linkability, including support for cooperative, step-
wise re-identification as well as individual authentication of pseudonyms.
Our proposal builds on the employment of efficient techniques for secure mul-
tiparty computation (SMPC) and cryptographically secure pseudo-random
number generators (PRNGs).
• Multilaterally secure location-based auditing, a novel consideration of auditing
mechanism towards real-world actions. Harnessing our novel pseudonym
construction, we propose mechanisms that support a fair balance of privacy
6 1 Introduction
protection and accountability. In contrast to previous work, a cooperative log
analysis is introduced that is tailored more closely to human-oriented dispute
resolution processes. We propose transparency as a second level of account-
ability and provide means that support individuals in repudiating false accu-
sation. Additionally, the approach can flexibly be instantiated with and with-
out law enforcement capabilities.
• A hybrid encryption technique for expressive policies, which is suitable for han-
dling encryption policies that may include a continuous dynamic attribute.
Leveraging an efficient combination of ciphertext-policy attribute-based en-
cryption, location-based encryption and symmetric encryption according to
AES, we devise an expressive encryption technique that is suitable also for
resource-constrained mobile devices.
• End-to-end secure attribute-based messaging, a novel communication mechanism
that supports end-to-end secure messaging with receivers unknown by iden-
tity. Based on our hybrid encryption technique, we conceptualize an approach
that flexibly supports important communication patterns, including location
addressing as well as notification of a priori unknown recipients, e.g. quali-
fied persons and external specialists. The proposal also allows querying hu-
man sensors and was tailored according to the needs of potential end users
within the emergency response domain. Harnessing an implicit addressing
mechanism, also location privacy of mobile receivers is protected.
• A novel representation of digital identities, which supports mobile users to be
addressable in communications, to be able to provide pseudonymous loca-
tion updates, to be re-identifiable in a log analysis and to individually access
log content. The proposed representation is organized in three logical layers;
on the user’s side, a personal communication device provides the digital con-
tainer, platform and technical trust anchor for our proposal.
An overview and the conceptual connection of our main contributions is given
in Figure 1.4. Based on our integrated, scenario-oriented presentation, this thesis,
on the one hand, depicts how cooperation based on pervasive ICT can enhance
mission-critical settings that inherently require multilateral security. On the other
hand, we show how cooperation can be a key mechanism to implement multilateral
security (cf. Figure 1.5).
1.5 Evaluation
We argue that technical feasibility, security and appropriateness for certain applica-
tion contexts is given by our contributions.
Firstly, prototype implementations serve as a proof-of-concept; they enable us to
conduct experiments which support our claim that the proposed concepts are tech-
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Figure 1.5: Cooperation and multilateral security
nically feasible as well as suitable to current standard mobile devices and storage
systems.
By means of security analyses, we depict the achieved level of security. Main
results are also confirmed by an external security evaluation that was conducted
by the independent German trust provider TÜViT, and by additional considera-
tions derived from an interdisciplinary simulation study. Within this study, we con-
ducted simulated court cases in order to identify the main factors for leveraging lo-
cation traces as legally acceptable evidence. Our appropriateness claims also draw
from experiences with potential real users, i.e. first responders, decision makers and
lecturers from German police and fire departments as well as relief organizations.
In particular, we conducted a user study in order to assess the usage potential of
attribute-based messaging concepts. The derived results were also incorporated in
our proposal.
1.6 Publications
The present thesis builds upon a number of scientific publications that were pub-
lished in a peer-reviewed book, articles, conference as well as workshop proceed-
ings and reports, and have also been presented and discussed at a symposium and
a poster session.
Initial discussions of IT security and privacy challenges inherent in pervasive
computing as well as in the emergency response context were published in [240, 72].
Related social and ethical aspects were discussed in [235]. Early conceptions of
this work have been published in [171, 236]. The mechanisms for end-to-end se-
cure attribute-based messaging were introduced in [232, 231]. Refinements and
additions were presented in [241, 237, 226], together with the construction of the
proposed hybrid encryption technique, that was also presented in [234]. Specific as-
pects related to the security architecture of mobile communication devices are given
in [32, 238]. The approach to multilevel linkable transaction pseudonyms was pre-
sented in [230, 239], along with the concepts for multilaterally secure location-based
auditing. The comprehensive concepts for the representation of digital identities as
well as an overview of main principles of this work were presented in [238]. Fur-
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thermore, a cooperation lead to an additional publication [136], addressing issues
of multilateral security and principal limits of privacy protection as well as of trans-
parency and audit mechanisms in a related e-government services context.
1.7 Thesis Structure
Beyond this introduction, this thesis consists of seven chapters, as follows:
Chapter 2: Background and Requirements introduces to pervasive computing and the
inherent IT security and privacy issues. It then analyzes ICT-supported emergency
response, as well as defines the reference use case of location-aware first response.
Based on the introduced background, the security requirements for multilaterally
secure pervasive cooperation are elicited and defined.
Chapter 3: State of the Art discusses the state of the art of existing research w.r.t.
to goals of this thesis. It points to shortcomings of current security techniques and
mechanisms that have to be overcome in order to fulfill the goals of this thesis.
Chapter 4: Novel Security Techniques introduces a novel pseudonym construction
and a hybrid encryption approach. These techniques constitute key building blocks
for the integrated approach of this work.
Chapter 5: Integrated Approach within Reference Scenario presents the main prin-
ciples for realizing a multilaterally secure pervasive cooperation and describes an
integrated system for location-aware first response, which applies them.
Chapter 6: Mechanisms contains a detailed description of the mechanisms under-
lying the depicted approach.
Chapter 7: Evaluation and Discussion presents a multifaceted security evaluation
and discusses further fields of application of our concepts and mechanisms.
Chapter 8: Summary concludes and summarizes the present thesis and also pro-
vides directions for future research.
2Background and Requirements
In this chapter, the background of this thesis is introduced. This includes a brief
discussion of pervasive computing basics as well as an introduction to its inherent
IT security and privacy issues. Also, the research questions that were formulated in
the previous chapter will be substantiated from an application-oriented perspective.
In order to do so, we elicit a set of security requirements that need to be satisfied
by a system in order to meet our understanding of a multilaterally secure pervasive
cooperation within our reference scenario of ICT-supported emergency response.
This chapter is structured as follows: Firstly, our perspective on pervasive com-
puting respectively pervasive cooperation is briefly explained in Section 2.1. A dis-
cussion on inherent IT security and privacy issues follows in Section 2.2. Then,
Section 2.3 investigates a concrete application example of pervasive ICT in the emer-
gency management domain. In order to depict how pervasive ICT could efficiently
support rescue missions, we introduce the vision of location-aware first response.
In Section 2.4, we illustrate the privacy and IT security challenges within this setting
by descriptive examples. Based on this, we formulate a set of security requirements
relevant to our goals, as well as a set of communication patterns. Finally, this chap-
ter is summarized in Section 2.5.
2.1 What is Pervasive Computing?
The term Pervasive Computing [194] refers to the paradigm and vision that informa-
tion and communication technologies and digital services become constantly avail-
able, personalized, and are even more, seamlessly embedded into everyday’s life
and work activities and processes in manifold aspects. With pervasive computing,
the creation, exchange, storage and consumption of digital information potentially
happens anytime and anywhere, while the computing devices and facilities per se are
designed in an unobtrusive manner, or become even invisible to the users. It thus
refers to a post-desktop era of computing.
Beside pervasive computing, the terms Ubiquitous Computing (UbiComp) [243]
and Ambient Intelligence (AmI) [242] are also commonly used in the literature to
describe this computing paradigm as well as the associated technologies. While
there are slight differences between the terms, they are often considered synonym
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[161]. This is also true for the scope of this thesis.
Additionally to the term pervasive computing, we make recurrent use of
• pervasive computing environment and pervasive system to refer to loosely inter-
connected computing facilities that belong to a common logical and/or orga-
nizational scope,
• pervasive ICT and pervasive technologies in order to subsume the technological
components and mechanisms that are present within such an environment,
and
• pervasive applications is used to emphasize that the targeted concepts focus on
the application level.
A major goal of pervasive computing research is to devise novel applications and
useful interactions, by leveraging interconnected ICT infrastructures and compo-
nents found therein [1]. It also investigates and tries to convey "what (it) would be
(..) like to live in a world with pervasive computing" [194], thus it is often scenario-
oriented.
From a technical point of view, research on pervasive computing often has an
integrating nature. Hereby, it touches many subfields within the computer science
domain, ranging from the development of hardware over networking and interac-
tion concepts to IT security and privacy topics. A focus lies on investigating how to
realize the technical support required for envisioned applications.
However, pervasive computing is not defined by a concrete technology, rather it
encompasses and connects a wide range of technological disciplines and neighbor-
ing areas [12, 79].
2.1.1 Perspective of this Thesis
The research presented in this thesis follows the aforementioned comprehensive
perspective. We indicate that pervasive computing does not only need to be un-
derstood from a pure technological point of view, but also in close connection to
application contexts and with special attention to possible implications, e.g. accep-
tance questions.
In the following sections, we give a brief introduction to our understanding of
pervasive computing, as relevant to this thesis1. We do this by giving application
examples and abstractly describing major technological building blocks and associ-
ated concepts found in pervasive systems.
As shown in Figure 2.1, the following sections describe the design and requirements
space of this research. In particular, we discuss the security challenges that we ad-
dress, elaborate on the privacy issues inherent in pervasive computing as well as
develop a certain application perspective. These aspects contribute to the elicitation
of security requirements w.r.t. to the main goals of this thesis.
1For more detailed technical and conceptual introductions to the broad topic of pervasive computing,
we refer the reader e.g. to [162, 242, 144, 91].
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Figure 2.1: Background and design space
2.1.2 From Product Traceability ...
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technologies (see e.g. [187, 73]) and the Global
Positioning System (GPS) are often seen as enabling technologies for pervasive com-
puting. This is due to the fact that they provide means for connecting and bridging
the real and the digital world [227]. For example, real world items and entities can
be associated with digital information that refers to the environment and the condi-
tions they are used in.
Historically, a major application context has been given within the field of logis-
tics and supply chain management. We next refer to the example of product trace-
ability. Here, appropriately equipped items, e.g. manufactured goods and products,
can continuously generate and provide situation- and product-related informations
that can be interpreted automatically or by human administrators (such as "these
apples were grown in California and shipped to Europe."). Also, associated real-
world conditions may be covered (such as "the temperature of the product’s storage
room never exceeded 5 degrees Celsius") or products can distinctly by re-identified
on demand.
In this setting, thoroughly integrated technologies enable to continuously trace
and monitor the products’ flow through a complete supply chain. Also, real time
stock holding as well as the detection of inappropriate conditions that appeared
during product dispatching can be supported. While the given examples do not
provide an in depth description of the technologies in use, we use them to con-
vey the potential of pervasive technologies: underlying real-world processes can
continuously be enhanced and optimized; also product safety and security can be
improved.
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Moreover, the examples illustrate important questions that are closely associated
to pervasive computing:
• Who is allowed to access which kind of information generated within the per-
vasive system under which circumstances?
• In which ways is it possible to interact and communicate with and within a
computerized environment?
2.1.3 .. to Human-Centric Pervasive Applications
Beyond the application on products and industrial goods, a major goal of pervasive
technologies is to support that "people live, work, and play in a seamlessly inter-
weaving computing environment" [243]. This was expressed in an early vision by
Mark Weiser, who is acknowledged as one of the key innovators and researchers of
pervasive computing.
Throughout the last years, the benefits of pervasive technologies have been in-
vestigated in multiple application domains, just to name a few examples:
• in the scenarios of ambient assisted living, domestic health care and smart
homes [102, 50, 48, 10, 97], pervasive ICT aims to support elderly people in
living independently in their homes by providing convenience and health care
functionalities;
• intelligent transportation systems [49, 180, 63] are designed to make efficient
use of the transportation infrastructures, both from an individual as well as
from an economical perspective;
• in emergency response scenarios [119, 196, 120, 145, 220, 65], approaches to
pervasive computing and communication aim to provide relevant informa-
tion to the right actors at the right time in order to speed up incident responses
and to implement safe and secure rescue missions.
ICT-supported emergency response also serves as major reference application
scenario throughout this thesis. As common property, the mentioned fields of ap-
plication aim to support individuals in their everyday tasks and are thus human-
centric.
As a consequence, employed technologies also have to fit with pre-existing con-
ventions of everyday’s life and expectations of potential users, in order to be suc-
cessful. Thus, the development of pervasive computing is often accompanied by
technology assessment research [75, 77, 101, 8]. This shall assure that technological
development remains consistent with social, ethical and legal perceptions. Espe-
cially, inherent acceptance issues need to be identified before the real world deploy-
ment of pervasive applications.
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Figure 2.2: Components of a pervasive system according to [77, 144, 8]
2.1.4 Main Components of Pervasive Systems
A primary aim of pervasive computing is to render access to and interaction with
the computing facilities as intuitive and easy as possible for human users. A com-
mon way to achieve this is to automate the provision of digital services, based on
information that is collected about the situation of use. This approach, on the one
hand, can minimize the cognitive load within human-computer interactions, and on
the other hand enables interactions with computing facilities that are only present
in the background.
Technically, the realization of such a pervasive systems requires data collecting
facilities, mechanisms for wirelessly transferring and meaningfully connecting data
in the background and consecutively providing personalized services to the users.
While there is no distinct reference architecture of pervasive systems, there is a
set of main functional components that are found in most pervasive systems. In
the following, we provide a brief introduction to common basic building blocks of
pervasive systems, according to [77, 144, 8]. An overview is given in Figure 2.2.
In the figure, arrows indicate information flows. The icon that depicts an eye
refers to the system’s capability to sense the real world, the other icon represents
higher-level information and services provided to the user. In this setting, basic
components are:
• A personal device is carried by a user, in order to enable interaction with the
pervasive environment. It is the user’s primary connection point and gateway
to the digital world.
• The term sensors relates to all components that collect information, e.g. about
14 2 Background and Requirements
the user and the environment. Such sensing facilities can e.g. be embedded in
devices, the environment or even be provided by humans in various ways.
• By means of localization, a user’s position, which represents sensor informa-
tion, can be computed and provided to the environment’s data processing
facilities.
• The data and information transfer between the distributed system components is
supported by a wireless, possibly distributed communication infrastructure.
• The collection, processing and storage of data can happen both locally on the
user’s personal device as well as centrally, e.g. on a server hosted by a ser-
vice provider as part of the "invisible" computing infrastructure.
• The provided data processing functionalities facilitate an evaluation of sensor
information in order to compute user and environmental context, i.e. mean-
ingful information that characterizes the situation of use. Based on context
information, it is possible to compute decisions w.r.t. the user’s information
or service needs and thus automate system reactions. In this task, collected
and available internal data can be complemented by external data, that is re-
quested from external data brokers, possibly over the Internet, to broaden the
information basis.
The emerging capability of the environment to react upon (and possibly adapt
to) external situations is referred to as context awareness [198, 197, 96].
2.1.5 Towards Pervasive Cooperation
In a pervasive system, the tight interplay and cooperation of the components sup-
ports the targeted system functionality. In this thesis, we focus on the following
aspects:
• The presentation given above focused on a single-user setting. We will extend
it to a multi-user setting. In this setting, pervasive ICT can support interac-
tions and cooperations between human users by means of pervasive comput-
ing resources and pervasive communication.
• In order to address the inherent acceptance issues, we will investigate the col-
lection and subsequent storage of location information as well as communica-
tions from a certain IT security-related as well as functional perspective.
• Within many pervasive application, location information presents a primary
type of context information [4]. In this thesis, we will additionally consider
location as a central integrating concept. In particular, we leverage location as
enabler for several types of pervasive interactions and cooperations.
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2.2 Some Security Issues in Pervasive Computing
In the last sections, a brief and selected introduction to the conception of perva-
sive computing has been presented. In the present section, we will explain why
the provision of IT security is considered as a major issue for the realization and
deployment of pervasive computing applications and point to main factors that are
relevant to this thesis. Firstly, we introduce our perspective on how IT security
needs to be conceived in pervasive computing settings. This is followed by a brief
investigation on the challenge of securing a pervasive system. Furthermore, the
concept of privacy and associated issues are described.
2.2.1 IT Security, Multilateral Security and Pervasive Systems
According to [88], IT security is "concerned with the measures we can take to deal
with intentional actions by parties behaving in some unwelcome fashion" within a
computing system. To be able to deal with actions that can be considered as unwel-
come fashion, IT security traditionally refers to protection goals or security requirements.
These requirements need to be fulfilled for actions which are performed by means
of computers and within computing systems, and are often determined by a con-
crete application. The parties that aim to intentionally violate protection goals are
denoted adversaries.
The most common protection goals are often summarized by the CIA triad:
• Confidentiality: information should not be disclosed to unauthorized parties;
• Integrity: information should not be modified without detection by unautho-
rized parties;
• Availability: information should not be made inaccessible by unauthorized
parties;
Cooperative pervasive computing applications typically involve multiple parties,
that harness ICT for interaction and cooperation or provide services within the sys-
tem. This renders the elicitation of protection goals a possibly complex issue.
For example, a user might provide her current location to further users to fos-
ter some sort of location-based social interactions, or use a location-based informa-
tion service that recommends nearby places of interest. In this simple example, the
user may articulate the protection goals that only authorized further users may ac-
cess her location information, and she may insists on privacy protection against the
provider of the information service. On the other hand, if the service is of a com-
mercial nature, the provider wants to assure to be paid for the service and to be able
to re-identify users that do not pay [36]. Further interests may be to profile the user,
e.g. an employer could want to control that contracted working hours are actually
served.
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Analyzing an collaborative application scenario can highlight inherent conflicts
w.r.t. underlying security and privacy requirements, that are due to different per-
sonal, legal or organizational backgrounds of the participants [95]. Generally speak-
ing, security requirements of parties and entities involved in digital transactions are
often conflicting. In order to deal with this issue, the concept of multilateral secu-
rity has be coined: multilaterally secure systems take into account security require-
ments of all involved parties and aim at balancing contrary interests in an acceptable
way [182]. Consequently, after conflicting security requirements have been traded
against a multilaterally accepted compromise, the parties should have an incentive
not to cheat and only need to minimally trust in the honesty of others, which is,
more generally, an ultimate goal of designing security protocols and systems [62].
Rather, the parties can concentrate on reaching a common goal.
This is especially true in pervasive systems, which aim to foster cooperation.
However, apart from this academic point of view, the actual implementation of mul-
tilaterally secure system is a highly difficult and complex task [174].
2.2.2 The Challenge of Securing a Pervasive System
In the last section, we argued that, firstly, a system can be considered secure if de-
fined protection goals are satisfied, and, secondly, security in pervasive computing
should be multilateral, i.e. consider legitimate goals of all involved parties.
But implementing and providing security mechanisms always has a cost, e.g. in
terms of resource consumptions, in terms of development and deployment efforts
and in terms of user awareness, or protection may confine system functionality.
Over the last years, a tremendous amount of literature has reviewed challenges
that arise in order to make pervasive systems secure, e.g. [13, 137, 109, 163, 112, 57,
18, 80, 37, 252, 171, 190, 215, 214, 107].
Since the term pervasive computing does not refer to a distinct reference archi-
tecture, the discussions often remain little comparable. However, they indicate, that
pervasive system are full of potential risks to security and privacy prominent on
various layers, that also go well beyond the mere protection of confidentiality, in-
tegrity and availability.
For the scope of this thesis, we address the challenge of securing a pervasive
system from the following, three layered perspective:
• Device/Technique layer: Which available basic security mechanisms and tech-
niques can be applied for securing a pervasive system? How does a chosen
approach interplay with pervasive devices, e.g. w.r.t. to resource constraints?
• Protocol/System layer: How can secure protocols and schemes be built on the
foundations that are given in a pervasive systems? Which security concepts
are suitable to effectively integrate the loosely connected parts into the emerg-
ing larger, yet secure systems?
• Human/Organizational layer: How is a pervasive application perceived by its
users? What is the achieved acceptance level? Which further organizational
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issues have an influence on establishing targeted protection goals? How can
the level of protection be conveyed to the users?
On every layer, we mentioned security challenges by formulating abstract ques-
tions. We will consider the questions within a concrete application scenario of per-
vasive computing, in order to support our design process. The proposed framework
informally reflects that
• IT security research has proposed a broad range of basic mechanisms a system
designer may choose from, e.g. encryption or authentication techniques, yet
the suitability for resource constrained devices is often questionable and needs
to be investigated;
• bootstrapping security properties of larger systems has to be carefully aligned
with the design of the targeted system functionalities;
• a real world usage of a theoretically secure approach can cause practical prob-
lems and thus conflict with security goals, e.g. imposed by limitations of hu-
man end users or administrators.
2.2.3 Privacy and the Need for Privacy Protection
The consideration of IT security in the sense of multilateral security also emphasizes
the issue of privacy protection. On the one hand, privacy protection is a security
requirement that is often articulated by individual users. On the other hand, it is
also implied by existing data protection regulations.
Privacy issues been noted from the beginning of pervasive computing research
[244]. They are considered as threats inherent in pervasive computing [139], and
have often been mentioned with strongly negative connotations. E.g. pervasive
systems have been compared to "surveillance infrastructures" [39]. Also, privacy
was considered the "achille’s heel of pervasive computing" [195].
However, privacy is a complex social, legal and technical issue [211, 2, 70]. In
order to understand the meanings attached to the concepts of privacy and privacy
protection, in the following sections we will take a brief look on legal foundations,
discuss the problem of location privacy as well as summarize important privacy
related notions. Finally, we will elaborate on the fact that privacy protection itself
can be in conflict with the protection goal of accountability.
Legal Foundations
The concept of privacy has evolved along with the capabilities and social percep-
tions of new technologies and their influence on the individual.
The first notably definition as the right to be left alone was given by Warren and
Brandeis [228]. It came up during the late nineteenth century, in times when pho-
tography became broadly available and newspapers could widely spread pictures
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taken. This development added a new dimension to the scope of disclosure of sen-
sitive information. In turn, legal foundations were required to protect individuals
from unwanted importunity.
More recently, after the introduction of electronic data bases allowed collecting
and searching personal data on a much larger scale, an important definition has
been given by Westin [245]:
"Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves
when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others."
Westin’s definition led to the articulation of the fair informations practices (FIPS)
[224], which are a basic set of guidelines for the management of personal informa-
tion. In summary, the FIPS include the following principles:
• Notice and awareness: An individual must be aware which entities are collec-
tion personal information about her and for what purpose this happens.
• Consent and use limitation: Data about an individual may only be collected if
the individual agrees, and the use of the collected personal information must
be limited to the specified and agreed purpose.
• Access and participation: An individual must be able to access stored personal
data which refers to her, and be able to contest the data’s accuracy.
• Integrity and security: Data that is collected must be assured to be accurate
and must be protected against unauthorized access, disclosure and usage.
• Enforcement and recourse: There must be mechanisms established which en-
force privacy protection as stated by the given principles. Even more, a data
collector must be accountable for any failures to comply with the principles
agreed to provide protection.
The FIPS have an important impact in the legal as well in IT security domains
[113]. On the legal side, this is e.g. reflected by the fact that US, Canadian, European
as well as OECD privacy legislations build on and extend them [83].
In addition to the FIPS, the principle of data minimization has evolved as one of the
main legal anchors2 for privacy protection:
• Data minimization: The collection of personal information should be limited
to what is relevant and necessary for accomplishing a specified purpose. The
data should only be retained for as long as it is needed.
In further directives3, also legal principles for dealing with violations and breaches
of data protection are given.
2The principle derives from EU Directive 95/46/EC and Regulation EC 45/2001, cf.
HTTP://WWW.EDPS.EUROPA.EU/EDPSWEB/.
3In particular, this issues is addressed by the EU Directive 2009/136/EC, which extends Directive
2002/58/EC, cf. HTTP://WWW.EDPS.EUROPA.EU/EDPSWEB/.
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The introduced principles provide abstract guidelines for privacy protection from
a legal point of view. However, they do not specify in detail the necessary means
for a technical implementation or enforcement.
This complex task is often addressed by more technical research communities, e.g.
P3P [52], the platform for privacy preferences refers to the FIPS; they are also frequently
interpreted in pervasive computing research contexts [137, 83, 212, 74, 128].
Location Privacy
Along with the development of pervasive ICT, new aspects and new forms of pri-
vacy have emerged and been identified. As argued by Langheinrich [137], this is
due to following properties of pervasive computing:
• Invisibility: computing facilities aim to disappear in the environment, thus ICT
usage is invisible to the users, yet possibly creates data related to individuals;
• Sensing: sensors constantly perceive possibly sensible aspects of the environ-
ment and associated actions of its users;
• Memory amplification: collected data can be stored and made accessible later.
In particular, location information represents one of the most important types of
context information exploited by pervasive systems. For example, the availability
of GPS allows continuously sensing the location of individuals with a high degree
of precision and accuracy. This has lead to the conception of the term of location
privacy4.
Referencing to the more general definition given by Westin, Duckham and Kulik
[58] state: "location privacy can be defined as a special type of information privacy which
concerns the claim of individuals to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent
location information about them is communicated to others."
The importance of providing location privacy can be conveyed by considering
negative consequences [93, 89, 58, 134]. These may include intrusive inferences and
attacks on personal safety.
Firsthand, locations are often meaningfully associated to real-world actions, e.g.
presence at meetings, visits of medical facilities, personal homes or even crime
scenes. Based on available location information, further sensitive facts might be
inferred, e.g. individual preferences or issues of physical health that may have neg-
ative impacts on social and economical life. Also, the knowledge of a current lo-
cation can be maliciously exploited for physical attacks on an individual or on her
property, if absence is indicated.
Yet, the actual and future scope of such negative effects can hardly be estimated.
4Location privacy is also addressed by regulations, e.g. in the Location Privacy Protection Act of 2001
(cf. HTTP://WWW.TECHLAWJOURNAL.COM/CONG107/PRIVACY/LOCATION/S1164IS.ASP), the
Wireless Privacy Protection Act of 2003 (cf. HTTP://WWW.THEORATOR.COM/BILLS108/HR71.HTML)
and the EU Directive 2002/58/EC (cf. HTTP://WWW.EDPS.EUROPA.EU/EDPSWEB/).
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Important Privacy Notions and Metrics
The aspects of privacy that were discussed thus far derive from legal definitions,
or are related to scenarios. They are thus little formal. Yet, in the privacy research
community, a broad background on the formal treatment of privacy issues has been
developed [175], that helps to describe privacy issues on the technical level. We
next introduce two fundamental notions related to privacy protection: anonymity
and unlinkability.
Within these notions, when speaking about an adversary, we refer to an entity
that tries to circumvent given protection means in an unwelcome fashion.
• Anonymity: as defined by [175], anonymity is state of not being identifiable
within a set of subjects, the so-called anonymity set. Anonymity can hide
entities that perform a transaction. Given that a transaction can be carried
out completely anonymously, i.e. in the absence of identifiers, an adversary is
unable to associate that action to any subject (or its identifier) within the set
of possible subjects. Thus, the degree of anonymity can be measured by the
cardinality of the anonymity set.
• Unlinkability: Unlinkability is the property that aims at hiding relationships
between items in a system [35]. If unlinkability is given, an adversary cannot
link together multiple actions, e.g. uses of resources or services or sending
messages, of the same subject.
Both anonymity and unlinkability refer to the inability of an adversary to behave
in some unwelcome fashion, thus they refer to an implemented state of protection.
More generally speaking, technical security mechanisms that aim to implement a
privacy-related protection goal often aim to provide anonymity and unlinkability.
2.2.4 Privacy Protection versus Accountability
As discussed so far, privacy protection is a security requirement associated to the
interests of individuals. In a pervasive system that aims for multilateral security,
also further interests have to be considered. One of them, that is of major impor-
tance to the present thesis, is accountability. This section motivates the necessity of
accountability and explains the inherent conflict to privacy protection.
Section 2.1.2 introduced an product traceability application example. Here, the
functionality of the system enables to continuously monitor the flow of the prod-
ucts throughout a supply chain in order to optimize processes and detect inappro-
priate conditions and states. This system functionality is possible since products are
associated to unique identifiers, which renders them linkable.
Abstracting from this setting and replacing the product by a human user emerges
a system that could support accountability. Accountability is the protection goal
that ensures that entities can be made accountable for their actions, by making it
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possible to uniquely link and associate actions of an entity to that entity. Account-
ability is often required due to legal or organizational regulations, e.g. law enforce-
ment is a primary example. A complementary concept is that of digital evidence, i.e.
"any information of probative value that is either stored or transmitted in digital
form" [217].
A pervasive system that senses real world facts and actions as well as records
these facts in data logs possibly produces large amounts of digital evidence, in case
that kind of information can be considered to be of probative value. This can be the
case if captured data allows or supports linking actions to an entity. Here, the con-
flict of security interests is obvious: while privacy protection aims at hiding relations
between users and actions, accountability aims at establishing relations. From this
point of view, accountability is a security requirement that is inherently conflicting
with privacy protection [67, 19, 20]. On a technical level, linkability for authorized
parties has to be balanced with unlinkability that protects against unwanted profil-
ing.
Yet, the concept of accountability can also be viewed from a different perspective:
as a user has to accept accountability for his actions in certain cases, also a data
collector shall be held accountable for complying with data protection principles
(cf. Section 2.2.3). This is often considered in the protection goal of transparency: a
user should be able to find out how information about her is processed and espe-
cially whether the responsible parties comply with the applicable rules for privacy
protection [99, 100].
2.3 Reference Scenario: ICT-Supported Emergency Response
In the last sections, we provided a brief introduction to main concepts of perva-
sive computing and approached the issue of establishing security within pervasive
systems on an abstract level. The present section concretizes these considerations.
In order to develop a better understanding of security and privacy issues inherent
to pervasive computing, we investigate a certain reference application scenario in
order to analyze
• how pervasive ICT may enhance important processes, and
• to which extent security and privacy protection goals have to be considered to
support multilateral security.
Thus far, security issues of pervasive systems have been investigated in a broad
range of application contexts and scenarios [80]. Within this thesis, we use the real
life context of emergency responses as our major application scenario5.
Presented findings result from discussions and experiences with German emer-
gency workers, ranging from executive levels over trainers to volunteers, build
upon available technical standards [141, 164], benefit from an exchange with the
5Yet, the contributions of this work are also relevant to further application contexts (cf. Section 7.4).
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scientific research community [72, 231, 32, 31, 29] as well as from extensive litera-
ture studies, e.g. [223, 47].
The remainder of this section is structured as follows: after a brief introduction
to area of emergency response, we depict how pervasive ICT may effectively sup-
port response and rescue-related actions. We do this by introducing our vision of
location-aware first response. Then, we describe and identify inherent security trade-
offs, formulate protection goals and elicit communication patterns concretely.
2.3.1 Introduction to Application Domain
Emergency responses are part of the area of emergency management. This term
summarizes the measures and procedures that are taken in order to protect lives,
property and infrastructure in the face of crisis situations and major incidents, in-
cluding natural catastrophes, technical incidents or even man-made accidents. Emer-
gency management includes preventive measures as well as actions taken and tech-
nologies applied to reestablish pre-incidental states.
Emergency responses need to be initiated as quickly as possible after a disaster
strikes, in order to save lives, infrastructure and property, as many victims might
not survive long without appropriate assistance [225]. Thus, the management and
coordination of available resources becomes a crucial task. Especially, the availabil-
ity of relevant information and effective means for communication are of highest
importance, to improve command and control of rescue missions. Yet, especially
in the beginning, emergency responses have to deal with unpredictable local emer-
gency situations that harden the establishment of communication structures and
with incomplete situational information. This beginning is often referred to as the
chaotic phase of emergency responses [158], and resulting incident missions are
then denoted as first responses.
2.3.2 Disaster Management Information Systems
In crisis situations, ICT may enhance existing processes that are traditionally re-
quired by emergency management workers or can even allow for the implementa-
tion of new support functionalities. Yet, emergency responses are nowadays broadly
supported by so-called disaster management information systems (DMIS)6.
Such a system aims at supporting the entities, players and organizations involved
in rescue efforts in various manners. DMIS may provide technical solutions and
tools for assessing the current situation, planning of responses and resources and
possibly also the simulation of alternatives.
DMIS have received increasing attention from industry and academic research
throughout the last years [157, 156, 120, 145, 119, 81, 191, 146, 38, 148, 220, 114, 3,
76]. The research on disaster management information systems spans from high-
level organizational views up to questions of how field forces can be supported
6Furthermore, different yet comparable notions can be found in the literature, e.g. emergency re-
sponse management information systems [223], incident management systems [132] and so on.
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by mobile response devices [135], whereas questions from cooperation of involved
parties, organizations and actors, visualization and decision-making are examined
[143]. The research is often scenario-oriented and -related, e.g. Johnson [121] draws
conclusions from a flooding in UK in 2007 and points out, among others, a need for
a better cooperation of organizations and involved actors.
As core functionality, a DMIS provides means for the efficient communication
within an operational command and control center as well as to the outside world.
The latter may include the communication between several centers as well as the
communication between a center and first responders and further entities in the
field, which are equipped with mobile communication devices.
An important property of emergency response work is that many people involved
in the execution of rescue missions are volunteers. In practice, e.g. in Germany,
this means that a large part of the responders are trained for responses, but not
continuously prepared to engage. Rather, these volunteers can be contacted during
their normal life and work via a pervasive communication mechanism, in order to
be able to support urgent incident response missions.
2.3.3 Towards Location-Aware First Response
In this section, we outline examples of ICT-based cooperations between control cen-
ter members and the entities in the field respectively at the incident site.
Throughout this work, we represent the group of people working inside a control
center by a single entity called central user7. The later ones are called mobile users.
In the following, we denote the targeted cooperation between a central user and
mobile users for the purpose of incident management first response coordination.
An abstract view of this setting is given in Figure 2.3. We assume that a digital
emergency communication network is available, that enables two-way communi-
cation between a central user and the mobile users. By means of this network, data
is exchanged between the command center and the incident scene as well as the
outside world. In Europe, examples of such networks are currently established ac-
cording to the TErrestrial Trunked RAdio (TETRA) standard8. TETRA networks
promise to reliably connect organizations, parties and individuals involved in res-
cue efforts.
A major finding relevant to this setting is that locations and location-related in-
formations are key factors to first response coordination [47]. Firsthand, aggregated
information, displayed on a digital map, which visualizes and annotates the cur-
rent disaster situation, can effectively support decision making processes in control
centers. For example, a responsible central user might have to send commands and
instructions to mobile users in order to facilitate an evacuation of citizens that are
affected by a toxic gas cloud which spreads out. In this task, the central user may be
7In real world settings, the emergency management work within a command and control center is
strictly organized, e.g. in Germany according to a set of roles, see [61] and references therein for
more background information. For simplicity reasons, our setting is reduced to an abstract view.
8Cf. WWW.TETRAMOU.COM.
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Figure 2.3: First response coordination setting
supported by location-depend information that is received from the incident site,
e.g. by reports received from eye witnesses, by photos taken locally and sent in, or
by measurements of sensors that are potentially embedded into an incident scene
or even body worn by responders.
Also, current locations of responders or specialist nearby can be useful to de-
fine and coordinate rescues and treatment plans. In the crisis scene sketched above,
available specialists for toxic matters could be leveraged for a timely local treatment
of injured people, especially if they also could be contacted dependent on their lo-
cations.
In addition, since any action takes place in time and space, location-related infor-
mations are important to understand and analyze what happens during a disaster
situation and induced rescue missions. A "crisis memory" [223], made up of col-
lected information, is some kind of audit log for real-world actions and could sup-
port the handling of liability issues. It could also help to improve future incident
responses.
Based on the presented considerations, we conclude that incident handling can
benefit from
• a location-based visualization of disaster situations, annotated by localized in-
formations and events, which are caused by the incident itself or occur during
rescue missions,
• exploiting measurements of local sensors, possibly worn by rescue forces, em-
bedded in the environment, or even harnessing humans as eye witnesses (and
thus as certain kind of sensors),
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Figure 2.4: Approach to context-aware ﬁrst response coordination
• facilities to communicate with mobile users, based on location,
• location-based documentation and auditing of incident responses in crisis sit-
uations.
In sum, we denote this setting as location-aware first response. Throughout this the-
sis, we aim to devise pervasive ICT that supports cooperation, while demanding
and possibly conflicting security and privacy requirements are satisfied. The co-
operations relevant to location-aware first response hereby serve as our reference
scenario.
2.4 Protection Goals Motivated within Reference Scenario
The system that shall provide the envisioned functionality that was described in the
last section is a special example of a pervasive system (cf. Section 2.1.4, Figure 2.3.).
In particular, mobile users carry personal devices and are able to provide their
current geographical position and further data to a central place, i.e. the command
and control center. Within the control center, a central user (cf. Figure 2.4) is able
to see and visualize received information; she can analyze the facts related to an in-
cident and think about required actions; she can provide information to the outside
world in order to re-act upon perceived external situations (cf. [232]).
Thus, in our setting, the decision component is realized via a human being, in-
stead of being fully automated as part of the context processing facilities. Since this
human part is inherently limited in her scalability, information services provided to
the outside world are realized via a one-to-many communication mechanisms.
In order to implement the system, certain protection goals have to be fulfilled. We
deal with these issues in the following sections. In our descriptive application sce-
nario, a two-way communication between the command and control center and the
incident scene and outside world is a major functionality to support cooperation.
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According to the goals of thesis, which are now instantiated in the context of
emergency response, we thus investigate properties of
• one-to-many emergency communication, between a central user and mobile
users, i.e. mobile receivers that are unknown by identity and form dynamic
groups, and of
• auditing of real-world actions by means of continuously provided location
information of mobile users.
in order to elicit concrete protection goals.
2.4.1 One-to-Many Communication in Emergency Situations
The capability to communicate and provide the right information to the right re-
ceivers is of highest importance for successful incident responses.
From an IT security perspective, instructions and requests sent out from a control
center in a crisis situation are also of highest sensitivity: they contain information
that may be the key to the survival of victims affected by a disaster, may contain
information about critical infrastructures, or hazardous materials. If such sensitive
information is not properly secured, it may be subject to malicious tampering, ma-
nipulation or even terroristic exploitation.
At this point, a failure of security can have drastic consequences: inadequate han-
dling of tactical information on the IT security level may become a threat to public
security. Actually, the lifes of first responders partly depend on correct information.
Injured persons, that shall be immediately rescued, and physical assets the first re-
sponders are chosen to protect, may be affected by IT security vulnerabilities, in the
second line, as well. These threats have to be reflected in the security architecture of
the employed DMIS.
A further important aspect is that a pervasive communication system that sup-
ports first response coordination may not be designed to send out instructions in a
context-aware, thus automated manner. The decision must always be taken by the
responsible user itself, and not by the system [213, 59], in order to comply with legal
demands and to mitigate acceptance issues.
Process of Requirements Elicitation
The present research involved both theoretical and practical considerations.
In the theoretical part, we analyzed our application scenario, relevant techni-
cal standards for secure emergency emergency communications (in particular the
TETRA standard according to [164, 141]) as well existing scientific research.
In the practical part, experiences and discussions with real users (first responders,
decision makers and trainers from police and fire departments as well as relief or-
ganizations and volunteers) helped to understand the emergency response domain.
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Figure 2.5: Research method w.r.t. communication mechanisms
Based both on the theoretical and the practical insight, we extracted the charac-
teristics of emergency communications relevant to this thesis. The pursued itera-
tive research method is shown in Figure 2.5. As part of the process of research, we
defined an initial set of security requirements for pervasive emergency communi-
cation and developed an initial conceptual approach (cf. [232, 231]) as well as a
corresponding prototype of communication mechanisms. The prototype was used
to conduct a user study that involved domain experts9. Based on the results of the
study, we refined the requirements and re-designed the conceptual approach (which
is presented in this thesis).
A basic finding is that messages are the preferred communication mechanism in
emergency management work [61]. Messages are also used to organize, inform and
document any progress and internal actions. In particular, we thus focus on the
communication between a central user in a command and control center and the
outside world via messaging.
The following lists give the main identified communication patterns (CPs) as well as
the refined set of security requirements (SReqs) relevant to this communication.
2.4.2 Emergency Communication Patterns
• CP1: Communication by location addressing: Fast participation in
a disaster response fundamentally depends on both the nature and location of
a disaster. In order to handle large-scale disasters, several parties need to co-
operate and communicate based on location. Some rescue efforts require the
participation of local relief agencies, while others require local specialists to
participate, rendering location both as a comfortable and necessary mean to
select receivers.
• CP2: Requests to unknown entities: Some parties, like fire and po-
9The conducted study is described in detail in Section 7.3.2.
28 2 Background and Requirements
lice departments, are involved in most responses. But since the geographical
scope of a disaster cannot be pre-determined before it actually happens, the
real identities of responsible people are often not directly known or available.
Yet, support for efficient communication with unknown entities is required.
• CP3: Communication with dynamic groups of entities: When
decision makers and central users need to communicate with local groups
of first responders, the actual identities are also not known beforehand, or
groups are even dynamically formed. These groups need to be addressable
comfortably.
• CP4: Deposition of information for future use(rs): In many
cases, information has to be deposited for entities that will join operations in
future.
2.4.3 Security Requirements for Emergency Communication
• SReqC1: Basic security: In emergency communication, mutual authen-
tication, message integrity, availability and revocation of devices are basic re-
quirements, e.g. detailed by the TETRA standard [141].
• SReqC2: End-to-end confidentiality w/o online PKG: Beyond
that, preserving end-to-end confidentiality through encryption is legally im-
plied for public security reasons. For scalability and efficiency reasons, the
end-to-end encryption mechanism also shall not rely on an online private key
generator (PKG).
• SReqC3: Protection against replay attacks: Means that protect
against replay attacks are required, in order to prevent an attacker from inject-
ing a valid message a further time.
• SReqC4: Non-repudiation of senders: Emergency communication re-
quires to document who sent which messages.
• SReqC5: Documentation of readers: Also, the parties and entities who
read received messages, requests and commands need to be documented for
post-hoc audit purposes.
• SReqC6: Efficiency of security mechanisms: Employed security
mechanisms need to be suitable for resource-constrained mobile devices that
are widely used in emergency communications. Especially, a real-time com-
munication must be possible.
• SReqC7: Appropriateness to users: In order to foster end user ac-
ceptance, security mechanisms must be understandable by and appropriate
to casual users [72]. For senders of messages, this implies minimum learning
efforts as well as an intuitive use.
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Figure 2.6: Research method w.r.t. auditing mechanisms
• SReqC8: Location privacy protection of receivers: Many par-
ticipants involved in responses, like specialists, doctors or volunteers, are only
available on requests sent to their mobile communication devices. Yet, the in-
dividual participation depends on the compatibility with individual prefer-
ences. Especially, many receivers demand location privacy protection as far
as possible, while being available for location-based addressing and partici-
pation in rescue missions.
2.4.4 Privacy and Accountability Issues of Real-World Auditing
In the following, we investigate protection goals relevant to the auditing of real-
world actions during incident missions.
Throughout this chapter, we have argued that an important aspect of pervasive
computing research is the investigation of acceptance issues w.r.t. novel technolo-
gies and applications. In the context of this thesis, we address the particular issue
of reconciling privacy protection and accountability.
Process of Requirements Elicitation
This section describes the pursued research method which led to the definition of
our security requirements (and to the technical approach presented in this thesis).
These requirements aim to fairly balance privacy protection and accountability. Our
method is shown in Figure 2.6.
As part of our research process, we analyzed relevant application scenarios and
related scientific research. Then, we defined an initial set of security requirements
and basic concepts for technically balancing conflicting requirements (cf. [236]). In
order to analyze which factors constitute a fair balance and to refine our proposals,
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we followed an interdisciplinary approach. In particular, we discussed the trade-
off of privacy protection and accountability with parts of the German information
ethics research community, e.g. in workshops that addressed privacy issues in per-
vasive computing and the Future Internet [240, 235]. Based on the derived insights,
we presented a refined set of requirements as well as our conceptual approach in
[230]. Technical details were refined in [239].
Finally, we complemented the interdisciplinary embedding of our research by
participating in a legal study. This so-called simulation study investigated account-
ability issues by means of simulated court cases and legal disputes10.
2.4.5 Application Examples within Reference Scenario
Having described the method and process of our research, we now switch back to
the application perspective.
In our reference scenario of location-aware first response, we assume that mobile
users continuously provide current GPS locations to the control center for the dura-
tion of their missions. While this may support the coordination of rescue missions,
collected historical position information creates a log which documents the rescue
missions. It thus documents real-world actions to a certain degree. This kind of
audit log is what we call a location audit log throughout this thesis.
Such a log can be analyzed for several purposes in the postprocessing phase of
an emergency. In the following, we assume that an location audit log obeys to a
simple structure: it contains several entries in the form identifier - time - location. The
organization which accounts for the emergency response wants to be able to analyze
processes after a rescue mission. Additionally, the goal of location audit logs is to
be able to assign responsibility for real-world actions, since organizations tend to
verify compliance.
In the following, we describe motivating real-world examples that could benefit
from a such a location audit log.
Example: Emergency Car Driving
During the course of a rescue mission, rescue vans or especially ambulance vehicles
sometimes are in need of violating general traffic rules, such as disregarding traffic
lights. This may lead to road accidents or injured pedestrians. Usually, emergency
cars beckon their emergency missions with sirens, however, there may be situations
where no acoustic signals is available. This may also be the case when a volunteer
is driving a personal car to quickly reach his designated destination during a rescue
mission.
10The study is described in detail in Section 7.3.1.
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Example: Destruction of Properties and Cases of Omitted Assistance
While mobile first responders are on their missions, they have to strongly prioritize
actions, according to given instructions. However, sometimes they have to depart
from that, based on local decision making. Some actions might be considered as
cases of omitted assistance by eye witnesses. This is especially true, when it comes
to rescuing injured persons, and the witnesses are not aware of the actual priorities
assigned, that may demand postponing or even skipping assistance.
Moreover, there are a lot of situations that entail the destruction of properties,
like breaking doors to enter a building, that are relevant to ex-post liability and
accountability discussions.
2.4.6 Security Requirements for Multilaterally Secure Auditing
As motivated, a location audit log contains information that could help to answer
questions whether a mobile user acted beyond her competences and authorizations
and exploited the current situation for inappropriate, suspicious or even malicious
purpose. However, this is a highly critical issue, since, in real-world rescue mis-
sions, first responders actually need to break common regulations in some cases
in order to save lives, and the underlying decisions often have to be made under
time pressure. Therefore, the psychological burdens of possibly having to face legal
consequences due to being digitally accountable need to be addressed, in order to
foster acceptance for the use of location tracking technologies.
In the following, we introduce our elicited security requirements that have to be
met in order to implement a multilaterally secure location auditing. Here, multi-
lateral security is considered in the sense that we take into account security and
privacy requirements of mobile users, organizations responsible for emergency re-
sponse, and law enforcement agencies, as well.
We stress that accountability and thus auditing mechanisms inherently conflict
with individual privacy protection. Based on our practical and theoretical consider-
ations that were presented throughout this chapter, we propose the following set of
security requirements in order to balance and reconcile location privacy protection
and accountability as fair and as far as possible.
Firstly, regarding the perspective of the individual mobile user:
• SReqA1: Data minimization: The use of identifiers that are directly as-
sociated to users should be avoided as far as possible or minimized in the data
collection, in order to provide a basic location privacy protection.
• SReqA2: Individual access: The user should be able to access the au-
dit log, in order to be able repudiate false accusations by providing evidences
of exoneration [9].
Secondly, regarding the perspective and role of third parties, e.g. organizations
responsible for emergency response and public security:
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• SReqA3: Privacy-respecting log analysis: It should be possible
to selectively analyze the entries that are recorded in a log in a privacy-respec-
ting manner11.
• SReqA4: Minimal disclosure: It should be possible to partially re-iden-
tify sample entries, i.e. to check if a log entry relates to a common organiza-
tional structure or function, without disclosing the complete identity in ques-
tion.
• SReqA5: Distribution of powers: An operational distribution of pow-
ers should be enforced, i.e. no single entity should be able to (mis)use the audit
functionalities.
• SReqA6: Transparency: The whole process of the log analysis should be
transparent to an affected user. Especially, it should be detectable if the parties
that are responsible for it do not comply with the rules set up for the privacy
protection of the individual user.
Thirdly, the legal perspective needs to be taken into account:
• SReqA7: Law enforcement: It should be possible to exercise a global law
enforcement functionality, i.e. a law enforcement authority should be able re-
voke privacy protection of every user in question, once convincing evidences
of inappropriate behavior have been identified. This is a requirement for
many ICT applications, that actually may lead to court proceedings for ac-
cused offences [179].
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, we provided a brief introduction to our understanding of pervasive
computing, as it is relevant to this thesis. Also, we introduced to the topic of perva-
sive cooperation. Then, we abstractly described the IT security and privacy issues
that are inherent in pervasive systems, from legal as well as technical perspectives.
Subsequently, in order to convey a better understanding of these issues, we in-
troduced our application domain of ICT-supported emergency response. Within
our reference scenario of location-aware first response, we depicted how pervasive
ICT could efficiently support rescue missions. In particular, we used this setting to
instantiate and illustrate the research goals and questions of this thesis.
We then described the pursued methods of our research; we draw from theoret-
ical, practical and interdisciplinary considerations that are integrated by means of
iterative requirements elicitation and design processes. Elicited security require-
ments for secure emergency communication and auditing mechanisms that fairly
balance privacy protection and accountability were given in the last part of this
11Viewed differently: it should by possible to selectively analyze the entries that are recorded in a log
despite that privacy protection is given.
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Figure 2.7: Overview of security requirements
chapter. Figure 2.7 gives an overview of the elicited requirements and their depen-
dencies.
In Chapter 3, we will review the state of the art of previous research w.r.t. to our
research goals. We will compare the existing proposals to the requirements elicited
in this chapter.

3State of the Art
This chapter reviews the state of the art of security mechanisms relevant to the main
goals of this thesis. The main goals and the associated research question were intro-
duced in Chapter 1 and further substantiated in Chapter 2. They serve as structur-
ing element of the discussion.
In our envisioned system for multilaterally secure pervasive cooperation, secu-
rity mechanisms are required that support two main functionalities: real-world au-
diting and targeted secure communication with entities unknown by identity. In
particular, security and privacy protection are required to render the system accept-
able to user expectations and to satisfy security requirements. However, the system
functionality shall not be confined by the employed protection mechanisms.
The discussion of the state of the art and thus the remainder of this chapter is
structured as follows. Firstly, in Section 3.1, we briefly describe the broader context
of security and privacy research in pervasive computing. Then, in the block that is
starting in Section 3.2, we analyze security mechanisms that may enable auditing
while a fair balance of privacy protection and accountability is given. Hereby, we
discuss and review existing work on pseudonymous auditing, location privacy pro-
tection and digital pseudonyms. In an additional block (Section 3.3), we review the
state of the art of communication mechanisms suitable for settings with unknown,
mobile receivers as well as dynamic groups. Our focus is put on approaches to
one-to-many messaging, which was identified as a key communication means in
emergency response scenarios in the last chapter. Furthermore, mechanisms for
the enforcement of end-to-end security suitable for one-to-many messaging are dis-
cussed.
3.1 The Broader Context
In this chapter, we focus our discussions on work that is closely related to the goals
of this thesis. Yet, we are aware of a broad range of further works on security and
privacy protection adequate for pervasive computing.
This topic has e.g. been addressed by several PhD theses [108, 126, 103, 138, 14,
56, 111, 199, 7] in the last years. The described approaches are mostly complementary
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to our work w.r.t. the development of more comprehensive security architectures
for pervasive systems.
However, to the best of our knowledge, research that explicitly targets the design
of multilaterally secure pervasive system is still in its infancy. In this area, Ortmann
et al. [168] address conflicting individual privacy requirements in multi-user per-
vasive computing environments. In addition, Gürses et al. [94] propose a method
for analyzing multilateral security requirements that is applicable to pervasive com-
puting environments. This method takes into account varying privacy interests.
On the other hand, there is a broad body of research that addressed the issue of
privacy protection in different computing settings. In particular, existing privacy-
enhancing technologies (PETs) can be the starting point to devise multilaterally se-
cure mechanisms for pervasive systems. We refer the reader to [2] for a general
overview, to [113] for a discussion of privacy issues related to human-computer in-
teraction (HCI) and to [117] for a discussion of cryptographic PETs. They represent
one of the main topics of this thesis, on a technical level.
3.2 Towards Multilaterally Secure Pervasive Auditing
A basic mechanism that is often exploited in the design of multilaterally secure sys-
tems is that already the detectability of inappropriate actions and accountability for
origination suffices to prevent misbehavior from happening. Especially, it is used
to enforce correct behavior in computing and also many real life settings, e.g. road
traffic regulation.
In a computing system, the traditional technical means to deal with this issue are
audit logs [200, 229]. Basically, an audit log contains tamper evident entries that
aim at recording irrefutable evidences of all users’ actions. While the log content
helps to detect inappropriate actions, users that behave appropriately could use it
to defend themselves against false accusations.
In this thesis, we aim for a special kind of audit log that helps to document real-
world actions. Application examples in the area of first response missions are used
to illustrate it. We discussed and derived security requirements that have to be
met to implement multilaterally secure auditing functionalities in Section 2.4.4. We
consider multilateral security in the sense that we take into account security and
privacy requirements of users, organizations and law enforcement agencies, as well.
Our goal is to achieve a fair balance of privacy protection and accountability.
A "classical" principle for balancing privacy protection and accountability is due
to Chaum [45]: the given privacy protection of a user shall be revoked in case a mis-
use has been detected. On a technical level, this may mean that a certain threshold
has been exceeded. A primary application example is that of e-cash: the user re-
mains initially private, when spending her electronic coins in a legitimate way. Yet,
in case she tries to illegally spend coins multiple times (which is possible since coins
are represented as mere digital information), her true identity shall be disclosed and
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the misuse be made obvious by authorized parties1. Yet, distinguishing between le-
gitimate and illegal or malicious actions is more difficult in different applications.
In our setting, the basic privacy protection can be implemented due to the use
of pseudonyms in the location tracking. Pseudonyms are identifier of entities that
are used instead of the entities’ real-world names. Pseudonyms then also imple-
ment the central reference point to evidence stored in an audit log. Consequently,
following this approach requires that auditing functionalities are compatible with
pseudonymized log data.
Making use of pseudonyms allows reconciling privacy protection and account-
ability in audit logs [67, 71] to a certain extent. Pseudonymous auditing was first
proposed by Fischer-Hübner in [69]. In recent work [71], the following principles
are considered for achieving a fair balance:
1. Pseudonymized entries of a log and thus pseudonymized entities can be made
accountable again. This is called re-identification or disclosure of pseudonyms.
Technically, the disclosure of pseudonyms requires to make use of the pseudo-
nym-to-identity-mapping.
2. The disclosure capability should be controlled, i.e. only authorized parties
shall be able to re-identify entities. Also, it should adhere to a priori specified
purposes and rules. In this thesis, we denote such a specification as disclosure
policy.
In this thesis, we have defined a more extensive set of requirements to fairly bal-
ance privacy protection and accountability. Additionally, re-identification shall only
be possible in a cooperative manner and proceed stepwise. Also, affected users shall
further be supported by enabling individual log access and transparency to recon-
cile security interests. Thus, a main challenge is to implement a selective control
on the pseudonym-to-identity mapping, i.e. a flexible control functionality regard-
ing the pseudonym linkability. Viewed differently, it is our aim to provide certain
degrees of pseudonym linkability for users, organizations as well as authorities.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no approach to auditing described in the
literature that meets all of our requirements. However, there are existing approaches
and security mechanisms that partly address our research questions. In particular,
we next discuss
• relevant properties and the constructions of digital pseudonyms,
• location privacy protection based on pseudonyms,
• approaches to pseudonymous auditing,
Our discussion starts with properties of pseudonyms in order to put forward our
line of argumentation.
1Arguing about parties that are authorized to disclose identities in case of detected misuse leads to
a further question: who should be authorized for such kind of capability? Possibly, parties with a
legal or organizational mandate are candidates for this task, yet it depends on the application.
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Figure 3.1: Classiﬁcation of pseudonyms according to [178]
3.2.1 Relevant Properties of Digital Pseudonyms
Historically, the term pseudonymous relates to the Greek word pseudonymos, which
means having a false name [68]. In a technical sense, a digital pseudonym2 is an
identifier of an entity that is used instead of the entitys real-world name [175].
Pseudonymity is the use of pseudonyms as identifiers.
Chaum [43] introduced digital pseudonyms as a basic tool for privacy protection
in computing systems. Since a pseudonym replaces identity-related information,
it firsthand implements unlinkability between a real-world identity and a pseudo-
nymized identity. In a computing system, a user can act among one or multiple
pseudonyms in digital transactions, e.g. in order to use a digital resource or service
without disclosing her identity. In recent years, a rich scientific background has
evolved [175] and several types of pseudonyms and fields of applications have been
identified.
Pseudonyms can be classified according to the degree of protection provided by
them, which is also given in Figure 3.1. The degree of protection manifests by
the unlinkability to a given user. Main types of pseudonyms3 that can be clas-
sified are person pseudonyms, role pseudonyms and transaction pseudonyms. A per-
son pseudonym is a substitute for a person’s name and represents the user’s civil
identity. Role pseudonyms are used for specific applications or tasks. Transaction
pseudonyms are pseudonyms that are only used in a single transaction. Thus, in
the literature, transaction pseudonyms are sometimes also denoted as short-lived
pseudonyms or simply as changing pseudonyms.
The provided degree of unlinkability and thus anonymity is stronger, the more of-
ten pseudonyms are changed over time. Thus, anonymity is highest for transaction
pseudonyms,
2For simplicity, we consider pseudonym as synonym to digital pseudonym.
3For more details see [175]. In [175], also further classes of pseudonyms that are not relevant to this
thesis are described.
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Furthermore, pseudonyms can classified depending on how and by whom given
pseudonyms can be re-translated into the user’s identity (by making use of the
pseudonym-to-identity-mapping). This is also captured in the notion of linkable
pseudonyms [19]. Technically, enabling such a mapping requires that a pseudonym
additionally encodes some kind of or is associated to trapdoor information, to en-
able attribution of pseudonyms to real-world identities. According to [67], major
types of pseudonyms are:
• Reference pseudonyms: In a simple case, a (non-changing) pseudonym can be
mapped back to an identity based on existing reference information, e.g. if
issued public keys are used as pseudonyms. Access to the referencing regis-
tration information then limits pseudonym disclosure.
• Self-generated pseudonyms: In case that pseudonyms are only generated by the
user herself and no reference is stored together with identities, only the user
herself can link a pseudonym, e.g. based on secret information. A self-chosen
nickname is a simple example.
• Cryptographic pseudonyms: Given that pseudonyms are constructed by apply-
ing a cryptographic function to identity-related information, the function itself
and possibly further input parameters control the re-identification. In case of
relying on encryption functions, e.g. the keys that enable decryption have to
be known.
Cryptographic pseudonyms have been applied and are key building blocks to
implement pseudonymous auditing functionalities [67]. We discuss applications
of pseudonyms for location privacy protection in the next section, in order to con-
vey the protection granted by pseudonyms. Then, we review existing approaches
to pseudonymous auditing. Finally, we investigate relevant approaches to crypto-
graphic transactions pseudonyms w.r.t. their suitability as possible building blocks
for multilaterally secure auditing. Where applicable, security requirements that are
addressed (+) / not addressed (-) / partially addressed (◦) are marked.
3.2.2 Location Privacy Protection based on Pseudonyms
In the context of location tracking systems and pervasive computing, pseudonyms
have been proposed as one of the basic means for location privacy protection. None
of the following approaches considers all our requirements. Thus, we will mark
requirements that are satisfied in order to refer to the relevant aspects of a certain
approach.
In a traditional direction of research, pseudonyms are used to protect against
an adversary that tries to link transactions and users in order to construct move-
ment profiles and comprehensive user traces (SReqA1: +). In early work, Kesdo-
gan et al. [131] proposed to use short-lived pseudonyms in mobile GSM networks
(SReqA1: +). Beresford et al. [15] combined the use of changing pseudonyms
with a geographic abstraction of mixnets, to form so called mix-zones. For users
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of location-based services, a mix-zone is a region without service use, in which the
actual pseudonym change is done, to hinder profiling (SReqA4: +). Recent follow
up work [78] addresses non-cooperative location privacy models and evaluates the
effect of unsynchronized pseudonym changes on the degree of anonymity achieved
(SReqA4: +).
A different use of pseudonyms is presented by Delakouridis et al. [53, 149, 150],
applying pseudonyms to the problem of securely storing and accessing location
information in a privacy-preserving, decentralized manner (SReqA2: +). The au-
thors propose to use pseudonyms as reference points for data access, and to addi-
tionally split the location information to be protected according to Shamir secret
sharing [202], and to distribute those shares on several servers, addressable via
pseudonyms.
Jorns et al. [122, 123] describe a further approach for location privacy protec-
tion based on transaction pseudonyms (SReqA1: +). The authors propose to cre-
ate pseudonyms via iterative hashing. Differently from our goals, the focus of this
work is to realize privacy-respecting authentication mechanisms for the access of
location-based services.
3.2.3 Pseudonymous Auditing
Pseudonymous auditing refers to the analysis of audit logs4 that contain pseudo-
nymized entries. It is now a widely recognized approach to balance the conflicting
security requirements of accountability and privacy protection to a certain extend.
The manual analysis itself, which is employed to derive evidences about the oc-
currence or non-occurrence of misuse documented by the log5, is often denoted as
audit.
In contrast to this kind of manual ex-post process, an automatic analysis of logs
during run time is called intrusion detection. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are
often considered in combination with audit logs. A broad discussion on intrusion
detection systems is given by Flegel [71]. Typically, IDS approaches do not consider
(at least) the individual access requirement (SReqA2: -); a distribution of powers is
mostly only partially addressed (SReqA5: ◦). In the present discussion, we will also
consider IDS approaches that are applicable to our setting. This discussion helps
the reader trace the historical evolution of concepts.
Early IDS approaches and implementations that targeted pseudonymous audit-
ing were presented in the seminal work of Fischer-Hübner et al. [69, 66].
In [210], Sobirey et al. present an approach that makes use of symmetric encryp-
tion for pseudonymization. Here, secret keys are updated in regular intervals to
produce some degree of linkability w.r.t. pseudonyms. The approach could be ex-
tended to a distribution of powers (SReqA5: ◦), e.g. by secret sharing the secret key
in use [67].
4In some literature, the term audit trail is used interchangeable to audit log.
5We restrict our discussion concerning the use of logs to the context of accountability.
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Figure 3.2: Pseudonymous operating system auditing according to [209, 67]
An overview of the follow-up approach of Sobirey et al. [208, 209] is shown
in Figure 3.2, to depict a common approach to pseudonymous auditing. It is de-
scribed within the context of operating system auditing. It proposes the three basic
steps of the creation of pseudonymous audit data (which is in some work also re-
ferred to as logging), the audit log analysis and the consecutive re-identification.
In this approach, the pseudonymization takes only place after transactions, such
that data minimization is only partially supported (SReqA1: ◦). Also, individual
access (SReqA2: -), partial re-identification (SReqA4: -), distribution of powers and
transparency (SReq6: -) are not considered.
Biskup and Flegel propose to use transaction pseudonyms [20, 71] in audit logs
as well as a method for the re-identification [19, 71] based on secret sharing [202].
The aim of the approach is to model the concept of initial suspicions that lead to
the disclosure of pseudonyms, in case a threshold of detected actions of possible
misuse is exceeded in the log analysis. Technically, pseudonyms are represented as
shares of a secret that relates to a users identity. The approach allows for a fine-
grained pseudonymization of logs while the analysis provides a higher degree of
privacy protection than previous approaches. Yet, mechanisms for individual access
(SReqA2: -), distribution of powers (SReqA5: -) and transparency (SReqA6: -) are
not described.
Differently, Shen et al. [204] describe an approach that focuses on the distribu-
tion of powers (SReq5A: +). The authors propose mechanisms based on variants
of secure multiparty computation techniques [248]. Here, the focus is on realiz-
ing privacy-preserving query mechanisms for analyzing a log without explicitly
considering the concept of pseudonyms. Also, mechanisms for individual access
(SReqA2: -), partial re-identification (SReqA4: -) and transparency (SReqA6: -) are
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not addressed.
In [99, 100], Hedbom et al. introduce concepts that are applicable to privacy-
respecting transparency logs (SReqA6: +). This work complements existing propos-
als to pseudonymous auditing, yet the authors do not describe a fully integrated
approach which addresses auditing and transparency.
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Fischer-Hübner [69, 66] ◦ - + - ◦ - ◦
Sobirey et al. [210, 208, 209] ◦ - + - ◦ - ◦
Biskup and Flegel [19, 20, 71] ◦ - + + ◦ - ◦
Shen et al. [204] ◦ + + + + - -
Hedbom et al. [99, 100] ◦ ◦ + - - + -
Table 3.1: Approaches to pseudonymous auditing
In Table 3.1, an overview of the discussed state of the art approaches to pseudony-
mous auditing and the addressed security requirements is given. Within the table,
we use the same notation as before (requirement addressed: + / not addressed: - /
partially addressed: ◦ ).
None of the existing proposals addresses all the listed requirements.
3.2.4 Eﬃcient Constructions of Transaction Pseudonyms
From the discussion of existing approaches to pseudonymous auditing, we con-
clude that the underlying pseudonym construction has a major impact on the pro-
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vided flexibility of the re-identification of pseudonymized users. In the following,
we will investigate prominent constructions of transaction pseudonyms w.r.t. their
applicability for our auditing setting. Hereby, we focus on approaches that are con-
sidered computationally efficient, since we target a use on resource-constrained mo-
bile device. Such efficient approaches have e.g. been proposed in and applied to the
area of RFID systems.
Several authors propose to use the output of hash functions as transaction pseu-
donyms. In this context, Henrici et al. [104] propose the so-called hash-based ID
variation approach, which in fact means a hash-based construction of transaction
pseudonyms. Since the scheme makes also use of session numbers, it requires an
initial synchronization with the backend side. The backend also triggers the change
of pseudonyms, making it unpractical for our setting, since we require a random
access facility for the log analysis. Ohkubo et al [166, 167] and Gruteser et al. [92]
propose to use a different constructions called hash-chains, to construct short-lived
pseudonyms. Here, the client itself changes the transaction pseudonym by deriv-
ing it (via hashing) from a hash chain, i.e. an iterated application of a hash on a
base identifier. A main drawback is the computational load for the backend, which
basically also has to execute hash iterations on all stored reference identifiers. This
leads to some sort of brute force search in order to authenticate (or thus re-identify)
a pseudonym. Advancements and combinations of the approaches are discussed in
[105].
A common property of such schemes is that different outputs (given a suitable
hash function) are pseudorandom and thus unlinkable. Also, since hash-functions
are one-way, the encoded identity is protected in the output. Yet, this class of con-
structions does thus far not support a partial re-identification (SReqA4: -). Also,
mechanisms for a distribution of power (SReqA5: -) are not described.
A different approach to efficiently derive transaction pseudonyms is proposed
by Juels et al. [125]. This work makes use of ElGamal encryption. Transaction
pseudonyms are derived by updating random factors in re-encryption operations.
Here, unlinkability and identity protection stems from the semantic security prop-
erty of ElGamal encryption. The approach supports law enforcement (SReqA7: +),
yet, no mechanisms for a partial re-identification (SReqA4: -) are described. Since it
employs a public key encryption, the ciphertexts and thus the pseudonyms exhibit
some kind of underlying algebraic structure, which could be harnessed to devise
extended linkability mechanisms. Also, a distribution of powers could by achieved
by secret sharing the private key, which makes this approach a candidate building
block for multilaterally secure auditing.
3.2.5 Conclusion
In the last sections, we have reviewed the state of the art of existing approach to-
wards the realization of multilaterally secure auditing. This included discussions of
suitable pseudonym constructions, location privacy protection via pseudonyms as
well as an investigation of existing approaches to pseudonymous auditing. None of
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the presented approaches has satisfied all our requirements.
However, the existing work provides insights in designing suitable mechanisms.
In particular, pseudonyms can implement main reference points to the detection of
evidence inside a log. In addition, transaction pseudonyms can provide the highest
degree of privacy protection. A key challenge is thus to devise a flexible approach
to linkable transaction pseudonyms, which can support users, organizations and
law enforcement authorities. We identified re-encryption-based pseudonyms as a
relevant base construction that we will consider for further advancements.
So far, the existing auditing concepts were applied within traditional computer
security applications like operating system audit logs. In our work, we aim to ex-
tend the application perspective also to real-world audit logs, which emerge from
location tracking applications6. A further challenge is thus to conceptualize audit-
ing mechanisms that are suitable for our novel real-world application scenario.
3.3 Towards End-to-End Secure Pervasive Communication
Communication technologies already have become an integral part of our modern
information society. Personal communication devices, as forerunners of pervasive
computing, enable locally distributed users to participate in communication con-
texts of everyday’s life and work. In some application scenarios, communication
technologies even constitute a critical service: considering e.g. the case of a sud-
den emergency, efficient communication support can mean the difference between
success and failure of rescue missions, possibly between life and death of affected
persons and between the loss and safeguard of infrastructure and property. Thus,
efficient emergency communication is of high practical importance, but has specific
challenges: unpredictable local emergency situations harden the establishment of
communication structures, legal requirements dictate the use of end-to-end secure
and documentable approaches, while end users demand ease-of-use and possibly
location privacy protection.
In our work, we use the setting of emergency communication as a kind of de-
scriptive worst-case-application-scenario with special demands. In Section 2.4.2, we
described major characteristics of emergency communications. Especially, a mech-
anism is required that enables one-to-many communication with mobile and pos-
sibly unknown and thus nameless receivers, that may also locally form dynamic
groups. Additionally, end-to-end encryption for the communication is legally im-
plied, which constitutes an additional challenge.
However, the targeted type of communication is also relevant to further perva-
sive computing settings beyond first response, e.g. in vehicular ad-hoc networks
(VANETs) [110] or Future Internet settings [238].
To the best of our knowledge, there is no approach to communication described
in the literature that meets all of our requirements. However, there are existing
6In [219], the application of accountability concepts to comparable settings is denoted as accountabil-
ity of presence.
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approaches and security mechanisms that partly address our research questions. In
particular, we discuss
• approaches to secure one-to-many messaging,
• techniques for achieving end-to-end encryption.
Our discussion starts with a review of existing approaches to one-to-may mes-
saging. Within this discussion, we also sketch the employed security mechanisms.
Yet, a more detailed consideration of the issue of end-to-end encryption follows in
Section 3.3.2.
3.3.1 Approaches to Secure One-to-Many Messaging
Work on secure one-to-many messaging started with the introduction of secure role-
based messaging [42, 160]. The scheme of Chadwick et al. [42] allows specifying the
recipients of a message based on a single organizational role. It employs traditional
public key infrastructure (PKI) [154] and role-based access control (RBAC) [193]
mechanisms, but does not provide end-to-end encryption suitable to our setting
(SReqC2: ◦), since a trusted entity is required for each message decryption. Issues
related to resource-constrained devices are not addressed (SReqC6: ◦).
The proposal of Mont et al. [160] allows combining several roles in order to form
a logical policy for recipient selection. The messaging scheme harnesses identity-
based encryption [86], such that logical policies are mapped to a single crypto-
graphic keys. Furthermore as a main drawback, it requires frequent interactions
with an online private key generator (PKG) in order to receive message decryption
keys (SReqC2: ◦). The authors focus on the security mechanisms for receivers, thus
they do not address sender non-repudiation (SReqC4: -).
In the work of Karabulut et al. [127], a one-to-many messaging service that pro-
vides end-to-end confidentiality is described. This approach harnesses IBE and also
requires an online PKG (SReqC2: ◦). The focus of this work is to achieve an in-
tegration of mobile devices into an enterprise system. In the messaging, only a
single attribute is considered. Requirements related to privacy protection are not
addressed (SReqC8: -).
In Bobba et al.’s approach, [23], the concept of attribute-based messaging is intro-
duced. ABM allows logically specifying the group of receivers of a message in form
of a flexible combination of attributes. ABM can be seen as a generalization of role-
based messaging. Bobba et al.’s approach builds on attribute-based access control
(ABAC) [249] as main security mechanism and thus does not provide end-to-end
encryption at all (SReqC2: -).
After the introduction of attribute-based encryption (ABE) techniques [192, 90,
181], which provide mechanisms for fine-grained cryptographic access control, end-
to-end encrypted attribute-based messaging schemes [232, 24] were proposed.
Both schemes employ ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) [17],
which allows for a flexible cryptographic encoding of sending policies. Especially,
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[24] extends the earlier work of Bobba et al. [23], by integrating encryption into
ABAC mechanisms, but addressed neither the handling of continuous dynamic
attributes like location (CP1: -) nor the requirements related to mobile receivers
(SReqC6: ◦).
Generally, the application of ABE enables a flexible specification of receivers and
content by means of multiple attributes. Yet, due to the inherent use of computa-
tionally demanding pairing-based cryptography, the practical applicability of ABE
concepts in scenarios with mobile and resource-constrained devices remains highly
challenging.
The approach reported in [232] is part of the research presented in this thesis. It
contains a proposal of an attribute-based messaging scheme and system for emer-
gency communication. While it was limited w.r.t. handling continuous dynamic
attributes as selectors, handling replay attacks (SReqC3: -) and issues related to
ease-of-use (SReqC7: -), a prototype was used to initiate discussions with real users,
enabling a cognitive walkthrough7[21] of emergency communication scenarios.
In a different line of research, Mayrhofer et al. [155] describe a one-to-many mes-
saging approach that also considers location addressing (CP1: +) and some sort of
location privacy protection (SReqC8: +). However, it is tailored for applications
scenarios that do not require end-to-end encryption (SReqC2: -).
In Table 3.2, an overview of the discussed state of the art approaches to secure
one-to-many messaging and the addressed security requirements is given. Within
the table, we use the same notation as before (requirement addressed: + / not ad-
dressed: - / partially addressed: ◦ ).
None of the existing proposals addresses all the listed requirements.
3.3.2 Techniques for End-to-End Encryption
The discussion of approaches for secure one-to-many messaging identified that a
flexible combination of attributes is a considered as an appropriate means for the
selection of receivers that are unknown by identity. However, enforcing end-to-end
confidentiality in such settings is challenging.
Firsthand, attribute-based messaging is usually implemented by some form of
access control mechanism, which allows securing the information in transmission.
Only user who can access the content of a message are considered as readers. For
wireless transmission, as found in our reference scenario, access control mecha-
nisms that do not rely on encryption are not suitable.
In the following, we review existing techniques that can be used to implement
end-to-end encryption. As already partly mentioned in the last section, end-to-end
secure communication can be implemented based on
• Symmetric Encryption
7A cognitive walkthrough, an usability evaluation method, builds on practical user experiments
with a system. This helped to understand how real users interact by and with an emergency
communication system. Findings contributed to Section 2.4.2 and Section 7.3.2.
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Chadwick et al. [42] + ◦ ◦ + - - + ◦ ◦
Mont et al. [160] + ◦ ◦ - - - + ◦ -
Karabulut et al. [127] + ◦ + + - + - - ◦
Bobba et al. [23] + - + + + ◦ ◦ - ◦
Bobba et al. [24] + + + + + ◦ ◦ - ◦
Weber [232] + + - - - + - + ◦
Mayrhofer et al. [155] ◦ - ◦ ◦ - + - + +
Table 3.2: Approaches to secure one-to-many messaging
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Figure 3.3: Principle of symmetric encryption according to [41]
• Asymmetric Encryption
• Identity-based Encryption
• Attribute-based Encryption
We discuss these approaches next.
In a large-scale or distributed setting, traditional cryptographic constructions suf-
fer from key distribution problems (symmetric encryption) or problems related to
the efficiency of encryption operations (asymmetric encryption).
Figure 3.3 depicts the basic approach how symmetric encryption can be applied to
achieve secure communication. The main drawback is that a symmetric key has to
be distributed between any relevant combination of senders and recipients. In case
the group of recipients is not known when a message is send out, this approach is
not applicable.
Figure 3.4 illustrates how public key encryption can solve the key distribution
problem of symmetric encryption. Here, instead of using a single symmetric key
for both encryption and decryption, a pair of keys is used. It consists of a public key
and a private key. By publishing the public keys of all possible recipients, a sender
can send encrypted messages. Yet, this approach does not consider one-to-many
settings. Also, operations of asymmetric encryption are more resource demanding
than symmetric ones. Therefore, both concepts alone do not fit well in our setting.
Identity-based encryption, which is a certificateless alternative to public key en-
cryption, allows encrypting messages under textual strings, instead of public keys.
Such a string originally refers to the identity of a recipient. This is also shown in
overview in Figure 3.5. However, this approach requires a complete list of all in-
tended receivers. This allows realizing encryption that is partly suitable for one-to-
many settings, by describing a group by a single textual string.
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Figure 3.4: Principle of asymmetric encryption according to [41]
Yet, we seek to employ an encryption technique that is able to handle more ex-
pressive messaging policies, which may translate to and thus support the concept
of attribute-based messaging more directly.
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a natural candidate building block for this
setting: here, groups of recipients can be selected in an elegant way, by specifying
combinations of descriptive attributes. Especially, ABE is a generalization of IBE. In
fact, the first variant was described as fuzzy identity-based encryption [192].
Yet, current ABE proposals lack an efficient way of handling dynamic attributes.
One common way is to add an expiration date to attributes as revocation mecha-
nism, as proposed by Bethencourt et al. [17]. Yet, this is not applicable to attributes
that change in an unpredictable manner, as in the case of location attributes, where
attributes additionally have a continuous range of values.
3.3.3 Conclusion
In the last sections, we have reviewed the state of the art of existing approach to-
wards the realization of end-to-end secure group communications suitable for per-
vasive settings.
This review included a discussion of approaches to secure one-to-many messag-
ing and techniques for achieving the required end-to-end encryption. None of the
presented approaches has satisfied all our requirements.
However, we identified the concept of attribute-based messaging (ABM) as com-
munication approach that is suitable to our setting. Existing ABM approaches har-
ness ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption for achieving end-to-end confi-
dentiality. Our setting requires taking into account also continuous dynamic at-
tributes, which is currently not supported by existing ABE techniques.
Beyond developing encryption techniques that support dynamic attributes, a main
scientific challenge is to devise an attribute-based messaging concept that is suit-
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Figure 3.5: Principle of identity-based cryptography according to [41]
able to our setting. In particular, end-to-end encryption has to meet the resource
constraints of mobile devices.
3.4 Summary
This thesis aims to support multilaterally secure pervasive cooperations, especially
w.r.t. the two main system functionalities of real-world auditing and secure per-
vasive one-to-many communication. This chapter reviewed the state of the art of
security mechanisms found in the the research literature, which can be applied to
our setting.
Our discussion of the state of the art lead to insights on how to design the required
functionalities in a secure way. Also the shortcomings of existing proposals were
identified. In particular, no existing approach satisfied all our requirements.
The first part of our state of the art review analyzed how to achieve a fair balance
of privacy protection and accountability. We identified pseudonym constructions
that provide flexible degrees of linkability for users, organizations and law enforce-
ment authorities as major building block for the realization of multilaterally secure
auditing mechanisms. In particular, re-encryption-based transaction pseudonyms
will further be considered in the next chapter.
The second part of our investigation focused on enabling end-to-end secure com-
munication with mobile entities that are unknown by identity. We identified attribute-
based messaging as the candidate communication mechanism for our setting. The
required end-to-end encryption can potentially be addressed by means of attribute-
based encryption techniques. However, resource constraints of mobile devices have
to be met and the handling of continuous dynamic attributes has to be supported.
4Novel Security Techniques
In this chapter, we describe two novel security techniques which overcome identi-
fied limitations of current state-of-the-art techniques (cf. Chapter 3). They constitute
important building blocks for the realization of our approach to multilaterally se-
cure pervasive cooperation. In particular, we introduce:
• pseudonyms with implicit attributes, a novel method to realize multilevel link-
able transaction pseudonyms,
• a hybrid encryption technique for expressive policies; this novel encryption tech-
nique may handle static attributes and continuous dynamic attributes in com-
bination as part of conjunctive encryption policies.
In later parts of this thesis, we show that pseudonyms with implicit attributes
support balancing privacy protection and accountability. We describe this in the
context of real-world auditing. The novel encryption technique is a key mecha-
nism for realizing end-to-end security within our messaging mechanisms. Beyond
this instantiation, both techniques have further applications, which will later be dis-
cussed in Section 7.4.
In the description of both techniques, we refer to the term attribute. In this work,
attributes represent properties of users and are thus parts of digital identities of
users (cf. Section 6.2.1). However, it is important to note that we introduce two dif-
ferent techniques that digitally handle specific properties of users by means of at-
tributes. In Chapter 5 and in Chapter 6, we will describe how these two approaches
can be combined in order to support a multilaterally secure pervasive cooperation.
This chapter is structured as follows: Firstly, we introduce the basics of pseudo-
nyms with implicit attributes in Section 4.1. We describe the construction, which
harnesses threshold ElGamal encryption, pseudo-random number generators and
secure multiparty computation mechanisms to establish several levels of linkability
between a pseudonym and its holder. Details on the setting and the main protocols
are introduced in Section 4.2. Then, in Section 4.3, we introduce a novel hybrid
encryption technique which is able to handle expressive encryption policies. This
technique is based on an efficient combination of attribute-based encryption and
location-based encryption techniques. The setting and main concepts are described
in Section 4.4. The chapter is concluded in Section 4.5.
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4.1 Pseudonyms with Implicit Attributes
In this section, we describe how to construct pseudonyms with implicit attributes, a
novel approach for realizing multilevel linkable transaction pseudonyms. While
a transaction pseudonym provides statistical unlinkability to further pseudonyms
created by the same user, multilevel linkability refers to a controlled capability to
make pseudonymous users accountable again in several levels of re-identification.
In order to achieve these seemingly conflicting properties, pseudonyms with im-
plicit attributes encode specific access informations that allow defining and enforc-
ing security policies (cf. Section 2.4.6) on transaction pseudonyms:
• users are empowered to authenticate own pseudonyms after use,
• authorized parties may cooperatively re-identify pseudonyms in multiple lev-
els of granularity, i.e. link them to attributes that are only implicitly associated
with pseudonyms due to specific registration information,
• an (optional) law enforcement authority may completely disclose every trans-
action pseudonym.
Our approach builds on and extends earlier work of Juels and Pappu [125], which
proposed encryption-based transaction pseudonyms (cf. Section 3.2.4). In existing
work, a controlled linkability is usually limited to law enforcement or does neither
consider a stepwise nor a cooperative re-identification. The next section introduces
the proposed construction principle, followed by a description of the main primi-
tives than we build upon. Then, the mechanisms are explained in detail.
4.1.1 Construction Principle
As discussed in Section 3, pseudonyms implement central reference points w.r.t. the
handling of access to personal data in pervasive systems. Thus, pseudonyms can
allow balancing conflicting accountability and privacy requirements to some extent.
Since a pseudonym is an identifier of an entity that is used instead of the real-world
name of the entity, it implements a certain degree of unlinkability and thus pri-
vacy protection. By using the identifier-to-pseudonym-mapping, a re-identification
of entities’ real world names is possible; thus making pseudonymized entities ac-
countable again. Hence, a fair balance of interests depends on the provided degrees
of (un-)linkability implemented by a pseudonym and by controlling who can use
the pseudonym-to-identity-mapping.
Existing types of pseudonyms (reference pseudonyms, self-generated pseudonyms
and cryptographic pseudonyms (cf. Section 3.2.1)) allow constructing particular
forms of pseudonym linkability. We strive for a construction that integrates all these
different levels of linkability. Thus, we propose to combine useful properties of ev-
ery of this types.
It is known that techniques from the area of secure multiparty computation (SMPC)
can theoretically be applied to a large range of problems in the area of privacy-
preserving data analysis and in the construction of privacy-preserving protocols
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[106, 142]. Basically, SMPC mechanisms [248] allow implementing multiparty pro-
tocols that do not rely on a single trusted third party (TTP). The intention of these
cryptographic techniques is that a number of distinct, but connected parties may
jointly compute an agreed function of their inputs in a secure way. Hereby, the
correctness of the output as well as the privacy of each input shall be preserved,
even if some participants cheat. Thus, secure multiparty computation is a general
approach to distribute the functionality and powers of a single TTP among several
parties1. In most SMPC approaches, this is only achieved with very high compu-
tational costs [142], due to the intensive use of secret sharing [202] and operations
on secret shared data in SMPC protocols. Yet, more efficient special purpose ap-
proaches to SMPC have been proposed. E.g. in the mix-and-match approach [118],
secret sharing techniques are replaced by operations on encrypted data. We exploit this
capability in our proposal.
Hereby, we follow basic ideas of the mix-and-match approach. We formulate the
pseudonym generation in terms of specific non-deterministic encryption operations.
Since the encryption is non-deterministic, this allows deriving multiple transac-
tion pseudonyms by updating the inherent random factors. Also, this enables us
to apply efficient concepts from the mix-and-match framework in order to realize
privacy-respecting data analysis functionalities on the pseudonym level. Especially,
we realize the mechanisms for multilevel linkability of pseudonyms based on ex-
tended mix-and-match concepts.
Additionally, we propose to make use of cryptographically secure pseudo ran-
dom number generators [133] in order to control random factors inside the encryp-
tion operations. This allows implementing a further direct pseudonym-to-identity-
mapping, that can be exploited by a user, in order to authenticate pseudonyms that
relate to herself.
4.1.2 Main Primitives
Having introduced the construction principle, in this section, we briefly describe
the main primitives that are employed in order to implement the pseudonyms with
implicit attributes approach.
Cryptographically Secure PRNGs
A pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) [133] is a deterministic algorithm that
generates sequences of numbers that appear random. In order to achieve this, a
PRNG incorporates an internal source of entropy, which is called a seed, for deriv-
ing and computing the output. A cryptographically secure PRNG is a special kind
of PRNG that produces sequences of numbers with stronger security requirements:
it is practically impossible to guess or derive any forward or backward numbers by
1A classic example of SMPC is the millionaires’ problem due to Yao [248]: some millionaires (the
parties) want to find out, who is the richest (agreed function) without revealing the precise amount
of their individual wealth (input privacy).
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analyzing the output of a cryptographically secure PRNG. Therefore, such a PRNG
is suitable for cryptographic purposes. Our constructions actually employ cryp-
tographically secure PRNGs. For simplicity, we often refer to this tool simply as
PRNG.
Threshold ElGamal Cryptosystem
A key primitive in our approach is the ElGamal cryptosystem [60], over subgroups
Gq of order q of the multiplicative group Z∗p, for large primes p = 2q + 1. The
primes p, q and a generator g of Gq are common system parameters. ElGamal en-
cryption is semantically secure in Gq, under certain complexity assumptions [222].
Practically, semantic security means that no partial information about a plaintext is
leaking from the corresponding ciphertext. Thus, an adversary can neither recover
any information about the plaintext from the ciphertext, nor distinguish whether a
ciphertext is the encryption of a known plaintext or not.
More specifically, we utilize a threshold variant of the ElGamal cryptosystem, ac-
cording to Pedersen [172, 173], which allows distributing cryptographic operations.
It thus supports distributability of powers. In this threshold system, an ElGamal
private key s ∈R Zq can be defined in two ways2:
• Firstly, it can be initially generated by a trusted dealer and then be secret
shared (according to Shamir secret sharing [202]) among all n participating
authorities.
• Secondly, it can be generated via the distributed key generation protocol of
Pedersen [172]3, whereby no single party knows the complete private key.
In both key generation approaches, the power to decrypt is distributed among all of
the participating authorities. A quorum, i.e. a minimal majority of t out of n author-
ities need to cooperate to perform a threshold decryption protocol, as specified in
[172, 173]. Thus, a threshold ElGamal system can tolerate a maximum of t− 1 cor-
rupt authorities, yet still requires a majority of t participating authorities. The total
number of authorities n has to be (at least) n = t− 1+ t = 2t− 1, so t− 1 is a minor-
ity of authorities. The authorities share a common public key, h = gs mod p. In this
ElGamal setting, a message m ∈ Gq is non-deterministically encrypted by choosing
r ∈R Zq and by computing (gr, hrm). Messages that are not in Gq can efficiently be
mapped onto Gq [118]. Thus, arbitrary strings can be ElGamal encrypted.
Since different parties cooperate within distributed protocols, there is a need for
a communication channel and a synchronization of individual inputs. Following
the standard assumption in the literature, we assume that the communication chan-
nel is a broadcast channel with memory. This channel, which is also referred to
as bulletin board, is used to store, exchange and synchronize inputs in any proto-
col that involves distributed computations. For example, partial decryptions and
2In the key generation, the private key is chosen at random.
3Or using alternative protocols for the same task, e.g. according to Gennaro et al. [84, 85].
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identifiers of every participating authority are provided to the bulletin board in a
threshold decryption. Moreover, this broadcast channel is append-only, i.e. once the
information is published, it is stored and cannot be changed or deleted afterwards.
Thus, its content can later be analyzed to support audit and verifiability purposes.
The ElGamal system parameters p, q, g and the public key h as well the mentioned
communication channel are also relevant and available to the following primitives,
i.e. non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, plaintext equality tests and ElGamal
reencryption mixnets.
Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge Proofs
Zero knowledge proofs (ZKPs) [87] are basically generalized challenge-response au-
thentication protocols which are used to guarantee correctness of and verify partic-
ipation in distributed cryptographic operations and protocols. A special feature of
ZKPs is that they disclose no further information beyond that a statement is true.
Non-interactive zero knowledge proofs (NIZKPs) [22] are variants which allow ren-
dering the challenge-response process non-interactive, i.e. they can be executed by
a single party. This is achieved by applying the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [64] and thus
produces transcripts of the NIZKPs. See e.g. [51] for a broader discussions of zero
knowledge techniques. A NIZKP it thus comparable to a digital signature, it can be
stored and may also be verified, after its execution. Thus, incorrect or inappropriate
actions can be deduced by assessing the transcripts. NIZKPs are a common cryp-
tographic approach to implement auditability4. They are involved in some of the
distributed cryptographic operations in order to assure that only correct inputs of
individual parties are considered for computing a function. It is important to notice
that zero knowledge techniques are integral parts of many protocols, yet, we mostly
abstract from details throughout this thesis.
Plaintext Equality Tests
A plaintext equality test (PET) [118] is a primitive for pairwise blind comparison
of ciphertexts of non-deterministic threshold cryptosystems like ElGamal. A PET
allows testing whether two ciphertexts represent the same plaintext by performing
algebraic operations on ciphertexts, but without revealing the plaintext. Plaintext
equality tests exploit properties of the algebraic division of two ciphertexts, which
is introduced next:
Let (x1, y1) = (gr1 , hr1 m1) and (x2, y2) = (gr2 , hr2 m2) be two ElGamal ciphertexts
with plaintexts m1 and m2. In case that m1 and m2 are equal, the algebraic divi-
sion of both, (x3, y3) = (x1/x2, y1/y2) = (gr1−r2 , hr1−r2 m1/m2) = (gr3 , hr3 m3) is an
encryption of 1, since m1/m2 = m3 = 1.
In a PET, the ciphertext (x3, y3) is firstly blinded by raising each component to a
random exponent z ∈ Zq , (x4, y4) = (xz3, yz3) = (gr3z, hr3zmz3), and then decrypted to
the blinded value, mz3. The decryption reveals m
z
3 = 1
z = 1 in case that the plaintexts
4In research dealing with cryptographic protocols, this is often referred to as verifiability.
56 4 Novel Security Techniques
Figure 4.1: Distributed computations and bulletin board
are equal and a random integer (m1/m2)
z otherwise5. Due to this, only negligible
information beyond whether the plaintexts are equal is leaking due to the execution
of the protocol. In order to prevent misuse of the power to decrypt, PETs can be
performed in a distributed setting, i.e. harnessing a threshold ElGamal system. In
this case, blinding and decryption are realized as distributed operations.
PETs and applications thereof are key primitives to implement multilevel linka-
bility of transaction pseudonyms.
Figure 4.1 shows the interplay of the primitives relevant to distributed (threshold)
computations and operations. Every authority submits the result of her partial op-
eration to the bulletin board, accompanied by a NIZKP. After verifying the proofs,
the bulletin board combines the inputs in order to produce the result of the opera-
tion, e.g. the result of a PET or a threshold decryption.
ElGamal Reencryption Mixnets
A mixnet, originally introduced by Chaum [43], is a primitive that can be used to
anonymize sets of ciphertexts by a set of mix servers. Together, the mix servers
form the mixnet. In our work, we build on ElGamal reencryption mixnets [169],
which basically reencrypt and permute ciphertexts in order to anonymize them.
In this setting, reencryption can be executed without a private key, i.e. it is not
required to decrypt the ciphertext in order to produce a reencryption. Moreover, we
assume that the mixnet is additionally verifiable and thus auditable, i.e. it provides
NIZKPs of correctness of the operations. This can e.g. be achieved by employing
5Given that the group order of the underlying group is prime, then (m1/m2)
z is a random non-
identity group element [147, 184, 40]. This is true in our setting, i.e. the underlying group Gq is of
prime order q.
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Figure 4.2: Interplay of primitives
the verifiable mixnet proposed Furukawa et al. [82], detailing the cryptographic
auditability concepts for reencryption mixnets.
Basically, a mixnet consists of a set of mix servers Mi, that consecutively process
ciphertexts. In our work, the operation of a reencryption mixnet consists of the
following two main steps:
1. Submission of Inputs: A batch of ElGamal encrypted inputs (gr, hrmi) is sub-
mitted to the mixnet. Every input is an ElGamal encryption of a message mi.
2. Mixing Phase: Mix server Mi receives the batch of ciphertexts output by the
previous mix server Mi−1 (or the initial input respectively). Mi reencrypts
each ciphertext ci = (gr, hrmi) by selecting a random value r
′ ∈ Zq and com-
puting c
′
i = (g
r ∗ gr′ , hr ∗ hr′mi) = (gr+r
′
, hr+r
′
mi). Then it permutes the batch
of all ciphertexts randomly and passes it to the next mix server Mi+1. The last
mix server outputs the batch of ciphertexts.
Within our work, mixnets help to build up anonymous reference sets used in the
re-identification of pseudonyms (cf. Section 4.2.4). In particular, mixnets anonymize
sets of ElGamal ciphertexts that represent transaction pseudonyms. These sets are
used to blindly compare a given transaction pseudonym with the resulting reference
set, based on variants of PETs, in order to perform a re-identification operation. The
underlying concept of reencryption is also employed in order to derive transaction
pseudonyms (cf. Section 4.2.2).
Primitives in Combination
Having introduced the main primitives, we now sketch the conceptual interplay
of the primitives. Figure 4.2 shows the relation of PRNGs, mixnets and PETs. In
this figure, E(m) represents the ElGamal encryption of an arbitrary plaintext m. By
means of a PRNG, the random factors used in the encryption can individually be
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controlled. A mixnet can implement unlinkability and anonymity within a set of
ciphertexts. A PET can be used to detect the equality of plaintexts.
In particular, the given primitives in combination allow making use of the several
degrees of (un-)linkability that are given in ElGamal settings.
4.2 Setting and Main Protocols
We introduce the basic concepts of our approach in the following. The provided
protocols implement functionalities for the generation, authentication, linking, par-
tial re-identification and complete disclosure of transaction pseudonyms.
4.2.1 Parties
We consider the following authorities and entities in our setting:
• A user is an entity that intents to act pseudonymously. A user provides a
transaction pseudonym as identifier during the relevant digital interactions
instead of her identity.
• A Registration Authority (RA) is an entity that is responsible for registration
processes. This authority interacts with users in order to register them to the
system and sets up a registration list, which contains registration information.
• Linkability Brokers (LBs) are authorities that are able to cooperatively link and
partially re-identify pseudonyms that are stored in a data repository after use.
• A Law Enforcement Authority (LEA) is an authority that is able to completely
re-identify a pseudonym. This is called disclosure of pseudonyms. The mis-
use of the privacy protection granted by pseudonyms can be prevented by
allowing such a trusted party to revoke pseudonymity in certain cases.
We assume that each entity is equipped with an appropriate computing device,
that is able to store keys, execute operations and provides communication facilities.
4.2.2 Registration and Generation of Transaction Pseudonyms
In this section, we introduce the concepts for pseudonym generation. Basically,
we propose to encode a static reference inside malleable pseudonyms, by gener-
ating pseudonyms as reencryptions of the reference value under the public key of
a threshold ElGamal cryptosystem. The resulting construction is what we call a
pseudonym with implicit attribute. This notion reflects that every transaction pseudonym
is implicitly associated with information - the implicit attributes - that can logi-
cally be derived from the registration context. Thus, implicit attributes are defined
on the semantics of available registration information and support the partial re-
identification of pseudonymous users.
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Figure 4.3: Registration process
Firstly, in our approach, every user must participate in a registration process,
which is also shown in Figure 4.3. In this process, each user receives a base pseudonym,
that enables her to derive transaction pseudonyms. We assume that the user is in
possession of a personal device which also implements a cryptographically secure
PRNG. In order to register, the user interacts with a trusted registration authority
(RA). The registration consists of the following main steps:
I. Each user is added to an integrity protected registration list. She receives a
distinct role pseudonym, which associates the user with some meaning in
the application context, e.g. with a role relevant to the issuing organization.
For example, a user can be registered as RoleX#136. The user’s unique real-
world identity, e.g. JohnDoe7, is encrypted and stored together with the role
pseudonym on the registration list. Also, the user receives a distinct reference
value, which is added to the respective entry of the registration list.
II. The RA derives a base pseudonym by encrypting the unique reference value.
Thus, a base pseudonym encodes a distinct reference.
III. The RA transfers the base pseudonym to the user’s personal device.
IV. The user generates and registers a seed in the PRNG of her device to enable it
for pseudonym generation.
6A registration list may contain additional information that can be used to define (implicit) attributes.
Such additional information is then included in additional columns of the registration list, cf. Fig-
ure 6.2
7We assume that the real world identity can be presented as a string, denoted as ID in the following.
This string could also contain legal identification numbers, in order to make it unique.
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In the registration phase, the encryptions are done under the public key belong-
ing to a set of so called linkability brokers8 relevant to the application context, e.g.
they may belong to the issuing organization, or even include a party that represents
interests of the users:
• The real-world identity ID is encrypted as: EPKLB(ID) = (gr, hr ID).
• To generate the base pseudonym for a user, the registration authority encrypts
the chosen reference value, which we denote RV, as: P = EPKLB(RV) =
(grs , hrs RV). Moreover, the random value rs, the start value for pseudonym
generation, is also transferred to the user and stored on her device.
The user is now able to derive transaction pseudonyms from her base pseudonym
in the following way:
1. The seeded PRNG is used to generate a sequence of random numbers.
2. Each random number ri is used to compute a randomization factor Fri =
(gri , hri).
3. Fr1 is used to construct the first transaction pseudonym by multiplying it with
the base pseudonym: PB = P0 = (gr, hrRV) ∗ (gr1 , hr1) = (gr+r1 , hr+r1 RV).
4. Further transaction pseudonyms are created by repeated multiplications: Pi+1 =
Pi ∗ Fri+1 .
By this procedure, which is also shown in Figure 4.4, a user creates a set of different
transaction pseudonyms that all contain the same reference value. The procedure
includes two factors that initialize pseudonym generation: an organizationally de-
fined one, the base pseudonym, as well a personally defined one, the seed. The gen-
erated pseudonyms are used instead of static identifiers during the relevant digital
interactions.
4.2.3 Authentication of Transaction Pseudonyms
Due to the construction, presented in the last section, users are also enabled to
authenticate a transaction pseudonym that is stored in a data repository after it
was used. Therefore, a user needs to show that she is in possession of the base
pseudonym and the correct aggregated random factor, which allows reproducing a
recorded pseudonym, thereby authenticating it.
8In the description, we assume that cryptographic keys have been generated and distributed before.
The linkability brokers thus share the private key associated with the single public key. Due to
the use of SMPC, variants with different distributions of power are possible. We elaborate on this
issue in Section 7.2.1.
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Figure 4.4: Overview of pseudonym generation
4.2.4 Linking and Partial Re-Identiﬁcation
In this section, we describe the concepts for linking and re-identifying transaction
pseudonyms. Basically, we harness the possibility to do algebraic operations on the
non-deterministic encrypted ciphertexts that represent transaction pseudonyms.
We assume that the transaction pseudonyms are recorded in a data repository
after they were used. Then, the linkability brokers are able to execute the following
two basic operations:
1. Linking: check if two recorded pseudonyms relate to the same entity but with-
out revealing the actual identity of the entity;
2. Partial Re-Identification: check if one entry relates to a group of entities with a
common organizational role or function, i.e. if an implicit attribute is satisfied.
Overview of Linking
The linking operation is implemented by executing a plaintext equality test on the
pseudonym values of two recorded pseudonyms. Suppose that Pa = (gra , hra RVa)
and Pb = (grb , hrb RVb) represent two entries of that kind. If they relate to the
same entity, they contain the same reference value. In order to verify this, the
pseudonyms can be algebraically divided: Pc = Pa/Pb = (gra−rb , hra−rb RVa/RVb).
Given that RVa equals RVb, this is an encryption of the value "1". By performing
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Figure 4.5: Steps of partial re-identiﬁcation
a threshold decryption, the linkability brokers reveal a value which is either "1",
indicating that the reference is matching, or a meaningless different value.
Overview of Partial Re-Identiﬁcation
The second operation, the partial re-identification, is an extension of the procedure
above to a global instead of pairwise comparison of pseudonyms. It allows testing
if a given transaction pseudonym relates to an implicit attribute, i.e. a certain orga-
nizational unit, a function or even place. The implicit attributes are defined on the
semantics of available registration information. This test does not disclose which of
the possibly involved users is the originator of the pseudonym. Thus it implements
a partial re-identification.
An overview of the method of partial re-identification is presented next. It con-
sists of building up anonymous reference sets, supported by mixnets, and mecha-
nisms for blind set lookups. The main steps are also presented in Figure 4.5. Again,
it is based on operations of an ElGamal threshold cryptosystem. Basically, it works
as following:
1. Distributed Key Generation: Firstly, the participating linkability brokers jointly
generate a shared key z, which is used for blinding purposes in later steps.
2. Selection: Then, the registration authority selects all entries of the registration
list that are relevant to the implicit attribute that shall be checked9 (see Figure
4.6 for an example) and creates encryption of each chosen reference value.
3. Mixing: Next, all encryptions are processed by a reencryption mixnet. This
creates an anonymized list of the ciphertexts, i.e. the positions of the individ-
ual entries in the list as well as the ciphertext representations are changed. The
result is called an authorization set.
9The selected entries define the implicit attributes. Given that further information is attached to the
registration list (cf. Figure 6.2), more meaningful implicit attributes can be set up.
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Figure 4.6: Example of selection of registration list entries
4. Blinding: The linkability brokers cooperatively apply their shares of z to each
ciphertext in the authorization set. This process achieves blinding of the refer-
ence inside the ciphertext.
5. Distributed Decryption: After that, each blinded ciphertext is jointly decrypted.
This yields a blinded reference, which is used as a deterministic yet blind fin-
gerprint of the originally chosen reference value.
6. Reference Set Definition: All processed blinded references define a blind refer-
ence set. The set can be used for matching without leaking the original ref-
erence value, by comparing only the blind fingerprints, which is called a set
lookup. Defined reference sets can be used in multiple lookups.
7. Lookup: In order to execute the lookup, the authorities derive a blind finger-
print of the chosen transaction pseudonym. Then, the lookup on the blind
reference set is performed.
Partial Re-Identiﬁcation in Detail
Having outlined the abstract steps, we now describe the method in detail. The
whole scheme makes use of secret sharing techniques according to Shamir [202]
as well as of the distributed key generation protocol according to Pedersen [172].
Firstly, to jointly generate the secret shared key z used for blinding, the linkability
brokers employ the distributed key generation protocol due to Pedersen. In this
protocol, each linkability broker LBj receives a share zj of the key z. Also, each
broker is publicly committed to the share zj by a public value ρzj = g
zj , due to the
execution of the protocol.
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In the following, we describe the complete protocol for distributed blinding, which
proceeds analog to the distributed decryption protocol [172, 173] of the ElGamal
threshold cryptosystem. This protocol can be used to blind an arbitrary element
x ∈ Gq using the shared key z. The following steps are executed in order to cooper-
atively apply z to the chosen pseudonym(s)10:
1. Each linkability broker computes bj = xzj , a partial blinding of x, by applying
its secret zj. Also, each officer publishes bj together with a NIZKP for assuring
logg ρzj = logx bj
The latter is realized using a non-interactive proof of knowledge for equality
of discrete logs [46]. The proof assures that the officer indeed utilized the
correct share to produce the partial blinding11.
2. For any subset Λ of t linkability brokers with valid zero-knowledge proofs,
the complete blinded value xz is reconstructed using the discrete Lagrange
interpolation
xz =∏
j∈Λ
b
λj,Λ
j mod p
where
λj,Λ = ∏
l∈Λ\{j}
l
l − j mod q
are the appropriate Lagrange coefficients.
Now, let RVi ∈ Gq be the algebraic representation of a reference value, and
(gr, hrRVi) a pseudonym derived from RVi, with r ∈R Zq. The linkability brokers
produce the deterministic fingerprint through the following steps:
1. To each component of (gr, hrRVi) the distributed blinding protocol is applied,
blinding it to a fix secret shared exponent z ∈ Zq:
((gr)z, (hrRVi)z) = (grz, hrzRVzi ).
2. The blinded pseudonym is jointly decrypted to the blinded reference RVzi us-
ing the distributed decryption protocol of the threshold ElGamal cryptosys-
tem.
Now, RVzi represents a deterministic fingerprint produced with a key z. It is used
to perform a lookup that reidentifies implicit attributes, by blindly comparing refer-
ence values with a blind reference set that is associated to the attribute. Especially,
10Every pseudonym is effectively encoded as two elements of Gq, whereas the second element is
directly derived from a reference value. This second element is directly manipulated by the pre-
sented mechanisms.
11Otherwise, the use of a fake share would lead to an incorrectly blinded value, which would interfere
with blind matching purposes. In generally, such a security mechanism is part of every threshold
operation.
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Figure 4.7: Lookup
the presented mechanism supports the re-identification of a recorded transaction
pseudonym in several levels of granularity. Hereby, the granularity only depends
on the chosen authorization or reference sets. By setting up several different sets
and consecutively performing lookups, a multilevel linkability check of a chosen
pseudonym is implemented12. A lookup is also depicted in Figure 4.7.
4.2.5 Complete Disclosure of Pseudonyms
As a complement to the operations for linking and partial re-identification of trans-
action pseudonyms, we describe the operations for the complete disclosure of pseu-
donyms in the following. The given approach can be instantiated such that linka-
bility brokers as well as a single law enforcement authority may execute a complete
disclosure. In case of the linkability brokers, the disclosure works as follows:
• Firstly, the linkability brokers cooperatively decrypt a transaction pseudonym,
which is recorded in a data repository. This yields the plaintext of the distinct
reference value encoded in the pseudonym.
• Next, the linkability brokers select the corresponding entry on the registration
list13. Then, they cooperatively decrypt the deposited ciphertext to reveal the
real-world identity.
12Due to the underlying set-based representation, each level of granularity corresponds to a degree
of anonymity, cf. Section 5.2.2. In the same section, the concept of a disclosure policy is introduced.
Its purpose is to specify how consecutive linkability checks shall be executed.
13If the access to the registration list is restricted, LBs are unable to completely disclose a transaction
pseudonym. In this case, they have to cooperate with the RA in order to access the matching
encrypted identity. Thus, the RA may implement a further security mechanism, cf. Section 7.2.1.
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The disclosure functionality for the law enforcement authority works in a compa-
rable way. Basically, we assume that the law enforcement authority is in possession
of the same private key as the linkability brokers, by initially having played the
role of the trusted dealer in the key generation process (cf. section 4.1.2). Then, the
disclosure proceeds as follows:
• Firstly, the law enforcement authority decrypts a transaction pseudonym, which
is recorded in a data repository. This yields the plaintext of the distinct refer-
ence value encoded in the pseudonym.
• Secondly, the authority selects the corresponding entry on the registration
list14. Then, it decrypts the deposited ciphertext in order to disclose the real-
world identity.
4.3 Hybrid Encryption Technique for Expressive Policies
In this section, we introduce a novel hybrid encryption technique that is able to
handle expressive policies. In our context, the notion of an expressive policy refers
to the capability to efficiently support static attributes as well as one continuous
dynamic attribute in combination in conjunctive encryption policies. In this section,
again, attributes refer to properties of users. Yet, it is important to note that this
section describes a technical approach for handling attributes that is different to the
concept of implicit attributes, which were described in the last sections.
We propose to efficiently combine ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption
[17] and location-based encryption [201, 54], which allows for realizing logical en-
cryption policies, while we leverage symmetric AES encryption to efficiently en-
crypt the payload. Current state-of-the-art encryption techniques are unable to sup-
port such encryption capabilities, which consider continuous dynamic attributes
that may change in an unpredictable manner (cf. Section 3.3.2).
The next section describes the underlying construction principle, followed by a
description of the main primitives. Then, the protocols and mechanisms are ex-
plained in detail.
4.3.1 Construction Principle
Realizing end-to-end encryption in pervasive computing settings and applications
is a challenging task: traditional asymmetric encryption schemes, e.g. RSA, and
PKI concepts are not practical for securing communication with dynamic groups
or unknown receivers, since unknown entities cannot be addressed and also cer-
tificate verification is a huge obstacle. More recent asymmetric encryption tech-
niques propose to generalize the role of the receivers’ identities [192] and thus can
enable a more flexible specification of receivers and content. In this approach, called
14Since a law enforcement authority is dedicated to completely disclose pseudonyms, we implicitly
assume that this authority has full access to the registration list.
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Figure 4.8: Overview of hybrid encryption technique
attribute-based encryption, key-related concepts refer to attributes, which can rep-
resent properties of receivers and/or messages.
Yet, handling continuous dynamic attributes is thus far only possible among the
unpractical assumption of an online key generator, which we want to avoid in our
design. Also, due to the inherent use of computationally demanding pairing-based
cryptography, the practical applicability of existing techniques remains highly chal-
lenging in scenarios with mobile and resource-constrained devices.
To overcome these issues, we propose to leverage ciphertext-policy attribute-
based encryption (CP-ABE) [17] in combination with location-based encryption (LBE)
[201, 54] and symmetric AES encryption.
Especially, we propose to make use of CP-ABE to handle static attributes within
an encryption policy, while the principle of location-based encryption is employed
to derive a symmetric key from a dynamic attribute, e.g. a GPS position. In order
to save the computation of pairings, we leverage CP-ABE in a hybrid mode, this
means, we split the encryption of the payload from the encryption of the session
key. The session key is then additionally bound to the location-based encryption.
Thus, in order to decrypt, both the CP-ABE policy (static attributes) and the LBE
constraint (a dynamic attribute) have to be satisfied. Figure 4.8 shows this construc-
tion principle in overview. Practically, this approach means that we combine an
offline key generation for static attributes with a light-weight online key generation
for dynamic attributes. Together with relying on AES encryption for the payload,
the approach15 is rendered suitable even for mobile and resource-constrained de-
vices that are the end point of an end-to-end encrypted communication.
15Note that our approach considers attribute-based encryption mostly as a black box. The given
descriptions thus mostly abstract from the concrete (pairing-related) algorithms of CP-ABE.
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4.3.2 Main Primitives
In this section, we describe the main building blocks, that contribute to the design
of the presented hybrid encryption technique.
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) [192] is an encryption technique that generalizes
the functional role of identities and keys. In traditional asymmetric encryption
schemes, identities relate to distinct public key / private key tuples. In ABE, the
concepts of public and private keys are replaced by sets of attributes16, which abstract
from actual user properties. Moreover, ABE is certificateless and the cryptographic
credentials are issued by a central trusted party called attribute authority, which is in
possession of a global master key for key generation. Since users are associated with
sets of attributes, they might try to trade some attributes and related private key
components to gain more decryption powers. However, ABE systems are collusion
resistant [17], i.e. keys of different users are incompatible due to the cryptographic
construction.
Like identity-based encryption [27], ABE cryptographically builds upon pairings,
i.e. bilinear maps that provide an extra structure on special elliptic curves. While
pairings enable attribute-based encryption, they are very computationally demand-
ing. From a practical point of view, the goal is to minimize pairing-related opera-
tions, in order to enable use even on resource-constrained devices.
Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) [17] is a special form of
attribute-based encryption, which associates a set of attributes used in the encryp-
tion process with logical access structures, also called attribute policies. Due to the
use of secret sharing [202], the access structures are trees with nodes that represent
t-out-of-n combinations of attribute child nodes, naturally including conjunctions
(AND) as well as disjunctions (OR).
In CP-ABE, the encryption algorithm takes as input a message and an attribute
policy. The algorithm encrypts the message and produces a ciphertext, such that
only a receiver possessing a set of attributes that satisfies the attribute policy is able
to decrypt that message. In order to avoid the computation of parings and thus
enable more practical applications, CP-ABE can be used in hybrid mode: a message
itself is encrypted with a random symmetric secret key. Only this session key is then
CP-AB encrypted under a policy. In the following, we assume that the ciphertext
also encodes the policy.
An example of an CP-ABE policy and its application to encryption in hybrid
mode is given in Figure 4.9. The figure shows an attribute policy containing at-
tributes that are taken from the first response domain. During the encryption under
this policy, the session key S is Shamir secret shared according to the operation spec-
ified in the nodes of the policy, from the root node down to the leafs. Given an AND
node, the key or the share of the key is distributed to child nodes according to an
16In the following, we denote the concept that replaces a private key as private attribute set.
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Figure 4.9: Example of CP-ABE policy
n-out-of-n secret sharing. For the decryption operation, this effectively means that
all the shares associated to child nodes have to be available, for the reconstruction
to succeed. Given an OR node, the key or the share of the key is distributed ac-
cording to an 1-out-of-n secret sharing, i.e. only one share is required to reconstruct
the secret in the level above. During the encryption process, shares of S are thus
consecutively dealt out from the root node down to the leaf nodes. Every leaf node
is associated to an attribute. The share dealt out to a leaf node is finally encrypted
according to attribute-based encryption principles. Thus, for the decryption to suc-
ceed, a user requires a set of attributes that at least satisfies the policy. Without at
least this set, the shares at the leaf nodes cannot be decrypted. Thus, the secret key
S cannot be reconstructed, and consecutively, the message cannot be decrypted.
For the purpose of symmetric encryption, we propose to make use of the ad-
vanced encryption standard (AES) [33]. AES supports key sizes of 128, 192 and 256
bits. Throughout this thesis, our descriptions refer to the use of AES-12817.
Location-Based Encryption
The concept of location-based encryption (LBE) was proposed by Scott and Denning
[201, 54]. It aims at securing mobile communication by limiting the area inside
which the intended recipient can decrypt a message18. .
In order to implement this location-based security constraint, LBE adds a layer of
security to a symmetric encryption of a message: the targeted recipient’s geographic
location L is combined with the session key, in order to produce a location-locked
17In recent cryptanalysis research, weaknesses in the AES were identified. In [26, 25], a key recovery
attack on AES-128 with computational complexity 2126.1 is described. Yet, the complexity of this
attack is still impractical, the AES-128 is still considered secure.
18Yet, further attributes beyond location, e.g. velocity, can also be handled by LBE concepts.
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key. This location-locked key is then sent along with the encrypted message. As a
result, the ciphertext can only be decrypted if the session key can be recovered from
the location-locked key. In turn, LBE requires that this decryption is only possible if
the receiver’s device is physically presented at location L, or respectively inside an
geographic area associated with L.
This process is called location verification, it hinges on a tamper-resistant GPS
receiver inside the recipient’s mobile device. In LBE, the sender has to transmit
parameters which define the area where decryption is permitted and may specify
further dynamic constraints like time periods or receiver velocity that have to be
verified upon decryption [5].
In general, a location-based encryption technique requires an efficient mapping
from location areas to symmetric keys, which is called a location lock. The location
lock is secured by including an additional key as an input parameter in order to
derive symmetric keys.
4.4 Setting and Main Mechanisms for Hybrid Encryption
We introduce the basic protocols of the novel hybrid encryption technique in the
following. We describe the encryption and the decryption scheme. Also, we detail
the underlying key management approach.
4.4.1 Parties
The parties relevant to the setting of the hybrid encryption technique are derived
from the underlying CP-ABE and LBE. For brevity of presentation, we only consider
the following two authorities and entities explicitly in our setting:
• Attribute authority AA: the AA is responsible for creating the private creden-
tials (attributes) used for decryption. Especially, it issues a private attribute
set {A}R to every receiver.
• Receiver R: this entity receives encrypted messages on her communication
device. The device is initialized for decryption with the receiver’s private
attribute set {A}R and KLL, the key for the location lock function. Also, the
device has a tamper-resistant GPS receiver that is leveraged in the following
schemes.
4.4.2 Encryption and Decryption Schemes
This section introduces the main schemes of the novel hybrid encryption technique
for expressive policies. The technique is hybrid, as it combines CP-ABE with LBE
and AES on the level of symmetric keys. In the following description, we refer to
location attributes as dynamic attributes only.
We use the following notation:
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Figure 4.10: Selection of GPS coordinates
• L(P1,P2) specifies an geographic area with the shape of an rectangle, defined
by GPS coordinates P1 = (x1, y1) and P2 = (x2, y2) (cf. Figure 4.10, which
exemplarily shows definition of GPS coordinates on a digital map.). In the
following, we also denote L(P1,P2) simply as L.
• EL(P1,P2)AP (M) denotes the encryption of a message M under a logical conjunction
of a CP-ABE attribute policy AP and a LBE location area attribute L(P1,P2).
• DPR{A}R(CT) denotes the decryption of a ciphertext CT initiated by a receiver R,
using his private attribute set {A}R, while being positioned at GPS coordinate
PR = (xR, yR).
It is possible that one of the two main parts of a policy remains undefined:
• in case the CP-ABE part AP is not specified, encryption is reduced to location-
based encryption;
• in case the LBE location area attribute L(P1,P2) is not specified, encryption is
reduced to ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption.
The combined approach is introduced next. Here, decryption succeeds if R’s at-
tribute set {A}R satisfies the attribute policy AP and R is positioned within L(P1,P2),
i.e. if x2 ≥ xR ≥ x1 and y2 ≥ yR ≥ y1 hold. Figure 4.11 shows the basic operations
of the encryption technique in overview.
Our hybrid encryption employs a keyed location lock mapping fLL(L(P1,P2), KLL),
according to the following principle: GPS coordinates P1, P2 and KLL are concate-
nated. Then, the resulting string sLL(P1,P2) = x1||y1||x2||y2||KLL is hashed, h(sLL(P1,P2)),
to a 128 bit string19, the location lock value.
19Here, we implicitly assume 128 bit security for symmetric keys. Thus, MD5 [186] is a hash function
of choice.
72 4 Novel Security Techniques
Figure 4.11: Schemes for encryption and decryption
Scheme for Hybrid Encryption
The hybrid encryption scheme works as follows (cf. Figure 4.11):
1. A random session key KeyS is generated.
2. The message is symmetrically encrypted under KeyS, producing ciphertext
CT1.
3. The location lock value is computed from the selected location area L and key
KLL.
4. KeyS is XORed with the location lock value, generating a hybrid key KeyH.
5. KeyH is concatenated with an encoding of the location area L, producing the
string L||KeyH. This string is CP-AB encrypted under an attribute policy AP,
producing ciphertext CT2
6. CT1 concatenated with CT2 represent the ciphertext CT. CT is transferred to a
receiver R.
Scheme for Hybrid Decryption
The scheme for hybrid decryption works as follows (cf. Figure 4.11):
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1. After reception of CT = CT1||CT2, receiver R tries to decrypt CT2, using his
private attribute set {A}R. On successful decryption, the location area L and
KeyH are recovered.
2. R’s current GPS position PR is computed by means of a tamper-resistant GPS
receiver and verified to be inside the location area L. On success, the location
lock value is computed, taking L and key KLL as input parameters.
3. The location lock value is then XORed with the recovered KeyH, in order to
reconstruct KeyS.
4. KeyS is used to symmetrically decrypt CT1 to M.
4.4.3 Management and Generation of Private Keys
The proposed hybrid encryption technique entails an important design aspect: key
management, including the generation of private keys.
Since the present approach combines two existing encryption techniques, it inher-
its some properties from CP-ABE, other characteristics derive from LBE. Especially,
the hybrid encryption technique hinges on a tamper-resistant GPS receiver. The
GPS receiver triggers the creation of keys that need to satisfy location-depended
constraints in the encryption.
Figure 4.12 shows the design space for the generation of private keys as well as
our chosen approach. Basically, in our setting, private key generation (PKG) is pos-
sible online, offline and embedded in tamper-resistant hardware [207]. Online PKG
refers to a server that is permanently reachable and produces and communicates
private keys or attributes on request. In the offline mode, all keys are generated in
a preceding phase and handed out to the receiver.
An embedded (online) generation of private keys refers to a local implementa-
tion of the key provision mechanisms based on tamper-resistant hardware on the
receivers’ device. In this case, a device itself creates a private key required for
Figure 4.12: Generation of private keys: design space and chosen approach
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message decryption. CP-ABE requires a master key for private key generation,
which is, among practical considerations, of high risk, since this global trapdoor
is then highly distributed. Furthermore, in an embedded (offline) key generation
mode, all possible keys/attributes are generated in a preceding phase, then regis-
tered in a tamper-resistant storage module of the receiver’s device. If a particular
key/attribute is required for decryption, the tamper-resistant hardware can tem-
porarily provide the key to the execution environment of the decryption operation
(cf. [232, 32, 238]).
In our work, we propose to realize the hybrid encryption technique with the
following combination of online and offline key generation mechanisms: static at-
tributes are generated offline by an CP-ABE attribute authority (AA) and distributed
to receivers before use, dynamic location attributes are generated by an embedded
online LBE key generator which is realized on the device. Practically, this approach
means that a global secret, i.e. KLL, the key for the location lock, is required for
securing one-to-many encryptions. Even though a global secret is distributed on
every device, it can only by used to generate dynamic attributes. Static attributes
cannot be generated on the device. Since the decryption based on static attributes
is executed in the first step, a maliciously generated dynamic attribute cannot allow
decrypting additional ciphertexts in case that insufficient static attributes are avail-
able. Yet, KLL also provides protection against outside adversaries in case that only
location attributes are used for encryption. Thus, the chosen approaches reconciles
misuse potential and functionality to a high degree, under practical assumptions.
The chosen approach moves a major part of trust into the organizational level of
using security mechanisms, i.e. the offline issuing of private attributes and KLL.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we contributed two novel security techniques:
• Firstly, we introduced pseudonyms with implicit attributes, our novel ap-
proach to multilevel linkable transaction pseudonyms. Our proposal extends
earlier work of Juels and Pappu [125] on encryption-based transaction pseu-
donyms. By making use of threshold ElGamal encryption, PRNGs and secure
multiparty computation mechanisms according to the mix-and-match frame-
work [118], we achieve multilevel linkability of transaction pseudonym for
users, organizations and law enforcement authorities.
• Secondly, we proposed a novel hybrid encryption technique for expressive
policies. We designed this technique as an efficient combination of attribute-
based encryption, location-based encryption as well as AES encryption. The
proposal allows handling continuous dynamic attributes in combination with
static attributes in order to support encryption under expressive policies. In
order to achieve this, we also devised novel mechanisms for the combined
offline and online generation of attributes and associated keys.
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Both techniques are major building blocks for our integrated approach to multi-
laterally secure pervasive cooperation, which is introduced in Chapter 5. Further
applications and security evaluations of our proposals will be given in Chapter 7.

5Integrated Approach within Reference
Scenario
In this chapter, we describe the main concepts of our novel approach to multilater-
ally secure pervasive cooperation. The approach is presented within the reference
scenario of location-aware first response. According to the goals of thesis, this chap-
ter thus introduces the basic principles and concepts for realizing
• multilaterally secure auditing, providing a fair balance of privacy protection
and accountability.
• end-to-end secure pervasive communication, i.e. one-to-many communica-
tion with mobile, nameless and possibly unknown receivers as well as dy-
namic groups of receivers,
The security techniques introduced in Chapter 4 are crucial building blocks for re-
alizing these mechanisms (cf. Figure 1.4). This chapter describes a novel integrated
architecture that results from the implementation of the aforementioned principles
and mechanisms. In particular, we introduce the technical setting, the involved par-
ties as well as their interactions.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, in Section 5.1, we
introduce to our approach in overview. In Section 5.2, we describe the two main
underlying principles. This is followed by the communication network model, in
Section 5.3 and the adversary model, in Section 5.4. After that, an overview on the
system is given in Section 5.5. This includes functional, temporal and logical views
on the resulting architecture. Finally, the chapter is summarized in Section 5.6.
5.1 Overview
In this section, we firstly give a high-level description of how mobile and central
users (cf. Section 2.3.3) and additional parties may securely interact in order to co-
ordinate a first response. We also describe how our main security goals are achieved
while efficiently enabling the targeted cooperation.
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Figure 5.1: Parties in overview
5.1.1 Parties
In the following, we make recurrent use of the icons shown in Figure 5.1. The de-
picted parties are shown in several further figures and have the following functions,
denotation and relations to earlier mentioned parties:
• a registration authority is involved in setup processes and registers mobile users
to the system. It also provides information to the auditing process that is de-
pendent on registration information. The registration authority corresponds
to the registration authority mentioned in Section 4.2.1 and to the attribute
authority mentioned in Section 4.4.1.
• A mobile user is involved in rescue missions, as a regular first responder or as
a specialist, who joins incident handling on request. A mobile user subsumes
the roles of a user, as introduced in Section 4.2.1, and of a receiver (cf. Section
4.4.1).
• A central user represents the emergency management stuff in a command and
control center. The central user has decision making and communication tasks
during a rescue mission.
• An audit officer represents the interests of organizations responsible for emer-
gency responses and is involved in the analysis of liability issues caused by
rescue missions. Within the present approach, an audit officer is involved in
cooperative analysis of location logs. An audit officer corresponds to the role
of an linkability broker, as described in Section 4.2.1.
• A data protection officer represents and defends privacy interests of mobile users
in the auditing and also supports transparency of this process. A data officer
also corresponds to the role of an linkability broker (cf. Section 4.2.1).
• A law enforcement authority represents and enforces legal interest. This author-
ity can globally re-identify mobile users within the system. It corresponds to
the role of the law enforcement authority, according to Section 4.2.1.
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Figure 5.2: States of mobile users
We will refer to these parties in the following sections as well as in various fig-
ures. In particular, in Section 5.5.1 we will detail the roles of the parties within the
integrated architecture.
5.1.2 Core Interactions
In this section, we introduce the core interactions of our approach. The interactions
are clustered in three temporal phases of before, during and after a first response or
rescue mission:
• Before being able to participate in rescue efforts, every mobile user, whether
first responder or external specialist, has to be registered to our system. In a
registration, the communication device is personalized.
• During rescue missions, she has to be logged in the available digital emergency
communication network via her personal communication device. Being reg-
istered and logged in to the network is what we define as passive state. In this
state, a mobile user is able to receive messages that are sent by a central user,
located in a command and control center.
For example, the central user may request specialists that are in close vicin-
ity to an incident site to participate in a response. Upon reading this request,
a mobile user individually confirms her availability by sending back an ac-
knowledgement message1.
Upon an actual engagement within a rescue mission, the mobile user’s state
is denoted as active. While being active, the user continuously sends location
updates, i.e. messages containing current time and GPS position along with
an identifier to the command and control center2.
1The design rationale of our approach is explained in the following Section 5.1.3. In this example, be-
yond confirming availability, an acknowledgement is also needed to satisfy the documentation
of readers requirement, cf. Section 2.4.3.
2Additional sensor data may be attached to location updates. If an user is appropriately equipped,
she may act as a mobile sensor and thus monitor levels of air pollution, or provide vital data
for individual health monitoring. Generally, additional sensor information can support decision
making processes in the command and control center in various ways, see e.g. [145, 47].
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The described state transition between passive and actives states of mobile
users is also depicted in Figure 5.2.
Received location updates are securely stored in the control center and thus
create location audit logs, which enable post-hoc auditing of rescue missions.
• After the end of a rescue mission, a location audit log can be cooperatively
analyzed, in order to react upon reported incidents (cf. Section 2.4.4). Audit
officers together with a data protection officer may re-identify mobile user in
a stepwise process. In the dispute resolution also affected mobile users and a
law enforcement authority may participate.
In this chapter, the interactions will be detailed in Section 5.5.2 and Section 5.5.3.
5.1.3 Design of Security Mechanisms
Having introduced core interactions relevant to our approach, we next explain the
design rationale of the mechanisms which implement the main associated security
goals. An overview of our design is given in Figure 5.3. In particular, according to
our requirements elicitation in Section 2.4, we aim for end-to-end secure communi-
cation as well as a fair balance of location privacy protection and accountability:
• Our reference scenario requires targeted, location-dependent end-to-end secure
communication, which enables mobile users that are unknown by identity to
participate in rescue missions without initially providing location informa-
tion:
– Since the identities of the receivers are unknown to the sender, the selec-
tion of mobile users has to be realized on a level of abstraction different
to identity. We propose to leverage attributes, i.e. properties a user ful-
fills, to specify receivers. In particular, a group of mobile users can be
expressed as a logical combination of attributes. The proposed combina-
tion has been devised based on the results of a user study that involved
real emergency workers (cf. Section 7.3.2); it includes attributes related
to organizations, roles, specializations as well as the current location of a
user in conjunction.
– In order to achieve end-to-end confidentiality, an encryption mechanism
has to be able to deal with dynamic attributes. To deal with this chal-
lenge, we propose to employ the hybrid encryption technique for expres-
sive policies, as presented in Section 4.3. Thus, requests and messages are
encrypted under expressive policies according to the chosen attributes.
– After the encryption, messages are broadcasted via an available commu-
nication network. Received messages are locally evaluated on mobile
devices; this implements an implicit addressing mechanism which addi-
tionally protects the location privacy of receivers.
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– In order to prevent replay attacks and to support non-repudiation of
senders, we leverage message authentication codes together with unique
message IDs. In addition, acknowledgements allow determining and
documenting the readers of a message.
– In sum, we denote the described communication method as end-to-end
secure attribute-based messaging (ABM).
• In order to achieve location privacy protection, we follow the principle of data
minimization, i.e. the use of data related to the identities of mobile users is
minimized. In particular, we apply this principle to the collection and to the
processing of data3:
– We propose that the collection of location data is restricted to the ac-
tive state, i.e. during rescue missions. Since location information is sent
by the users, the update frequency is personally adjustable. This imple-
ments an individual control functionality.
– Instead of using static identifiers, we propose to use (linkable) transac-
tion pseudonyms in the location updates. The pseudonyms are created
according to the principles of pseudonyms with implicit attributes (cf.
Section 4.1). Thus, location updates are unlinkable w.r.t. the identifiers.
– We design the analysis capabilities for location updates as a privacy-
respecting audit. In particular, the audit logs are already pseudonymized
upon creation.
• The resulting pseudonymized location audit logs support accountability of real-
world actions:
– Following the principle of data minimization, accountability w.r.t. to mo-
bile users is restricted to the duration of first response missions.
– In order to prevent misuse by single authorities, we design accountability
mechanisms as a cooperative analysis of location logs; the mechanisms
harness linkability measures of the employed pseudonym construction.
An analysis supports a distribution of powers; we introduce a data pro-
tection officer as a representative of and additional support for affected
users. Location audit log are a special kind of audit logs. In order to cope
with them, we propose location-based auditing mechanisms.
– We propose that the re-identification of pseudonymous users is controlled
by means of a disclosure policy. It allows specifying levels of disclosure
both in terms of semantics and anonymity measures.
– In order to support the requirements of different application contexts, the
approach can flexibly be instantiated with and without law enforcement
capabilities.
3As introduced above, this is also true for the addressing of users, which makes use of attributes
instead of identities
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Figure 5.3: Overview of security design
– The individual access to an audit log is part of a fair balance of pri-
vacy protection and accountability. In order to realize it, we propose
an access control mechanism, that is based on authenticating transaction
pseudonyms.
– Transparency of an executed audit is also given to affected users. Trans-
parency implements a second level of accountability, w.r.t. the actions
of authorities involved in the auditing. Users can access transparency
information, again based on transaction pseudonyms that are used as
reference points in an access control mechanism.
– In sum, the described concept is called multilaterally secure location-based
auditing.
In the remainder of this chapter, we describe the main concepts for the realization
of our approach. In particular, this outlines of how the techniques presented in
Chapter 4 are instantiated in order to fulfill our security requirements. A more
detailed description of the mechanisms is given in Chapter 6.
5.2 Basic Principles
Having presented an overview, this section describes more details of our proposal.
Technically, our approach to multilaterally secure pervasive cooperation builds upon
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Figure 5.4: Structure of logical messaging policy
two basic principles:
1. mobile users are made implicitly addressable via attributes (including loca-
tion), i.e. the selection of cooperation partners is executed on a level of ab-
straction that is different to identity,
2. mobile users regularly provide location updates together with linkable trans-
action pseudonyms, in order to enable a real-world auditing that is based on
pseudonymous location traces.
We describe our realization of these principles next.
5.2.1 Make Users Implicitly Addressable via Attributes
As motivated in Section 2.3.3, reaching the right actors at the right time is of high
practical importance for the coordination of incident responses. However, in the
beginning of a response mission, the communication structures are often little es-
tablished. In particular, a sender in a certain messaging task does not immediately
known with which actual parties and entities to communicate. Rather, the sender
can elaborate which kind of organizations, roles and specializations are appropriate
and where the receivers should be present, to allow for a fast engagement [223, 151].
Thus, we propose that a sender, i.e. a central user, may specify the group of in-
tended readers of a message on a level of abstraction different to identity. Instead,
the sender leverages a specific logical combination of receivers’ properties. Espe-
cially, we propose to use the logical attributes as depicted in Figure 5.4 in conjunc-
tion. It consists of attributes related to an organization, a role, a specialization or a
location, i.e. a place where the receiver is currently present. Such a combination is
what we call a logical messaging policy. It is used to specify the group of readers of a
message that is to be sent to the outside world and the incident site.
Communication mechanisms that support a flexible specification of readers via
an attribute-based description are denoted as attribute-based messaging (ABM) in
the research literature [23, 232, 241, 24, 237]. ABM concepts allow implementing a
communication approach that handles all major communication patterns, as given
in Section 2.4.2; ABM thus also minimizes learning efforts for the senders.
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Figure 5.5: Steps of end-to-end secure attribute-based messaging
In the present work, we propose to realize end-to-end secure attribute-based mes-
saging according to the following main steps:
• Firstly, the sender selects the group of intended readers by specifying a con-
junction of attributes that readers have to fulfill, encrypts the message under
the resulting logical messaging policy using the encryption scheme of Section
4.4 and broadcasts it to all mobile users that are logged in the communication
network.
• Secondly, every receiver locally evaluates every received message on her com-
munication device. The encryption mechanism assures that she can only de-
crypt a message and thus only read it if she satisfied the specified attribute
combination.
• Thirdly, every reader of a message sends an acknowledgement to the sender,
i.e. she confirms that she read the message. Thus, the sender does not know
the actual group of readers of a message when sending it, but only after re-
ceiving the acknowledgements.
Our approach, as introduced, leverages a variant of an implicit addressing mech-
anism [177, 176], which makes use of attributes for addressing mobile users, in order
to retain a functionality for targeted communication. Thus, within the approach, a
mobile user is associated with a set of attributes that she satisfies. The attributes
in use can be classified into two classes: static and dynamic. The values of static
attributes do not change over time, e.g. a mobile user belongs to the same organi-
zation and has the same role as long this is not changed due to external reasons.
Dynamic attributes possibly exhibit a frequent value change, e.g. the current loca-
tion of first responder changes as she moves. The present proposal handles dynamic
and static attributes on the encryption level4; the proposal is described next.
4One-to-many communication is crucial for first response scenarios. Typically, it is supported on the
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Figure 5.6: Activation of mobile users
In order to realize an end-to-end secure ABM functionality, we can also build on
existing digital emergency communication networks. As such, the network pro-
vides basic security services for emergency communication; it also implies the exis-
tence of secured mobile devices on the receiver side.
However, realizing the end-to-end encryption leads to new challenges: tradi-
tional asymmetric encryption schemes and PKI concepts are not practical for com-
munication with unknown receivers (cf. Section 3.3.2). In addition, existing encryp-
tion techniques do not provide the required flexibility and means for handling dy-
namic attributes with continuous values, e.g. location. To overcome these issues, we
leverage the novel hybrid encryption technique for expressive policies (cf. Section
4.3), in order to achieve end-to-end encryption in the messaging. This technique, de-
veloped in the present work, supports a cryptographic realization of flexible crypto-
graphic attribute policies; it also considers dynamic attributes with continuous values.
In the emergency response domain, the use of augmented digital maps is inher-
ent [47]. An integration of the selection of location attributes into a digital map was
proposed by real users to support an intuitive use (cf. Figure 4.10 and Section 7.3.2).
It requires an expressive encryption, for incorporating location into the end-to-end
encryption. Due to the local evaluation of policies, receivers can be addressed de-
pending on their current location, without requiring them to continuously provide
location information.
5.2.2 Provide Pseudonymous yet Linkable Location Updates
Once activated, a mobile user regularly provides location updates to the command
and control center. Each location update contains the current position of the user, i.e.
GPS coordinates computed on the user’s device, the current time, and an identifier.
Instead of using a static identifier, a user provides a linkable transaction pseudonym
in every location update. Such a transaction pseudonym is derived according to the
network layer. E.g. in TETRA networks (cf. Section 2.3.3), multicast communication mechanisms
are described. However, these mechanisms do not specify the end-to-end encryption [141].
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Figure 5.7: Cooperative log analysis
techniques of pseudonyms with implicit attributes, as proposed in Section 4.1. Ev-
ery location update is securely stored in a so called location audit log. The process of
the activation of mobile users and the subsequent provision and storage of location
updates is shown in Figure 5.6.
Audit logs can be analyzed by authorized parties in a cooperative manner5 (as
illustrated in Figure 5.7), after missions, in order to deal with real world liability
issues. In this context, we propose to implement multilateral security, i.e. a fair
balance of security interests, based on the following main properties:
• In the log analysis, attributes that are implicitly encoded in the transaction
pseudonyms can be evaluated cooperatively, which allows for a stepwise re-
identification of users associated to the pseudonyms. This mechanism mini-
mizes the disclosure of identity-related information and thus preserves user
privacy.
• Mobile users are empowered to access the data which is stored in the audit
along with a pseudonym, since individual access rights are encoded into the
pseudonyms. This is used to implement mechanisms for individual access.
• Transparency of the log analysis is given, i.e. affected mobile users can ver-
ify the appropriateness of the log analysis. This is based on pseudonym-
dependent selective access to the transparency log, which extends the audit
log. Additionally, a data protection officer is involved in the cooperative anal-
ysis and report to the users.
• A law enforcement functionality is supported: a law enforcement authority
may globally revoke pseudonymity of all involved mobile users. This is im-
5In Section 4.2, the parties involved in this task are called linkability brokers.
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Figure 5.8: Levels of access in auditing
plemented by means of a global decryption capability of the encryption-based
transaction pseudonyms. Yet, the present approach can also be instantiated
without the law enforcement functionality. This issue is discussed in Section
7.2.1.
The given flexibility w.r.t. the levels of access and re-identification is exemplified
in Figure 5.8. The approach provides a multilevel re-identification functionality, it
thus supports a dispute resolution processes of reported incidents. Main aspects are
explained next.
Audit officers (AOs), together with a data protection officer (DPO) may cooper-
atively link entries of the log, in order to create a trace. A trace consists of several
transaction pseudonyms of a single mobile user, without revealing the user’s iden-
tity. It can visualized in a location-based representation (cf. Section 6.5.2). After
its creation, the officers may stepwise re-identify traces (or single log entries), by
re-identifying implicit attributes of a trace or a single pseudonym.
The rules and conditions, which we denote as disclosure policy, for the actual de-
tection of inappropriate behavior and misuse within the audit log analysis must be
defined within the organizational and legal context of the application. We propose
that the rules are defined according to the need-to-know principle [6], i.e. to execute
a step-wise analysis of the log with highest possible anonymity restrictions. This
means that a stepwise re-identification starts on a coarse level, e.g. it is first checked
which organization a trace is associated with. In consecutive re-identification steps,
the accuracy is increased, a trace can be verified against sub-units within the orga-
nization. In Figure 5.8, the example of the "Response Team Alpha" as a possible
level of re-identification is shown. Yet, the individual levels do not need to relate to
distinct organizations, but can flexibly be defined, since the underlying mechanism
leverages a set-based representation. Thus, each of these levels also corresponds to
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a degree of anonymity, given by the size of the chosen set.
In case that a complete disclosure is determined, a pseudonym is cooperatively
decrypted. As a result, the encoded reference value is recovered. Based on registra-
tion information, it can be linked to a role pseudonym (cf. Figure 4.3). By addition-
ally decrypting associated identity information, the real world identity can finally
be completely re-identified.
Each action within the log analysis requires a cooperative decision: the audit of-
ficers as well as the data protection officer have to jointly agree on the execution of
the action. In this process, the DPO acts as a representative of all mobile users and
thus protects their privacy interests, since he is able to refuse inappropriate actions.
Technically, the cooperative decisions require that a threshold of t officers have to
agree. We propose to instantiate the mechanism with t− 1 AOs and one DPO. Yet,
the approach can flexibly support a wide range of distributions of power, and may
also exclude the global access for law enforcement (cf. Section 7.2.1).
5.3 Communication Network Model
This section introduces the communication network model. We assume that two
distinct types of networks and communication channels are available within our
setting:
• a digital emergency communication network enables communication between
the command and control center and mobile users,
• an authenticated broadcast channel with memory enables the cooperative au-
dit log analysis. According to the literature, such a channel is also called a
bulletin board [118].
The latter one corresponds to the communication model which is introduced in
Section 4.1.2. The parties that participate in the audit log analysis are equipped
with smart cards. A smart card is used to authenticate to the bulletin board and to
provide a partial result as input to the distributed computations (cf. Figure 4.1).
In order to enable communication between a control center and the outside world,
each mobile user is in possession of a personal communication device. Each device has
a unique identification number. By means of the device, a user can log into the
digital network, given that a mutual authentication between the network and the
device succeeds. The network access of the device can be revoked by a network
administrator.
Further application level security services are in the end user domain and thus
enabled through a registration process: every user receives keys and credentials
according to her real world properties, i.e. attributes. The received credentials rep-
resent a mobile user’s digital identity within the first response application context.
Thus, by taking part in the registration, the personal communication becomes a per-
sonalized communication device, that enables secured two-way communication. The
device is able to decrypt messages according to the hybrid encryption technique
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Figure 5.9: Security services of emergency communication network
for expressive policies, as introduced in Section 4.3. We assume that it provides a
tamper-resistant GPS receiver. It also implements the online key management pro-
cedure of the encryption technique (cf. Section 4.4.3). The security services of the
emergency network and the communication device are summarized in Figure 5.9.
5.4 Adversary Model
In the following, we describe our adversary model. This concretizes the notions of
end-to-end security and multilateral security within the present work. The adver-
sary model considers two distinct classes of adversaries:
• an outside adversary tries to corrupt and interfere with the secured communi-
cation between a command and control center and the outside world,
• an inside adversary tries to interfere with the targeted balance between privacy
protection and accountability.
The capabilities that we ascribe to each adversary are defined next.
5.4.1 Properties of Outside Adversary
For the outside adversary model, we consider a limited version of the Dolev-Yao threat
model [55]. In the Dolev-Yao model, the adversary has control of all communication
channels, being able to eavesdrop messages in transit, destroy, replay and insert
messages into the communication channel. However, the adversary is not able to
break any cryptographic mechanisms without obtaining the required cryptographic
keys. Especially, a Dolev-Yao adversary does not have cryptanalysis capabilities, i.e.
is unable to circumvent complexity theoretic assumptions of security mechanisms.
Precisely, we restrict the Dolev-Yao model by removing the ability of the adver-
sary to destroy messages in transit. The deletion of such messages in a computer
network scenario leads to denial of service attacks. Although such type of attacks
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could be physically plausible in some scenarios using radio jamming techniques,
we disregard such attacks. Moreover, we do not allow the adversary to interfere
with registration processes.
5.4.2 Properties of Inside Adversary
In order to clarify the meaning of an adversary in our context of multilateral secu-
rity, we distinguish between opponents and inside adversaries:
• Firsthand, within the system, specific parties are mutual opponents w.r.t. the
fulfillment of their own security goals. For example, a mobile user’s privacy
interests oppose to the accountability interests of audit officers. Thus, from the
perspective of one party, the opponent has conflicting security goals. Yet, such
(mutual) opponents are (both) authorized for their specific tasks, and thus not
considered as adversaries w.r.t. the goal of multilateral security.
• Differently, an inside adversary tries to manipulate the results of actions with
malicious intent and without authorization. For example, such an adversary,
DPO or AO, may try to corrupt parties in order to trace a mobile user. Such a
corruption may also turn an opponent into an inside adversary.
We assume that an inside adversary may corrupt up to t − 1 audit officers. In
addition, an inside adversary may not interfere with registration processes, cannot
circumvent complexity theoretic assumptions of security mechanisms or change the
content of logs and bulletin boards.
5.4.3 Further Types of Adversaries
We are aware that further types of adversaries can be devised. E.g. the consider-
ation of adversaries that may interfere with registration processes would require
rethinking these mechanisms. This could possibly impact the main security design.
Yet, dealing with these adversaries is out of the scope of this thesis and considered
future work.
5.5 System Overview
The main principles introduced in the previous sections manifest in an integrated
architecture (also briefly denoted as system), which is depicted in overview in Fig-
ure 5.10. This section defines the involved parties and modules. Also, it provides
temporal and logical views of the system.
5.5.1 Parties and Modules
Conforming with Figure 1.3 and concretizing the number of instantiations involved,
we specify the parties6 within the integrated system as follows
6The icons used to visualize the parties throughout this thesis have been shown in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.10: Integrated architecture in overview
• a registration authority (RA),
• a law enforcement authority (LEA),
• a set of t− 1 audit officers (AOs), where t7 is an odd integer of at least 3,
• a data protection officer (DPO),
• an arbitrarily large number of mobile users (MUs), which is made up of first
responders and specialist,
• a central user (CU)8.
In order to execute operations and protocols, the parties are supported by and
make use of the following main modules, that implement system functionality:
• The RA is equipped with a registration module, which supports the creation
and storage of a registration list as well as the definition of authorization sets,
which are used in the auditing. Also, a verifiable mixnet (cf. Section 4.1.2) is
implemented in the registration module.
• The CU is supported by modules for visualization of the emergency situation
and communication with the outside world. The communication module im-
plements the mechanisms for end-to-end secure attribute-based messaging.
7The parameter t defines the threshold of parties that need to cooperate in order to execute certain
distributed computations, cf. Section 4.1.2, Section 5.2.2 and Section 6.1.
8We represent the group of people working inside a control center by a single entity, cf. Section 2.3.3.
92 5 Integrated Approach within Reference Scenario
• Location updates of MUs are handled by a communication module for incom-
ing tracking information and by a database module, that securely stores the
received data, which results in a location audit log.
• The AOs and the DPO are supported by modules for the log analysis, which
enable a multilaterally secure location-based auditing.
5.5.2 Phases
The complete approach can be divided into several phases. The temporal alignment
of the phases9. and the involved parties are shown in Figure 5.11. The phases are
described next.
• Setup Phase: In this phase, system parameters for the cryptosystems and cryp-
tographic master keys used for registration, communication and auditing are
created.
• Registration Phase: Each mobile user personalizes her communication device,
by receiving credentials according to her properties; she is thus enabled for
pseudonym generation and secure communication. Also, each user and her
registration informations are added to a registration list.
• Activation and Group Communication Phase: After being registered and logged
in the emergency communication network, mobile users can be requested to
join rescue missions by a central user, using end-to-end secure attribute-based
messaging. Also, further group communications are enabled by this mecha-
nism.
• Location Tracking Phase: Upon activation, during a rescue mission, a mobile
user regularly provides location updates under transaction pseudonyms to
the control center. This is referred to as location tracking phase. The frequency
of location updates depends on the preference of the user. The transaction
pseudonyms are created locally on the personal device. Location updates are
securely stored in a location audit log in the command and control center.
• Location Auditing Phase: In this phase, entries of the log are jointly processed
by audit and data protection officers for organizational and legal liability rea-
sons. Upon convincing detection of inappropriate actions, implicit attributes
of pseudonyms can be re-identified. The created traces support dispute reso-
lutions, in which mobile users may also exercise an individual access to the log,
in order to repudiate false accusations by providing evidence of exoneration.
If a log analysis leads to to court proceedings, a law enforcement authority can
re-identify any log entries that may support returning a verdict.
9In most cases, previous phases are necessary for the next phase to proceed, e.g. cryptographic keys
have to be generated before they can be used, users have to be registered before they can act,
and data has to be recorded in logs before the auditing can start. In case of activation and group
communication as well as location tracking, phases are overlapping.
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Figure 5.11: Phases and involved parties
• Transparency Phase: In this phase, the appropriateness of the actions of the
audit officers in the log analysis phase can be verified by mobile users. This is
done by checking the transcripts created in the log analysis that are stored on
the broadcast channels with memory. Additionally, transparency information
can be exchanged between the data protection officer and mobile users.
5.5.3 Interactions
Having introduced a temporal view in the last section, this section gives a logical
view of the interactions within the system. During the operation and use of the sys-
tem, the present parties interact and cooperate in several ways. Figure 5.12 depicts
the main interactions. The numbers refer to the following list of interactions:
1. Generation of System Parameters and Public Keys
2. Generation and Distribution of Private Keys
3. Registration of Mobile Users
4. Provision of Attributes for Use in Communication
5. Provision of Location Updates
6. Group Communication
7. Provision of Authorization Sets
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Figure 5.12: Interactions between parties
8. Cooperative Audit
9. Individual Log Access
10. Law Enforcement
11. Exchange of Transparency Information
This section defined who interacts and cooperates in which logical procedures.
The mechanisms that implement these procedures will be presented in detail in the
next chapter.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced our novel approach to multilaterally secure perva-
sive cooperation in overview. In the context of the whole thesis, this chapter has an
integrating function. It connected the application scenario of location-aware first re-
sponse to a system model, we introduced the main principles to implement security
and the resulting integrated architecture.
Our integrated approach addresses the shortcomings of existing work as follows:
• In order to enable secure communication with unknown receivers, we pro-
pose to make mobile users implicitly addressable via attributes. In particular,
we applied the hybrid encryption technique for expressive policies (presented
in Chapter 4) such that location privacy of receivers is protected as well as the
appropriateness to users is supported. We thus contributed the principles and
basics of a novel attribute-based addressing and messaging mechanism; it har-
nesses attributes related to organizations, roles, specializations as well as the
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current location of a user in conjunction. We thus also added a concept for
attribute combinations that are both practical and appropriate to real users to
the literature.
• In order to achieve a fair balance of location privacy protection and account-
ability, we propose that mobile users regularly provide location updates to-
gether with linkable transaction pseudonyms. In particular, we leverage pseu-
donyms with implicit attributes (cf. Chapter 4) for this task; stored location
updates constitute audit logs that are pseudonymized already upon creation.
In order to complement this proposal, we contributed novel mechanisms for
real-world auditing. This setting has not been addressed by the previous work
in the area of pseudonymous auditing. In addition, we contributed pseudony-
mous location traces as a particular form of evidence. On a technical level, our
proposal combines cooperative auditing with transparency mechanisms in or-
der to constitute a second level of accountability w.r.t. the actions of involved
authorities. Existing research has not proposed such capabilities in combina-
tion. We thus extended the concept of pseudonymous auditing to multilater-
ally secure auditing.
In order to complement the description of our integrated proposal, we also pro-
vided the underlying communication network model and a novel adversary model
that captures the characteristics of multilateral security in our cooperative setting.
In this chapter, the introduced approach was presented in terms of parties, mod-
ules, phases and interactions. Beyond that, further technical and organizational
mechanisms are associated to our proposal. They will be introduced in detail in
Chapter 6.

6Mechanisms
In this chapter, we describe the mechanisms that implement the procedures intro-
duced in the last chapter in detail. This includes setup, registration, communication,
location tracking as well as auditing mechanisms.
The presentation in this chapter is structured according to the chronological se-
quence: firstly, the system setup as well as the mechanisms and procedures for man-
aging and registering the digital identities of mobile users are described, in Section
6.1. This is followed by a description of the registration mechanisms in Section 6.2.
Section 6.3 then describes the messaging mechanisms, including examples. In Sec-
tion 6.4 we describe, how location tracking information is provided to the command
and control center. The mechanisms for multilaterally secure auditing are given in
Section 6.5, including an example. Finally, the chapter is summarized in Section 6.6.
6.1 Setup
In this phase, system parameters and cryptographic keys, both related to auditing
and messaging functionalities, are created and distributed, if necessary. The par-
ties involved in the setup are the registration authority (RA), the law enforcement
authority (LEA), the data protection officer (DPO) and a set of audit officers (AOs).
This phase proceeds as follows. In order to setup auditing functionalities, the
following steps are executed:
1. The RA chooses the parameters t and n. Hereby, t is the threshold that spec-
ifies the number of authorities that need to cooperate, is an odd integer of at
least 3, and n = 2t− 11.
2. The RA creates the ElGamal system parameters.
1The parameters n and t have a direct influence on the underlying threshold ElGamal cryptosystem.
As introduced in Section 4.1.2, it can tolerate a maximum of t − 1 corrupt authorities, yet still
requires a majority of t participating authorities. The total number of authorities n has to be (at
least) n = t− 1 + t = 2t− 1, thus t− 1 is a minority of authorities. Cf. Section 4.1.2, Section 5.2.2
and Section 5.5.1.
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3. The LEA generates an ElGamal key pair (SKLB, PKLB). Then, the LEA executes
an (t, n)-secret sharing [202] on the SKLB, hereby dealing out one share to the
DPO, one share to each of the t− 1 AOs, and keeps the remaining n− t shares.
4. The AOs, the DPO and the LEA authority jointly create a shared key z, using
the distributed key generation protocol according to Pedersen [172]. As in the
case of the private key, each AO and the DPO receive one share, while the LEA
receives any further share. The key will be used within blinding operations
for re-identification of transaction pseudonyms.
In order to setup messaging functionalities, the following steps are executed:
1. The RA creates the system parameters for the hybrid encryption technique,
including CP-ABE system parameters.
2. The RA generates keys for the hybrid encryption technique. In order to do so,
it executes the setup algorithm2 of the underlying CP-ABE cryptosystem, thus
the RA generates the public parameters PK and the master key MK. The MK
is kept secret by the RA. Thus, the RA is enabled to play the role of the AA of
the CP-ABE part of the hybrid encryption technique.
6.2 Registration
The registration is an organizational mechanism that defines which mobile users
belong to the system and may thus participate in cooperative incident responses. In
the registration phase, mobile users interact with the registration authority in order
to personalize their communication devices according to their digital identity, by
receiving cryptographic keys and being included in a registration list.
The following section describes how digital identities are represented within the
present approach. Then, the process of the registration itself is given.
6.2.1 Representation of Digital Identities
In order to be addressable in communications, to be able to provide pseudonymous
location updates and also to be re-identifiable in a log analysis, it is necessary that
properties of mobile user are digitally represented within the system. Supporting
the use of real world properties of real world entities as digital identifiers in com-
puter networks and applications is commonly denoted as digital identity manage-
ment [170]. Generally, a digital identity abstracts from a real world person or user,
implementing a unique digital representation of that entity. Also, such a digital
identity details relationships to other entities or parties and contains associated ac-
cess rights and credentials w.r.t. certain application contexts [246].
2The setup algorithm is the key generation procedure for the attribute authority (AA) of a CP-ABE
system.
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Figure 6.1: Representation of digital identities
In the present approach, mobile users are registered to the system according to a
specific digital identity profile that is described next. Figure 6.1 depicts how such a
digital identity for multilaterally secure pervasive cooperation is organized. It consists of
three logical layers, thus it comprises the following identity-related informations:
1. the core identity: the unique representation of an real world identity, i.e. a
mobile user, consisting of a unique base identifier and related informations,
2. static user properties: organizational roles and specializations or relevant skills,
i.e. all static attributes relevant to emergency communications,
3. dynamic user properties: location-dependent and thus dynamic attributes and
associated embedded credentials3 as well as access rights to audit logs, i.e.
transaction authenticators.
In our approach, every layer is associated with keying material and credentials
that a mobile user receives for implementing the targeted security goals:
• In order to reconcile privacy protection and accountability, a base pseudonym
PUi ,B is issued and further derived informations are registered, to enable the
pseudonymous provision of location updates and the selective analysis of au-
dit logs,
• in order to enable end-to-end secure communication via attribute-based mes-
saging, a private attribute set {A}Ui , containing static attributes, is issued, and
the generation of dynamic attributes is supported.
3According to Section 4.4.3, we denote the local generation of keys and credentials on a device as
embedded. Thus, the term associated embedded credentials refers to keys that are generated according
to dynamic attributes.
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Figure 6.2: Sample registration list
A personal communication device, that is carried by and associated to any mobile
user, as specified in Section 5.3, provides the digital container, platform and tech-
nical trust anchor of this approach. It is personalized in the registration process,
which is described next.
6.2.2 Registration Process
During the the registration process, an integrity-protected registration list is created
by the RA. The list contains one entry per mobile user that is registered to the
system. An example of such a list is depicted in Figure 6.2. As shown, each list entry
contains identity-related informations including a unique reference value, a unique
role pseudonym, an encryption of the real world identity as well as associated static
attributes4. The underlying registration which creates such a list has two main parts.
We describe them next.
The first main part of the registration proceeds according to the registration proce-
dure introduced in Section 4.2.2, i.e. this procedure is instantiated in our application
context of first response. During this part, the RA issues a base pseudonym to each
mobile user, that enables her to derive transaction pseudonyms locally on her de-
vice. In order to register, the user provides her mobile device for personalization to
the RA. In case the user has no such device, she receives a new one5. Then, this part
of the registration process consists of the following main steps:
1. For each user, a new entry in the integrity protected registration list created
is by the RA. An encryption of the users’ real world identity is added to that
entry.
4Additional keys issued to the users are neglected in the figure.
5For example, this is the case if a new external specialist or volunteer registers.
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2. The user receives a distinct role pseudonym, which associates the user with
her organizational role in the emergency response context. Also, the user re-
ceives a distinct reference value, which we denote AUi . Both, the role pseudo-
nym and the reference value are added to the respective entry of the registra-
tion list.
3. Then, the user receives a base pseudonym, which is a non-deterministic en-
cryption of the reference value: PUi ,B = EPKLB(AUi). It is registered to the
mobile device.
4. The random factor ri,B used in the encryption of the reference value is stored
on the user’s device.
5. The user generates an unique seed sUi and registers it to the PRNG of her
mobile device6.
In the second part of the registration process, a user receives attributes for use
in end-to-end secure attribute-based messaging. System-wide attributes with same
semantics have the same string representation. The attribute-related registration
proceeds as follows:
1. Upon proof of eligibility given by the user, the RA creates a set of crypto-
graphic attributes, by executing the key generation according to the CP-ABE
system within the hybrid encryption technique. This set contains attributes ac-
cording to organization as well as role memberships and specializations that
a mobile user satisfies.
2. The resulting set of attributes, {A}Ui , is transferred to the user’s device.
3. In turn, the unique identification number of the mobile device is added to the
user’s entry in the registration list.
4. The user receives a key for symmetric encryption of replies, KRSAck, and registers
two keys for mutual message authentication7 with sender S, denoted KRMAC
and KSMAC.
5. Additionally, the user receives a symmetric keys, denoted KLL, for securing
the location lock function of the hybrid encryption technique.
Having participated in the registration, a mobile user is enabled to participate in
cooperative rescue missions.
6Figure 4.4 shows the functions of seed and base pseudonym in the generation of transaction
pseudonyms.
7The keys are part of message authentication codes (MACs).
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Figure 6.3: Implementation of ABM within integrated system
6.3 Activation and Group Communication
For this phase, we assume that mobile users have been registered to the system be-
fore and are in the passive state. As detailed in section 5.1, this means they have
joined the digital emergency network via their personalized communication de-
vices, and are thus able to receive messages that are sent by the central user. The
communication mechanism for this kind of group communication is denoted end-
to-end secure attribute-based messaging. The following sections provide a detailed de-
scription of our approach.
6.3.1 Overview
Within the integrated system (cf. Section 5.5), the communication mechanism of
end-to-end secure attribute-based messaging is mainly implemented in the module
for outgoing communication and on the personalized communication devices. The
module for outgoing communication also provides
• a digital map (DM), that helps selecting location attributes,
• a central attribute data base (ADB), that stores all defined static attributes,
• a message log (ML), that stores outgoing messages,
• a readers list (RL), that is used to document the group of readers of a message.
Log and list are append-only. Figure 6.3 shows the components in overview.
In the present approach, the realization of end-to-end secure ABM hinges on two
main conceptual layers:
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• On the logical messaging policy layer, a sender may specify logical messaging
policies, in order to select receivers in the communication via an ABM system
on a level of abstraction different to identity.
• The access control layer provides security mechanisms that enforce the con-
straints specified by the logical messaging policies, by employing encryption
techniques and tamper-resistant access control support mechanisms.
In the following, sending a single message by means of the provided communi-
cation functionality is called a messaging act.
6.3.2 Logical Messaging Policy Layer:
In any messaging act, a sender
• has to choose between two communication modes: direction communication /
requests and depositions. The first one refers to the communication patterns
CP1-CP3, the latter one to CP4 (cf. Section 2.4.2);
• specifies the logical messaging policy. Therefore, the sender firstly selects at-
tributes that represent organizations (e.g. Police), roles (e.g. Group Leader)
and specializations (e.g. Specialist Toxic Matters), from the central attribute
database, secondly, selects a location attribute by selecting a geographic area
on a digital map. This is executed by selecting two points P1, P2 that define a
rectangle (cf. Figure 4.10). According to the spatial position on a digital map,
each point refers to a GPS position that is thus specified.
The basic structure of logical messaging policies, as shown in Figure 5.4, is a logi-
cal conjunction of one attribute related to location, one attribute related to a special-
ization, one attribute related to a role as well as one attribute related to an organiza-
tion. Thus, a specified logical messaging policy consists of at least one and at most
four of the given attributes.
6.3.3 Access Control Layer
End-to-end secure attribute-based messaging makes use of an efficient end-to-end
encryption mechanism in order to guarantee end-to-end confidentiality against out-
side adversaries. Especially, we build upon the novel hybrid encryption technique
(cf. Section 4.3) that is proposed within this thesis. It is the main mechanism for im-
plementing the access control layer. Yet, the selection of the communication pattern
has an effect on this access control layer:
• for direct communications (CP1,CP3) and requests (CP2), the enforcement
requires making use of the hybrid encryption technique,
• depositions (CP4) can be handled with CP-ABE (cf. Section 4.3.2) alone.
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Figure 6.4: Mapping of messaging policies to hybrid encryption
In the latter case, the specification of sending policy does not contain a continuous
location attribute. This allows for a direct mapping to CP-ABE policies8. If a depo-
sition is chosen, also no broadcast of messages is executed. Rather, the deposited
message is internally stored on the ML for parties that join the rescue missions at a
later point in time.
The following descriptions focus on the realization of CP1-CP3. In this case, log-
ical messaging policies are mapped to the hybrid encryption technique as follows,
also shown in Figure 6.4: the attributes related to organizations, roles and special-
izations are mapped to a structured CP-ABE policy. This structured policy adheres
to the structure of the messaging policy, i.e. it is a conjunction. The attribute related
to location is basically handled as introduced in Section 4.4.2. In particular, a key is
securely derived from GPS coordinates and then XORed with a symmetric session
key.
6.3.4 Protocol for End-to-End Secure Messaging
This section provides a schematic view of messaging acts, in order to complement
the description.
In order to send a message, the sender has to specify a logical messaging policy
by selecting static attributes and a location attribute on the digital map DM, and
composes the message content. Basically, a messaging act furthermore consists of
a broadcast of an end-to-end encrypted message ME2E and answer back steps. The
end-to-end encryption incorporates a unique message ID, IDM, to prevent replay
attacks, symmetric non-repudiation is supported by message authentication codes
(MACs). Messages sent out and acknowledged readers are documented on message
log (ML) and readers list (RL). Optionally, readers can reply and answer a read
messages.
8Yet, this kind of encryption can be executed in the same technical setting given by our hybrid en-
cryption approach, i.e. the hybrid encryption technique reduces to CP-ABE in that case.
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Figure 6.5: Protocol for end-to-end secure attribute-based messaging
In Section 5.2.1, our approach to attribute-based messaging has been introduced
to consist of the main steps sending, local evaluation and acknowledgement9. The pro-
tocol that implements these steps and which is underlying every messaging act is
depicted in Figure 6.5. In this figure, the left side represents the sender in a con-
trol center, the right side the mobile users that receive message. Here, || represents
string concatenation. In detail, the protocol proceeds as follows:
• The sender concatenates: a message content m, a unique message ID, which
we denote as IDM, and a MAC on the former two contents. This MAC is real-
ized via hashing the concatenated content and a symmetric key. Then, an en-
cryption according to the specified logical messaging policy is executed. The
so encrypted message ME2E is broadcasted via the digital emergency commu-
nication network. Also, the message is added to the message list ML.
• Upon receiving the message, every mobile user tries to decrypt the message.
This succeeds, if the policy is satisfied. Decryption provides the received mes-
sage content MR, the received message ID IMRM as well as the received MAC
value hR. Every user verifies whether the message ID is fresh, i.e. that it has
not been used before10. Also, it verifies the MAC by recomputing it and com-
paring the value.
9Optionally, a reader can answer a message. This step can be implemented mostly analogously to
acknowledgements. Further details, e.g. a set of reference strings for indicating different levels of
priority of a message, are considered future work.
10In order to verify that a message ID has not been used before, a receiver has to store every received
message ID locally on her device. The received MACs are also stored to support a later analysis.
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• In case both verifications succeed, a receiver becomes a reader of the message.
She acknowledges that she is able to read a fresh and integrity protected mes-
sage. In order to so, she concatenates the string "Ack", the received message
ID, her unique device identification number and a MAC on the previous con-
tent. Together, this is symmetrically encrypted and sent to the command and
control center as acknowledgement message.
• The sender decrypts every received acknowledgement message. Decryption
provides the "Ack" string, the value of a message ID IDSM, a devices identifica-
tion number IMSISR and a MAC value h
S. The sender identifies the messaging
act via the IDSM and verifies the MAC value. If this succeeds, a reference to the
reader and the message is added to the RL, in order to document the group of
readers of a message.
6.3.5 Examples
As introduced, end-to-end secure attribute-based messaging is a very flexible com-
munication mechanism. In this section, we give concrete examples of messaging
policies and elaborate on their relevance to the first response application context, in
order to show how ABM can be applied effectively. In Figure 6.6, six distinct ex-
amples are given. In every example the rightmost string shall represent a location
attribute selected on a digital map. Here, textual representations instead of GPS po-
sitions, e.g. "Near Disaster Area", are used to convey the functions in the application
context.
• Example 1: This policy can be used in order to communicate tactical informa-
tion relevant to a rescue mission. The role attribute group leader is used to
address mobile users with command and control responsibilities in the field.
This reflects that command and control is actually exercised locally in the first
response domain.
• Example 2: Based on a policy as given in this example, specialist that may
immediately be required can be contacted. In this case, the sender can select a
location attribute that specifies a region which allows for a fast transfer to the
incident site.
• Example 3: This policy maps to a situation, which requires large numbers of
helpers with a special skill. Such helpers are normally not directly associated
to an emergency services organization, but are rather available and organized
as volunteers. In the message content, they can e.g. be requested to show up
at a certain point, where a local organizer will arrange further instructions.
• Example 4: Medics with special skills are often required in order to quickly
react in emergency situations. With such kind of messaging policy, they can
efficiently be contacted to allow for a fast engagement.
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Figure 6.6: Examples of logical messaging policies
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• Example 5: Reports and informations on the local situation are often valuable
to decision makers in a control center. This kind of policy can be used to
harness mobile users as human sensors, i.e. requesting them to send in reports
or digital photos that document local effects if a disaster. It thus implements a
kind of query on human sensors.
• Example 6: In case that only the location addressing is used, a pure geo-casting
functionality can be realized. This can for example be used to send out urgent
warnings to all mobile users involved in a rescue mission.
6.4 Location Tracking
After a mobile user has changed her state to active, i.e. upon the start of her par-
ticipation in a rescue mission, the user provides location updates to the command
and control center, i.e. messages including information on the current location of
the user. The computation of this location information is GPS-based, i.e. the com-
munication device locally estimates latitude and longitude values of the user’s geo-
graphic position based on the global positioning system. Every update is send along
with a transaction pseudonym. The frequency of updates is chosen accordingly to
the preference of the user, e.g. every 10 seconds.
The provision of location information consists of the following steps:
1. Pseudonym Generation: Each user Ui derives from her base pseudonym PUi ,B
an ordered set of transaction pseudonyms {PUi ,j}. In order to do so, firstly, the
seeded PRNG of the communication device is used to produce an ordered set
of random factors {ri,j}. Then, the random factor inside the base pseudonym
is updated with a random factor from the set, i.e. a re-encryption is performed:
PUi ,1 = PUi ,B ∗ (gri,1 , hri,1), PUi,j+1 = PUi ,j ∗ (gri,j+1 , hri,j+1)11.
2. Location Updates: In the active state, each user provides location information
along with transaction pseudonyms from the set {PUi ,j}. According to the
preferences of each user, location updates are sent in a specified interval of
time. Each time, the pseudonym PUi ,j is changed to PUi ,j+1. Changing a trans-
action pseudonym, based on re-encryption, does not change the reference
value encoded in the pseudonym.
3. Storage: The location updates are securely stored after reception in the com-
mand and control center, thus a location audit log is created. Its entries are in
the form pseudonym - time - location. The pseudonym field records the value of a
transaction pseudonym.
In the given description, we abstract from additional security mechanisms, i.e.
signing and encrypting the location. For this purpose, standard mechanisms can be
applied, especially the update only needs to be encrypted for a single party in the
command and control center.
11The described method is also shown in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 6.7: Process and steps of auditing
6.5 Multilaterally Secure Auditing
While providing location updates, as described above, proceeds automated once it
is triggered, an ex-post audit is a more complex socio-technical process, involving
cooperative decisions, execution of technical protocols as well as dispute resolution
steps. The following sections describe both the technical mechanisms, which make
use of the operations associated to pseudonyms with implicit attributes, as intro-
duced in Section 4.1, as well the embedding in an integrated process. Firstly, an
overview of the proposed process is given, followed by further descriptions of the
involved mechanisms. This als includes descriptions of the associated transparency
mechanisms.
6.5.1 Overview
The proposed approach to multilaterally secure auditing consist of several main
steps, that are shown in Figure 6.7. It results from extending and modifying the
basic process of pseudonymous auditing due to Sobirey et al. [209, 67] (cf. Figure
3.2). In particular, our proposal reflects that
• real-world audits based on collected location information require starting points
for the analysis to commence. We introduce incident reports for this purpose;
• the support of partial re-identifications in the auditing mechanisms manifest
in dispute resolution steps on the process level;
• transparency measures complement the audit, they are partly realized as ad-
ditional ex-post log access and analysis steps12.
12In the following, the transparency mechanisms are described separately in Section 6.5.5.
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The main steps proceed as follows:
• Incident Report: A log analysis is started upon a possible case of misuse is re-
ported. We call this an incident report. It contains the description of a possible
malicious incident associated with a time and a location. Incident reports can
e.g. be given by eye witnesses after a rescue mission.
• Trace Re-Identification: Upon receiving an incident report, the authorities au-
thorized for auditing begin to analyze an existing location audit log. The en-
tries of the log are initially unlinkable w.r.t. their identifiers, since they are
indexed by transaction pseudonyms. Based on the linking procedures sup-
ported by the underlying pseudonym technique, i.e. secure multiparty com-
putation protocols, transaction pseudonyms can be linked to each other, in
order to create a trace. Linking two transaction pseudonyms means that they
represent the same mobile user, yet without disclosing which user is actu-
ally represented. Created traces (or single transaction pseudonyms) can be
partially re-identified. This means that implicit attributes of a trace, possibly
related to organizational or team structures, can be detected, again without
disclosing the real world identity of the represented user.
• Dispute Resolution: Having re-identified an implicit attribute of a trace implies
that a mobile user has been present at a certain location and time, as repre-
sented by the trace. This information is used to find out further details about
the case of misuse that was reported. Therefore, a responsible person is asked
whether she can resolve the dispute, whether the reported incident took place,
or to provide further relevant information.
• Individual Access: In the dispute resolution step, a mobile user may be named
to be possibly involved in the reported incident. In this case, the user may
react by providing further information on the incident. Also, she may indi-
vidually access the audit log in order to repudiate false accusations by pro-
viding evidences of exoneration. In case that a dispute could not be resolved,
i.e. if it could not be by verified whether a misuse took place, or traces could
not be associated to an accountable user, additional traces can be created and
re-identified. Also, a partial re-identification may be executed on a more fine-
grained level.
• Cooperative Disclosure: Following a partial re-iden-tification, a complete re-
identification can be executed, upon a detection of inappropriate actions docu-
ment by the log. We call this a cooperative disclosure. In this case, pseudonyms
can be completely revoked in order to unveil the encoded reference value.
This value refers to an entry of the registration. The encrypted real world
identity field can then be decrypted consecutively.
• Law Enforcement: This step is optional. If a log analysis leads to court proceed-
ings, i.e. a detected incident has legal relevance, a law enforcement authority
can disclose all log entries that may support returning a verdict.
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Figure 6.8: Visualization of log analysis
Figure 6.9: Example of re-identiﬁed trace
6.5.2 Log Analysis Mechanisms
The presented approach to auditing makes use of transaction pseudonyms as cen-
tral reference points for implementing security mechanisms. For the log analysis
itself, this entails that a pseudonym and the associated time and GPS position can
be represented on a digital map, in order to visualize the analysis. An example
of such a visualization is given in Figure 6.8. In this Figure, the x-axis of the dig-
ital map represents the longitude value of the GPS position, the y-axis the corre-
sponding latitude value. Green points represent entries of the log which have not
been considered for analysis operations yet, blue points and associated arrows with
a continuous line represent a trace that has already been created. Arrows with a
dashed line indicate sample possibilities for continuing the trace creation. An es-
tablished trace can be re-identified w.r.t. attributes that are implicitly associated
with a pseudonym via registration information. An example of a re-identified trace
is shown in Figure 6.9.
The procedures employed within a log analysis, as specified in Section 6.5.2, are
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based on secure multiparty computation protocols, i.e. computations on encrypted
data, which is possible since pseudonyms are created as re-encryptions of ElGamal
ciphertexts. The linking and re-identification procedures are jointly executed by the
audit officers and the data protection officer. This requires that each officer agrees
to the execution by providing the partial input to the broadcast channel, which is
also called a bulletin board and implemented by a bulletin board server. The bul-
letin board server synchronizes the distributed computations, i.e. it aggregates the
partial results of every officer. Also, it creates a transcript of every executed proce-
dure. The transcript includes pseudonym-based references to log entries, wherein
pseudonyms are denoted as Pm, Pn in case of two pseudonyms that are linked, and
as {Pm, Pn, ..}, in case a trace is considered. Also, the transcript refers to the opera-
tion that has been executed (linking, re-identification, disclosure) and a result of the
operation, where applicable. Thus, a transcript includes the following content:
• Log entries indexed by Pm, Pn have been considered for linking. Linking re-
sult: true / false.
• Log entries indexed by {Pm, Pn, ..} have been considered for re-identification
w.r.t. attribute A. Re-identification result: true / false.
• Log entries indexed by {Pm, Pn, ..} have been considered for disclosure.
These transcripts created by a log analysis constitute a transparency log. Associ-
ated transparency mechanisms are described in Section 6.5.5.
6.5.3 Disclosure Policy and Provision of Authorization Sets
Within the log analysis, officers jointly re-identify every created trace w.r.t. to an
implicit attribute A. This supports that only minimal identity-related informations
need to be disclosed in the course of an audit. Yet, the actual conditions and rules
according to which attributes may be re-identified, i.e. the disclosure policy (cf. Sec-
tion 5.2.2), have to be defined within the application context. The present approach
supports a step-wise disclosure based on implicit attributes. A disclosure policy can
basically be defined by means of organizational structures, which allows adhering
to the need-to-know principle [6], i.e. to start a step-wise analysis on a coarse level.
For example, the disclosure policy may state that the first re-identification shall
be executed w.r.t. to an organizational attribute, e.g. "Police". The consecutive
re-identification steps may then test whether roles within an organization are satis-
fied ( e.g. the attribute "First Responder"), or check against existing team structures
(e.g. the already given example of the attribute "Response Team Alpha"). Every
implicit attribute refers to an authorization set, that needs to be defined by the reg-
istration authority. The definition of an authorization set proceeds according to
the mechanisms introduced in Section 6.5.2. In order to do so, the RA firstly se-
lects the base pseudonyms of the relevant entries of the registration list and then
anonymizes them by means of a verifiable mixnet. The resulting authorization set
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Figure 6.10: Provision of authorization sets
is then provided to the officers, which derive a blind reference set from it. This pro-
vision is also shown in Figure 6.10. Blind reference sets can be reused, i.e. multiple
re-identifications w.r.t. to the same represented attribute can be executed.
Technically, implicit attributes have a set-based representation. This allows for-
mulating the disclosure policy additionally in terms of anonymity, since anonymity
is defined according to the size of the anonymity set. For example, a disclosure pol-
icy might state that a re-identification step has to be based on an anonymity set with
cardinality of 20.
6.5.4 Mechanism for Individual Log Access
In order to resolve disputes, a mobile user Ui may access data recorded in the log
that relate to herself. In order to do, she selects an entry k of the log by handing out
authentication information in form of an aggregated random factor ri,A = ∑
j=k
j=1 ri,j
and the base pseudonym PUi ,B to the access control mechanism of the log, i.e. the
policy decision point. After verifying, whether the pseudonym indexing the log
entry k matches the reconstructed transaction pseudonym PUi ,k, the user receives a
tuple time - location. This may additionally by certified by the audit officers. The user
can use the tuple to repudiate location- and time-dependent accusations against her.
The protocol for individual log access is also given in Figure 6.11.
6.5.5 Transparency Mechanisms
Transparency mechanisms implement a second level of accountability within our
approach, i.e. audit officers can be made accountable for violating the disclosure
policy within an audit log analysis. Our transparency mechanisms have two com-
ponents:
• Firstly, a data protection officer is involved in the auditing and has to agree
in order to execute any operation within an log analysis. Thus, the DPO can
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Figure 6.11: Protocol for individual log access
Figure 6.12: Transparency within auditing process
provide details on the analysis and on the decision process to every requesting
user.
• Secondly, the transcripts created by a log analysis constitute a transparency
log. This log can be accessed by a user to decide whether the investigations
have been executed according to the disclosure policy.
Figure 6.12 shows the scope of the latter mechanism within the complete auditing
process.
In order to implement it, we propose that an affected user may selectively access
the transparency log, in order to verify all entries indexed by pseudonyms that re-
late to herself. As in the case of individual log access, transaction pseudonyms are
the reference points for implementing an selective access mechanism, this time to
the transparency logs. In order to access the transparency log, a user provides her
base pseudonym PUi ,B, her chosen seed value and the index of her last generated
transaction pseudonym to the access control mechanism of the transparency log.
The access control mechanism firstly reconstructs every transaction pseudonym the
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user has provided within an location update by iteratively reencrypting the base
pseudonym. Then it selects every entry of the transparency log that contains a
transaction pseudonym that is present in the afore created list of used transaction
pseudonyms. The entries of the transparency log are handed out to the user. They
document the auditing actions that have been induced on log entries that relate to
the user herself.
6.5.6 Scenario and Application Example
Having described the mechanisms for auditing, we now provide a descriptive ex-
ample that shall illustrate how the presented approach can actually be employed in
practice. Again, the example takes place in an emergency response context.
We assume the scenario that a large airport is affected by a large scale emergency.
Several airplanes have caught fire due to an accident. The burning is spreading
over to the terminal buildings. Since the fire brigade of the airport is unable to
handle the situation on its own, additional forces from nearby fire departments are
requested. Also, a local fire department sends a group of 50 mobile first responders
to support the rescue missions. Arriving at the airport, the first responders register
to the system.
During the course of the successful rescue mission, their movements and posi-
tions are continuously sent to the control center and stored in the audit log. After
successfully managing the emergency, a group of airport officers is appointed to
analyze a specific incident which has been reported to them by an anonymous eye
witness: it is mentioned that a group of 4 firefighters suddenly disappeared from an
important task to extinguish fire in an office wing, located in the vicinity of a jeweler
in the shopping area. The store reports that expensive items have disappeared, and
several offices have been destroyed due to the lack of man power. Analyzing the
log, the officers manage to identify traces of 5 pseudonymous users that move away
from the office wing in question (by linking log entries). Moreover, the 5 traces can
be re-identified to belong to a local fire department (by re-identifying implicit at-
tributes). On request, the responsible local commander asserts that a group of his
first responders decided to change a mission task, due to the observation of strange
knocking sounds nearby. While, in that case, the commanders information suffices
to resolve the dispute on the incident in question, the concerned firefighters could
have also used the individual log access functionality, in order to document the
actions during the mission.
6.6 Summary
This chapter provided the details of the mechanisms relevant to our integrated ap-
proach to multilaterally secure pervasive cooperation. Continuing our scenario-
oriented presentation, the mechanisms were illustrated in the context of location-
aware first response. In particular, our presentation included setup, registration,
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communication, location tracking as well as auditing and transparency mechanisms.
We contributed:
• a novel representation of digital identities which supports mobile users to be
addressable in communications, to be able to provide pseudonymous loca-
tion updates, to be re-identifiable in a log analysis and to individually access
log content. The proposed representation is organized in three logical layers;
on the user’s side, a personal communication device provides the digital con-
tainer, platform and technical trust anchor of this approach.
• a trusted registration process; registered users are enabled to participate in co-
operative rescue missions. The registration complements our digital identity
representation as the main organizational trust anchor of our work.
• a protocol for end-to-end secure attribute-based messaging; the proposal sup-
ports protection against replay attacks, non-repudiation of senders and docu-
mentation of readers. In addition, we provided novel use cases for ABM con-
cepts. This included the capability to query human sensors, which we thus
added to the literature.
• a novel auditing process; in contrast to previous work, a stepwise process is
introduced. It is more closely designed according to human-oriented dispute
resolutions. As part of this process, means for individual access to audit log
content were provided. We showed how to implement a policy decision point
that leverages transaction pseudonyms as central reference points. In addi-
tion, we gave a descriptive application example of real-world auditing capa-
bilities. Differently to existing work, our proposal can flexibly be instantiated
with and without law enforcement capabilities.
• transparency mechanisms that make use both of a data protection officer as
well as of transparency logs; such logs can be accessed despite the fact that
affected users are pseudonymous.
Having now completed the description of our novel concepts and mechanisms,
we will evaluate our proposals in Chapter 7.
7Evaluation and Discussion
This thesis addresses IT security and privacy aspects of cooperative pervasive sys-
tems. It aims to develop concepts and mechanisms for what we denote as multilat-
erally secure pervasive cooperation. Yet, evaluating the achieved state of security of a
pervasive system is a challenging task. Showing that our devised mechanisms fulfill
the protection goals that were elicited in Section 2.4 thus requires to consider differ-
ent conceptual and technological layers interwoven within the proposed approach.
In order to support the claim that our goal is reached by the contributions presented
in this thesis, this chapter evaluates and answers the following main questions:
• Are the proposed mechanisms technically feasible? Can they be realized within
the setting they are presented in, under realistic assumptions?
• Are the proposed mechanisms secure? Do they fulfill the protection goals as
stated?
• Are the proposed mechanisms appropriate to potential users? Under which
circumstances could they be used in practice?
In order to answer these question, we built proof of concept implementations and
conducted practical experiments with the prototypes. In addition, we conducted a
security analysis of the mechanisms. Both are presented in this chapter. The secu-
rity of our pseudonym construction is additionally supported by an independent
security evaluation conducted by an external expert. Moreover, we report on exper-
iments with potential real users, based on a preliminary ABM prototype, that sup-
ported the design process. In order to assess limits and circumstances for a practical
use of pseudonymized location traces in dispute resolutions, we conducted simu-
lated court cases as part of a juridical simulation study. Additionally, in this chapter,
we will elaborate on the applicability of our contributions to further settings and
relevant application contexts beyond emergency response.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.1 sketches the
prototypes. Section 7.2 analyzes the main mechanisms w.r.t. the fulfillment of the
security requirements. Appropriateness considerations are presented in Section 7.3.
The general applicability of our concepts is discussed in Section 7.4. We summarize
this chapter in Section 7.5.
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Figure 7.1: Architecture for distributed cryptographic mechanisms
7.1 Technical Feasibility
As part of this work, prototype implementations of the core mechanisms proposed
in this thesis have been developed. Implementing a certain approach is a good
way to find out the obstacles of theoretical concepts and thus to develop a deeper
understand of the material. In particular, our prototypes serve as proof of concept
and thus support the claim that our contributions are technically feasible within
realistic settings. Beside descriptions of the prototype implementations, we also
report on relevant issues related to resource consumptions of our mechanisms.
7.1.1 Prototype of Auditing Mechanisms
In this section, we briefly describe the prototype implementation of multilevel link-
able transaction pseudonyms and the auditing mechanisms which build upon them.
The description includes a simple application example, which shows some of the
main processes realized within the prototype.
The proposed mechanisms have been implemented in the Java programming lan-
guage, which offers APIs for the development of IT security and cryptography-
related software: the Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA) and the Java Cryptog-
raphy Extension (JCE). Additionally, in some parts of our work, we leverage the
FlexiProvider toolkit1, which provides cryptographic base mechanisms suitable for
applications that are implemented according to the JCA.
The prototype supports the generation of pseudonyms and pseudonymized loca-
tion updates as well as the storage in audit logs and the consecutive analysis of log
content. For the generation of location updates and thus the definition of entries in
audit logs, we follow a simulation-based approach. I.e. we developed a module that
1See WWW.FLEXIPROVIDER.DE
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generates the traces of mobile users. A view of the architecture supporting the dis-
tributed cryptographic mechanism for the audit log analysis is given in Figure 7.1.
In our work, we follow the proposal found in the research literature that the com-
munication channels underlying the schemes are represented by a bulletin board,
i.e. a software module that stores and synchronizes the partial inputs of the author-
ities [118] (cf. Section 4.1.2, Figure 4.1 and Section 6.5.2). The prototype can flexibly
handle different distributions of power w.r.t. the threshold parameters t and n and
different strengths of encryption, which have a direct effect on the bitlength of every
transaction pseudonym. In order to illustrate the functionality of the prototype, we
describe a simple and reduced example in the following2.
Example
In the given example, the initial setup phase (cf. Section 6.1) is skipped, and a se-
curity level of 32 bit3 is chosen. This is necessary for the pseudonyms to remain
reasonably displayable on the given sheet of paper, since the chosen level of secu-
rity has an effect on the length of pseudonyms that will be shown in a numerical
representation4.
The example consists of three steps.
• Firstly, in Figure 7.2, the creation of a registration list is shown. Here, we delib-
erately use only two real world names, Bernhard Wolf and Georg Schweer, in
order to draw the reader’s attention to these two entries. For the other entries
of the registration, we make use of the wild-card names Person03 to Person10.
• Next, an excerpt of audit log content that was created in the same setting is
given in Figure 7.3. It especially shows the concept of transaction pseudonyms.
Here, only three location updates are shown. Every entry relates to the same
user. Yet, each entry of the log is associated to a different transaction pseudo-
nym.
• To conclude the example in a meaningful manner, in Figure 7.4 the result of a
pseudonym disclosure is shown5. Here, the role reference is discovered. By
relating it to the registration list, the name of the accountable mobile user, in
this case Berhard Wolf, can be completely recovered.
The depicted example has been part of a simulated court case in a juridical simu-
lation study [205]. This issue will be discussed in Section 7.3.1.
2The example does not include partial re-identifications, which are nevertheless supported by the
prototype.
3The security level relates to ElGamal security, not to symmetric security.
4Choosing a higher security level would result in a longer numerical representation of the
pseudonyms. Displaying a pseudonym that was created according to a security level of 64 bit
e.g. results in a numerical representation as follows: 5138434074120674335-6719133392833443198.
5During a log analysis, further entries stored on a bulletin board have been created. To keep the
example simple, they are not displayed.
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Figure 7.2: Example: registration
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Figure 7.3: Example: excerpt of audit log content
Figure 7.4: Example: disclosure of a pseudonym
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7.1.2 Storage Overhead induced by Transaction Pseudonyms
In this section, we elaborate on the issue of storage overhead that arises due to the
use of pseudonyms with implicit attributes.
Due to the proposed construction, a transaction pseudonym is represented as two
elements of the algebraic group underlying the ElGamal system. Every value thus
refers to one group element, and the bit length of the group element is directly
depending on the chosen security level. As argued before, in order to keep the pre-
vious example presentable within this thesis, we have chosen a security level of 32
bit. In this setup, a single transaction pseudonym is represented by two numerical
values, e.g. 1109354291 and 2197984521 (cf. Figure 7.3).
In a practical application, the security level has to be chosen such that brute-force-
attacks on the pseudonymized data is rendered impossible. Given 32 bit symmetric
security, there may be at most 232 keys that need to be considered for brute-force
decryption. Current security catalogues propose a level according to 100 bit sym-
metric security [34] for practical applications of legally binding digital signatures.
Security No. of Frequency Duration No. of Stored Storage Payload
(in bit) Entities (per min.) (in hours) Pseudonyms (in GB) (in GB)
256 100 2 10 120 000 0.01 < 0.01
256 100 6 10 360 000 0.02 < 0.01
256 500 2 10 600 000 0.04 0.01
256 500 6 10 1 800 000 0.11 0.02
256 100 2 500 6 000 000 0.36 0.06
256 100 6 500 18 000 000 1.07 0.20
256 500 2 500 30 000 000 1.79 0.34
256 500 6 500 90 000 000 5.36 1.01
1024 100 2 10 120 000 0.03 < 0.01
1024 100 6 10 360 000 0.09 < 0.01
1024 500 2 10 600 000 0.14 0.01
1024 500 6 10 1 800 000 0.43 0.02
1024 100 2 500 6 000 000 1.43 0.06
1024 100 6 500 18 000 000 4.29 0.20
1024 500 2 500 30 000 000 7.15 0.34
1024 500 6 500 90 000 000 21.45 1.01
Table 7.1: Storage requirements
Thus, the main storage requirement that is induced by our pseudonym construc-
tion is given by two group elements per transaction pseudonym. The bit size of
each group element depends on the chosen security level. In case that 1024 bit secu-
rity for ElGamal is chosen, every transaction pseudonym thus requires about 2 KB
of storage. Additionally, the frequency of location updates also largely impacts the
storage requirements.
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Table 7.1 contains the calculated storage requirements for representative scenar-
ios. The setting is as follows: we present calculations for a medium (256 bit) and
a high level (1024 bit) of security. Moreover, we distinguish between average scale
(100 entities) and large scale (500 entities) rescue missions. We assume that every
entity sends a pseudonymized location update every 30 seconds or 10 seconds. For
the duration of missions, we distinguish between single missions of 10 hours as
well as a yearly requirement of estimated 500 hours (of location tracking). In the
table, the column No. of Stored Pseudonyms refers to the total number of transaction
pseudonyms (and thus entries of the location audit log) that are created and stored
according to the given scenario. The column Storage shows the resulting calculated
storage needs for the transaction pseudonyms only, taking into account that each
pseudonym is represented as two group elements. The storage requirement for the
additional payload of timestamps and GPS coordinates is given in the last column,
assuming 96 bit of payload per log entry6.
We conclude that, in sum, our approach has an reasonable overhead that can eas-
ily be met by current data storage systems, even considering that every transaction
pseudonym may require up to several KB of storage, depending on the underlying
group. In particular, the approach can be instantiated over elliptic curve groups,
such that a comparable level of security can be achieved at much smaller key sizes,
i.e. 160 bit instead of 1024 bit. In this case, the storage requirement roughly corre-
sponds to the 256 bit level of Table 7.1.
For the mobile communication device of mobile users, the storage is even more
efficient. Only the index of a transaction pseudonym w.r.t. the output of the PRNG
must be stored beyond a transaction lifetime, since every pseudonym can be recon-
structed by the user.
7.1.3 Prototype Implementation of ABM
Our approach to end-to-end secure attribute-based messaging and the underlying
hybrid encryption technique have been developed in a two-step approach. Firstly,
an initial ABM prototype was created in order to enable a cognitive walkthrough
with potential end users of this novel communication approach (cf. 7.3.2). The
findings contributed to the final design and lead to a second prototype, which is
briefly described in the following.
Our ABM prototype implementation consists of several main components. A
messaging center represents the tool for the central user that supports the sending of
messages. The messages can be received, decrypted and displayed by clients. One
variant of the client is tailored for desktop PCs, one for standard mobile devices.
The components encompass protype implementations of the encryption technique,
which supports the end-to-end encrypted sending and the decryption of a message
after reception.
6Depending on the implementation of the log, additional storage will be required. We do not take
this into account for our calculations.
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Figure 7.5: View of messaging center
A view of the messaging center is given in Figure 7.5. In consists of two parts,
comprising a digital map and an user interface for the definition of static attributes
and textual messages. The latter part is based on the programming language Java.
Here, the sender may select attributes related to organizations, roles and specializa-
tions from pre-defined lists of existing attributes and textually enter the content of a
message. The selection of location attributes makes use of a digital map that is dis-
played in an Internet browser. It harnesses digital maps provided by OpenLayers
7. Here, the user may specify a location attribute by selecting a geographic region
on the digital map. Derived GPS information is then synchronized with the other
part of the messaging center, in order to complement the specification of the send-
ing policy. In Figure 7.6, a view of the desktop client if given. Additionally, Figure
7.7 gives an example of a message that could not be decrypted by the receiver, i.e.
the policy could not be satisfied.
The underlying encryption technique was implemented in the C programming
language. In particular, C was chosen for efficiency reasons, in order to speed up
the cryptographic operations in comparison to a Java implementation. For parts of
the prototype, the following cryptographic libraries were used:
• Advanced Crypto Software Collection: Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-based En-
cryption8
7See HTTP://WWW.OPENLAYERS.ORG/.
8See HTTP://ACSC.CSL.SRI.COM/CPABE/.
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Figure 7.6: View of client for desktop PCs
Figure 7.7: Example of unsatisied policy
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• PBC Library: The Pairing-Based Cryptography Library9
• GNU MP Bignum Library10
7.1.4 Resource Consumptions of ABM
In order to assess the resource consumptions of our approach to end-to-end secure
attribute-based messaging, a variant of the receiving clients has been developed
for standard mobile devices. In particular, we chose a HTC P3600 smart phone as
reference platform11. This device supports Windows ME 5.012 as operating system.
On this platform, we conducted runtime measurements to support the claim that
our approach is compatible to resource constrained devices13. Here, the main fo-
cus of our investigation is whether decryption is possible in real-time on mobile
devices. Following proposals in the research literature, our prototype implemen-
tation harnesses a 160 bit elliptic curve group. In particular, it was constructed on
the curve y2 = x3 + x over a 512 bit field. This curve is denoted as pairing group
in the following. In pairing groups, the bit security is measured by multiplying the
underlying group’s field size with the embedding degree of the group [159, 124]. In
our experimental setting, we chose a 512 bit base field with an embedding degree
of 2, thus the bit security is considered equivalent to 1024 bit RSA security14. We
consider this setting as appropriate for emergency communications.
We executed 20 experiments in the described setting. We chose messaging poli-
cies of maximum complexity w.r.t. pairings, i.e. the policies included three at-
tributes related to CP-ABE. The length of the textual messages varied between 20
and 60 characters. The measured decryption time varied between 2.4 and 2.7 sec-
onds on the chosen platform, which we consider as real-time.
We conclude that our proposal is suitable even for resource-constrained mobile
devices. The most time consuming operation is the decryption on a mobile device.
On a conceptual as well as on an implementation level, there is further space for
optimization of the encryption operations, which we consider as future work.
7.2 Security
In this section, we provide an analysis on the fulfillment of the security require-
ments that were defined in Section 2.4. Since the requirements are split up in two
sets, also the discussion has two main parts.
9See HTTP://CRYPTO.STANFORD.EDU/PBC/.
10See HTTP://GMPLIB.ORG/.
11See HTTP://WWW.HTC.COM/DE/PRODUCT/P3600/SPECIFICATION.HTML.
12See WWW.MICROSOFT.COM/WINDOWSMOBILE.
13In the literature, complementary runtime measurements and experiments can be found. In [116],
Jacobi discusses the applicability of attribute-based encryption to wireless sensor networks. Ex-
periments relevant to vehicular ad hoc network scenarios are reported in [110]. Traynor et al. [218]
investigate the application of ABE to conditional access systems such as pay-per-view television.
14A table for comparison of bit security levels can be found in [140].
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In the first part, we analyze the proposed approach to multilaterally secure audit-
ing, including the underlying pseudonym technique. In the latter part, we address
our approach to attribute-based messaging, including the hybrid encryption tech-
nique that we build upon.
7.2.1 Security Analysis of Auditing
We next discuss the fulfillment of the security requirements relevant to auditing.
• SReqA1: Data minimization: From the users’ perspective, individual
privacy within the location tracking is protected due to the use of transaction
pseudonyms. Additionally, location tracking is restricted to the active state,
such that, in sum, data minimization w.r.t. identifiers that are directly associ-
ated to users is given within our approach.
However, the approach is tailored within the context of emergency communi-
cations, where parties use dedicated digital radio networks with own security
infrastructure, e.g. according to the TETRA standard15. Thus, complementary
security measures are provided by the host network, where further identifiers
cannot be avoided. Yet, this is not considered within our adversary model (cf.
Section 5.4), only the pseudonymized identifiers are chosen for the auditing.
Here, every user is able to adjust the frequency of pseudonym changes and
of location updates sent to the control center, thus she is empowered to adjust
the temporal granularity of linkability within an audit log.
Yet, since such a log also supports the user, sending frequent location updates
is also aligned with a user’s own interests, in the sense of multilateral security.
• SReqA2: Individual access: In order to implement an individual access
functionality, which supports defending against false accusations and thus
could actually entail legal effects16, the underlying approach to pseudonym
authentication needs to assure a uniqueness property.
Especially, it must not be possible for an adversary17 to provide authentica-
tion information for a pseudonym without being the real originator. This is
achieved in our construction due to a two-factor authentication process: The
users needs to provide both the base pseudonym and the aggregated random
factors. An adversary could only try to guess base pseudonym and matching
aggregated random factor, since she cannot access the seed to derive correct
values, which is generated and stored only locally.
15Cf. WWW.TETRAMOU.COM.
16The acceptability of GPS tracking information as evidence in court proceedings is also a legal issue.
In a trial, it has to be considered if evidence of having been at a certain location is acceptable and
actually relates to having committed a certain action. From a security point of view, this boils down
to the question, whether the location tracking infrastructure is trustworthy, which is, in fact, a
core assumption of our approach. We provide a further treatment of this issue by describing and
discussing simulated legal trials and court cases in Section 7.3.1.
17In that case, the adversary could be a further mobile user of the location tracking system who tries
to fake evidences.
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Moreover, the probability to succeed with such a bruteforce attack can be low-
ered by requiring a user to authenticate multiple consecutive log entries.
• SReqA3: Privacy-respecting log analysis / SReqA4: Minimal
disclosure: As proposed, log analysis boils down to creating user traces
within a log, harnessing two main operations (cf. Section 6.5.2). This is even
possible in pseudonymized logs, since the underlying pseudonym approach
supports these operations.
The properties of the pseudonym construction stem from a semantically se-
cure encryption operation, thus transaction pseudonyms do not leak informa-
tion about the implicit attributes and the encoded reference value.
Moreover, no single audit officer is able to decrypt a pseudonym and thus
to link a pseudonym to a user. This is achieved since pseudonym creation is
performed as encryption operations of a threshold cryptosystem, and registra-
tion information is still required for resolution of reference values. Therefore,
officers have to cooperate in every step of the log analysis, implementing a
distribution of power and operational separation of duty in our system. In
sum, a privacy-respecting log analysis is given.
The log analysis is complemented by methods for partial re-identification. The
first linking operation offers minimal disclosure due to the direct application of
plaintext equality tests [118], i.e. it directly exhibits the privacy property of
secure multiparty computation.
Differently, in the proposed set lookup approach, the equality test is executed
by means of deterministic fingerprints, thus semantic security is not satisfied
for this operation. This approach is required in order to make reference sets
reusable, and only additional information from comparing fingerprints could
be maliciously derived. Yet, this is within the capabilities that opponents are
ascribed to within our adversary model w.r.t. multilateral security, which aims
at dispute resolution. In particular, the process of auditing has to comply to
a disclosure policy, which encodes the rules for the re-identification of mobile
users18. The compliance to this policy is assured by means of the transparency
mechanisms, see below.
In addition, for the creation of reference sets, the anonymizing property of the
mixnet supports blinding. Technically, the mixnet harnesses semantically se-
cure ElGamal reencryption.
• SReqA5: Distribution of powers / SeqA7: Law enforcement:
The proposed construction allows flexibly representing several distributions
18An inside adversary (cf. Section 5.4.2) could aim to reduce a user’s degree of anonymity by correlating
background knowledge and reference sets of several consecutive steps of partial re-identification.
The resulting intersection of two or several reference sets (and thus anonymity sets) is possibly
smaller than each of the sets. In the literature, comparable attacks on anonymity techniques are
known as intersection attack [16, 247, 130]. We address this issue only by means of the disclosure
policy, i.e. we explicitly allow certain kinds of consecutive re-identification steps. In particular, we
consider the definition of intersection-attack-resistant disclosure policies as future work.
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of powers. In particular, this flexibility builds on the use of a (t, n) threshold
ElGamal cryptosystem as well as the distributed computation of linking oper-
ations.
In Chapter 5, we proposed a basic setting, which can flexibly be tailored to
different application needs. Due to its flexibility, the complete approach can
e.g. also be instantiated without a data protection officer. Firsthand, the ap-
proach can also tolerate the failure of at maximum n − t authorities, which
may be due to unavailability or due to corruption. Additionally, the robust-
ness of the scheme stems from its ability to tolerate attacks against officers or
failures of them, without corrupting the whole system. Technically, this builds
on the property of Shamir secret sharing that any number of shares below the
threshold yield no partial information about the key.
However, we require the registration phase to be trustworthy, since it depends
on a single registration authority RA, which is contrary to the distributed de-
sign of the rest of the schemes.
Also, the law enforcement authority LEA represents a single TTP. However, the
scheme can be instantiated without LEA, if not required in a certain applica-
tion context. In that case, the initial generation of SKLB is executed according
to the distributed key generation protocol of Pedersen [172].
In addition, the power of the officers to completely disclose pseudonyms is
restricted to re-identifying at most the reference value. Only in cooperation
with the RA, the matching encrypted identity on the registration list can be
retrieved.
Effectively, the RA thus implements an additional access control mechanism
here. By encrypting the registration list under a second public key of the LEA
instead of PKLB, an additional distribution of powers can be implemented.
Variants in the encryption of the registration list can also be used to impose
higher computational cost on the final disclosure step, if necessary.
• SReqA6: Transparency: The multilateral security property of the overall
approach makes use of the principle of accountability by auditability on several
levels: mobile users can partly be held accountable for real-world actions ac-
cording to their presence and absence at certain locations during missions,
due to the existence of location audit logs. Additionally, audit officers can be
held accountable for their actions during the log analysis process, partly due
to existence of transcripts of the cooperative log analysis. This second level of
accountability is denoted as transparency.
Especially, anyone who can read the transparency log can audit the log analy-
sis process. Such a verifier can control whether the analysis has been executed
according to the disclosure policy. Thus, this particular transparency mecha-
nism requires individual efforts for controlling the transparency log in order
to be enforced. Individual access to the transparency log itself is controlled by
a generalization of the mechanism for individual access. Its security depends
on the choice of unique seeds and the correct creation of base pseudonyms
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within the registration process. Yet, we assume that the complete registration
is trustworthy.
As a variant, transparency logs can be made accessible to larger groups of
verifiers, in order to support a transparency mechanism with shared respon-
sibilities for controlling the log.
A complementary support measure for transparency is given due the exis-
tence of a data protection officer. The DPO can individually give out infor-
mation on the log analysis process, constituting a further social and organiza-
tional level of security.
Security Requirement Main Security Mechanism
SReqA1: Data minimization Unlinkable transaction pseudonyms
(based on semantically-secure encryption)
Restricted data collection
Adjustable frequency
SReqA2: Individual access Two-factor pseudonym authentication
SReqA3: Privacy-respecting Separation of duty
log analysis (based on trusted registration authority)
Privacy-respecting trace creation
(based on privacy property of SMPC)
SReqA4: Minimal disclosure (Reusable) partial re-identification
(based on set lookup)
Anonymization by mixnet
(based on semantically-secure encryption)
Disclosure policy
(enforced by transparency mechanisms)
SReqA5: Distribution SMPC / threshold cryptography
of powers (based on secret sharing of keys)
Flexible instantiability, incl. DPO
(based on key distribution)
SReqA6: Transparency Individual access to transparency log
(based on pseudonym authentication)
Data protection officer
SReqA7: Law enforcement Global decryption capability
(based on trusted key generation)
Variant without law enforcement
(based on distributed key generation)
Table 7.2: Audit security requirements and mechanisms
In Table 7.2, we present the security requirements and the associated security
mechanisms in overview. In particular, in our approach the fulfillment of protection
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goals reduces to cryptographic assumptions, is based on partially trusted processes
/ authorities and is achieved by means of cooperative protocols and schemes.
7.2.2 Trust Requirements relevant to Auditing
Having analyzed the fulfillment of the protection goals, we next provide a comple-
mentary view of the security of the presented concepts by listing the trust require-
ments. Especially, we describe which parties within the auditing approach need to
be trusted not to violate the ascribed behavior to which extent. Each listed trust
requirement describes and refers to a risk that has to be addressed, in order to ac-
complish a trustworthy implementation and operation of a system [62].
Our discussion excludes mobile users, since the major issue is that real world ac-
tions during a rescue mission cannot easily be judged to be inappropriate. The
presented approach shall support an ex-post handling of liability issues. Software
modules are also only considered on an abstract level.
We identified the following trust requirements:
• The registration authority has to be trusted to enforce a correct registration
phase, and to provide correct authorizations sets.
• The mixnet that is used by the RA is verifiable and thus does not need to be
fully trusted. In particular, it can guarantee anonymization if at least one of
the mix servers is honest and correctly executes the mixing phase19. Thus at
least one mix server has to be trusted; otherwise a denial of service attack
against the creation of blind reference sets (cf. Section 4.2.4) can be launched.
• A quorum of officers (i.e. a set of at least t officers, including AOs and the
DPO) have to be trusted to execute an audit according to a specified disclosure
policy, in order to achieve a dispute resolution. At least t out of n officers
are required to execute steps involving shared keys. Yet, violations can be
detected, based on the transparency mechanism, and even in case of collusion
and direct decryption of a pseudonym, only the reference value and not the
real world identity of affected mobile users is disclosed.
• The bulletin board, the audit log and the registration list have to be trusted to op-
erate and store data correctly. A reliable communication subsystem is crucial
for the whole auditing process.
We conclude that denial of service attacks represent the greatest risks within the
approach. While such attacks are beyond the scope of this work, they could addi-
tionally be handled on conceptual, implementation as well as organizational levels
(cf. Section 5.4.3).
19In particular, this requires reencrypting the ciphertexts with random values and randomly permut-
ing the batch of all ciphertexts (cf. Section 4.1.2).
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7.2.3 Independent Security Review of Pseudonymization Technique
The security evaluation of mechanisms can involve a certification of the achieved
level of security, given by a third party. A common way is to rely on standardized
evaluation procedures, e.g. according to common criteria. While such a certifica-
tion is actually required in some application contexts, e.g. public security and emer-
gency response, it is only reasonable for fully developed ICT products. It is rather
inapplicable to scientific prototypes.
Yet, in order to support the present security evaluation, a main contribution of
this thesis, the pseudonymization approach, has been assessed by an expert of the
independent German trust provider TÜViT20. The expert acknowledged the correct-
ness and trustworthiness of our approach, but imposed operational conditions for
a real world usage [205, 206].
We will discuss this issue more closely in Section 7.3.1.
7.2.4 Discussion of Hybrid Encryption Technique
In the following two sections, we assess the security provided by our proposed
approach to end-to-end secure attribute-based messaging. Firstly, we discuss the
novel hybrid encryption technique. Then, then fulfillment of the security require-
ments relevant to emergency communication (cf. Section 2.4.3) is investigated.
According to Section 4.3.1 and Section 4.4.3, the proposed design of the hybrid
encryption technique follows two main goals: achieving efficiency in handling con-
tinuous dynamic attributes and minimizing trust requirements in attribute authori-
ties at the same time. We recap our design decisions and discuss the resulting level
of security.
At first, handling dynamic attributes requires means for providing keys on mo-
bile devices. An online AA (or online PKG) could principally solve the problem,
but does not scale. An offline AA only allows handling dynamic attributes by pre-
registering all possible attributes to a local trusted activator. This is inefficient for
continuous attributes. An embedded AA could be implemented locally on tamper-
resistant hardware. However, it locally requires the master key and could generate
all attributes of all users, such that the key escrow risk associated to a compromise
is extremely high. Within our approach, we propose to conceptually split the role of
the single AA (cf. Figure 4.12): an offline CP-ABE AA issues all static attributes in a
registration phase, while an embedded LBE AA handles dynamic location attributes,
based on tamper-resistant hardware.
W.r.t. to encryption security, the hybrid technique is designed such that the loca-
tion-based encryption (LBE) parts adds a further level of security to the symmetric
session key that is used for message encryption. In our approach, the XOR operation
encrypts the initially generated session key comparable to an one-time pad [203].
Hence, decryption is only possible if the required CP-ABE attributes are available
20TÜViT (see WWW.TUVIT.DE) is specialized in evaluating the trustworthiness of IT security modules
as well as their operational embedding.
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to decrypt the outer asymmetric encryption layer and the location lock value can be
generated correctly in order to recover the session key.
In most cases, messaging policies include a conjunction of location and further
CP-ABE attributes (cf. Figure 6.6). Then, this approach retains encryption of mes-
sages even in case the embedded LBE AA is compromised.
Moreover, in case the CP-ABE attributes are compromised, a message is still pro-
tected by the additional location-dependent encryption layer. Thus, the hybrid en-
cryption technique allows realizing end-to-end encryption while being able to han-
dle expressive policies.
In addition, our proposal minimizes the use of pairings in the end-to-end encryp-
tion. This design broadens the applicability of the encryption technique to a range of
mobile devices. In turn, the hybrid encryption technique looses full cryptographic
collusion resistance w.r.t. the expressive policy. Yet, a collusion between receivers
or adversaries that try trading CP-ABE attributes, e.g. in order to gain access to
messages of further organizations, fails.
The hybrid encryption assumes tamper-resistant hardware, especially a tamper-
resistant GPS receiver. In the emergency response application context, this assump-
tion is practically fulfilled, e.g. by given TETRA mobile communication devices.
The application logic required to implement the location lock mapping and the
location verification procedure is small, such that means to guarantee correctness
based on certification procedures can easily be applied. Together with a secure soft-
ware stack supported by a TPM chip of the mobile device [32], additional practical
security guarantees could be given.
In some cases, a device may be unable to compute its current GPS position, e.g.
inside closed buildings. To circumvent functional problems, we propose to inter-
nally rely on the last computed (and thus computable) GPS position in such cases.
7.2.5 Security Analysis of Communication Mechanisms
In this section, we discuss the fulfillment of the security requirements relevant to
emergency communication.
• SReq1: Basic security: The basic security mechanisms of mutual au-
thentication, message integrity and availability are given by the security ar-
chitecture of the emergency communication network (cf. 5.3).
Since the ABM scheme is realized on the end-to-end encryption layer, they
apply to it, too. Especially, device revocation is possible by means of the net-
work, without relying on additional cryptographic mechanisms on the appli-
cation level.
• SReq2: End-to-end confidentiality w/o online PKG: End-to-end
encryption in the messaging is given due to and implemented by the use of
the proposed hybrid encryption technique on the end-to-end encryption layer.
In particular, the enforcement of the LBE part of expressive policies hinges on
tamper-resistant GPS receivers. In addition, computational security reduces
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to the same computational assumptions as in CP-ABE. For more details, we
refer to [17].
Collusion resistance is given as discussed in Section 7.2.4.
• SReq3: Protection against replay attacks: Replay attacks are han-
dled on the end-to-end encryption layer: after decryption, the receiver verifies
the freshness of the included message ID. The receiver rejects messages that
contain an ID that she already decrypted. This mechanism requires that the
message ID is unique due to its generation.
• SReq4: Non-repudiation of senders: Non-repudiation of senders is
assured due to two mechanisms.
Firstly, each message sent is added to the message log ML, for additional se-
curity digitally signed by the sender S. This record can later be analyzed.
Secondly, each message includes a MAC, such that it can be linked to the
sender, given that the registration information is correct.
• SReq5: Documentation of readers: Readers, i.e. the subset of all re-
ceivers of a message that satisfied the logical messaging policy, are docu-
mented via the readers list RL. In order to achieve this, readers have to send
acknowledgements to the control center. The fulfillment of this requirement
thus hinges on the compliance to the protocol for end-to-end secure attribute-
based messaging (cf. Figure 6.5)21.
Unique mobile subscriber identities, IMSIR, can be resolved to real world
identities of readers, by linking them to information present on the registra-
tion list RegL.
• SReq6: Efficiency of security mechanisms: Efficiency of the pro-
posed ABM scheme has computational and organizational factors.
Regarding computational efficiency, our approach has a low pairing complex-
ity. Firsthand, this is achieved by the design of the messaging policies (cf.
Figure 5.4) as well as by the proposed hybrid encryption mode. In particular,
the session key decryption requires one XOR operation for the LBE part. In or-
der to decrypt the CP-ABE part of the policy, two pairing operations for every
attribute that is matched by one of a receiver’s attributes are required22. Yet,
messaging policies are designed such that at most 6 pairing operations are re-
quired. Thus, the hybrid policy encryption technique together with the policy
design render the decryption practically in real time on resource-constrained
devices (cf. Section 7.1.4).
From the organizational perspective, no online PKE is required, such that the
21For additional security, the software modules implementing the protocol can be certified by a trust
provider.
22In case the approach would be extended to policies with additional internal AND-/OR-levels, one
exponentiation operation would be required for each internal node from an attribute in the leaf to
the root node of the CP-ABE policy part.
7.3 Appropriateness 135
number of interactions that are required for the end-to-end key management
are reduced to a single registration phase.
• SReq7: Appropriateness to users: Appropriateness to users is sup-
ported by the following factors.
Firstly, our ABM approach allows for a single, combined realization of all nec-
essary communication patterns CP1-CP4 (cf. Section 2.4.2). It thus minimizes
learning efforts.
Secondly, our approach integrates continuous location attributes into the se-
lection of receivers, which are intuitive selectors for senders.
Thirdly, more generally, the approach has been designed based on insights
that were derived from experiments with potential real users. We discuss this
issue more closely in Section 7.3.2.
• SReq8: Location privacy protection of receivers: From the re-
ceivers’ perspective, the given approach allows for an acceptable integration
into personal lives, since privacy protection is given due to the following
mechanisms.
Firstly, every registered mobile user can be efficiently contacted and requested
via an implicit addressing method that includes location. In particular, in our
proposal this is possible without continuously disclosing identifying informa-
tion along with location updates beforehand. Instead, the implicit addressing
is based on broadcasts and local enforcement (by means of the hybrid encryp-
tion technique) on the mobile device23.
Secondly, upon activation unlinkable transaction pseudonyms provide pri-
vacy protection, as discussed in Section 7.2.1.
In Table 7.3, we list the security requirements and the associated security mecha-
nisms in overview. The fulfillment of protection goals reduces to cryptographic as-
sumptions and trusted processes. Moreover, the implementation of functionalities
for implicit addressing on mobile devices (which in turn require trusted hardware)
is a key mechanism to achieve privacy protection. In addition, our design is also
based on experiences with real users. This issue is discussed in more detail in the
following sections.
7.3 Appropriateness
In this section, we elaborate on the appropriateness and practicality of our work to
realistic application scenarios. Firstly, we present results of a study that addressed
the acceptability of pseudonymized location traces as evidence in legal disputes.
Then, in Section 7.3.2, we describe experiments with a preliminary ABM prototype
involving potential real users, that contributed to the final design.
23The privacy protection achieved by broadcast- and implicit addressing-based communication
mechanisms is also denoted as receiver anonymity in the literature, cf. [177].
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Security Requirement Main Security Mechanism
SReq1: Basic security Mutual authentication
Message integrity
Availability
Device revocation
(all given by underlying network)
SReq2: End-to-end Hybrid encryption technique
confidentiality (based on offline and embedded PKG)
w/o online PKG (based on tamper-resistant GPS receiver)
Collusion resistance
(based on CP-ABE)
SReq3: Protection against Message ID
replay attacks (based on unique generation of IDs)
SReq4: Non-repudiation Message authentication codes
of senders (based on key distribution)
Message log
SReq5: Documentation Acknowledgements
of readers (based on compliance to protocol)
Message authentication codes
(based on key distribution)
Readers list
(based on correct registration information)
SReq6: Efficiency of Policy design
security mechanisms Hybrid encryption mode
(based on encryption technique)
Offline key generation
(based on registration)
SReq7: Appropriateness Single communication mechanism
to users Intuitive location selection
Design tailored to end users
(based on experiments)
SReq8: Location privacy Broadcast
protection Implicit addressing
of receivers (based on local enforcement on device)
Table 7.3: Communication security requirements and mechanisms
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7.3.1 Using Pseudonymized Location Traces in Legal Disputes
As part of this research, the acceptability of pseudonymized location traces in legal
disputes has been evaluated. A legal dispute represents a highly demanding sce-
nario, thus it is also appropriate to draw conclusions about application scenarios
with less demands, as targeted by our work.
A major goal of the investigation that we report on in the following was to assess
technologies that produce digital evidence in a realistic, yet safe environment, while
both the technology and the juridical regulations are still configurable. As stated by
Bratus et al., a critical issue in such settings is that "computer-generated evidence
comes from an entity that cannot take an oath ensuring its intent of providing the
truth" [30]. Thus, we aimed to identify the limiting factors towards the legal ac-
ceptability of digital evidence, in particular w.r.t. our approach to pseudonymous
auditing presented in this thesis.
Setting
The present investigation was part of an interdisciplinary study. In particular, we
conducted simulated court cases as part of a juridical simulation [185, 189], which
included German layers, a judge and IT security experts. This so-called simulation
study24 was prepared and conducted at the Center for Advanced Security Research
Darmstadt (CASED)25 in 2010.
An impression of the course of a simulated court case is given in Figure 7.8. The
study was organized by members of the PROVET group26 from Universität Kassel,
under the auspices of Prof. Alexander Roßnagel.
Assumptions
In the legal assessment some assumptions27 were made, which are described next.
The application of the pseudonymization technique was considered in the tech-
nical and organizational context of digital emergency communication networks28.
Especially, TETRA networks were considered. These networks are specifically tai-
lored for mission-critical settings and thus satisfy stringent security and reliability
requirements [141]. This is also true for the involved mobile communication de-
vices, which are equipped with tamper-resistant GPS receivers.
Additionally, we assume that the devices may contain further associated func-
tionalities, which are described in the next section. To enable mobile users to pro-
vide pseudonymized location information, a prior registration is required, in order
to enable correct generation and re-identification of pseudonyms. The registration
24The underlying methodology is described by Roßnagel in [188].
25See HTTP://WWW.CASED.DE/.
26PROVET is the Projektgruppe verfassungsverträgliche Technikgestaltung, i.e. the project group for
legally compliant technology design, see HTTP://PROVET.UNI-KASSEL.DE.
27These assumptions are in accordance to the assumptions that were stated throughout this thesis.
28In particular, this is a instantiation of the setting that is described in Chapter 5.
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Figure 7.8: Impression of court case simulated at CASED
thus implements an organizational trust anchor and is assumed to having occurred
correctly and trustworthy.
Court Case
In the study, we defined two representative court cases29. Every case describes a
scenario and an associated legal dispute. We next sketch one of the cases30.
In the given case, it is assumed that a first responder has been present at the loca-
tion of a certain incident. The incident involved a famous person, and the responder
allegedly took a digital picture documenting the scene with a camera integrated in
his mobile device. The photo was sold by him to a newspaper, yet he did not re-
ceive the payment. Instead, the newspaper claimed that the picture was taken by
an internal editor. The picture itself contained no GPS data attached, yet the first
responder accessed the entries of the pseudonymized location audit log that shall
help to document his presence. In a simulated legal trial, the judge had to decide
whether provided re-identified GPS traces can be accepted as evidence.
Based on our prototype (cf. Section 7.1.1), we generated scenario-related evi-
dence. The associated location traces are also shown in Figure 7.9 and Figure 7.10.
These traces illustrate the (simulated) movement of the responder in a period of
time relevant to the incident that was addressed by the court case.
29The simulation study covered 10 court cases, cf. [189]. We focus on the cases relevant to this thesis.
30Our other court case was less complex, in particular it was assumed that no additional function-
alities were associated to the mobile devices. We focus on the description of the more complex
court case, since it highlighted certain practical aspects that we elaborate on in the remainder of
this section.
7.3 Appropriateness 139
Figure 7.9: Sample location trace used as evidence, marked with dots
Figure 7.10: Sample location trace used as evidence, marked with blue line
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Identiﬁed Limiting Factors
Within the study, a judge, who was supported by an IT security expert31, inves-
tigated which conditions have to be met to consider de-pseudonymized location
traces as legally acceptable evidence.
The main statement given is that the employed mechanisms were acknowledged
to be secure, but the legal acceptability is not improved in comparison to traditional,
non-digital evidence, e.g. human eye witnesses or testimonies. Yet, several factors
were identified that can have a direct effect on the legal acceptability. We briefly
elaborate on these factors in the following.
• Date of registration: the date of registration needs to be available to the court.
• Role of registration authority: the registration authority should not be part of
an organization involved in the incident, in the given case a fire department.
Such an internal registration authority would be considered a deficit in a real
case.
• Strength of encryption: cryptographic parameters have to be chosen such that
pseudonymity is protected against brute force re-identification attacks. The
strength used in the sample settings was considered inappropriate for practi-
cal purposes, yet considered adequate to illustrate the functionality.
• Association of user and device: due to the approach, evidence was given that
the registered device has been present at a certain location and time. Yet, this
information does not indicate which legal person has actually carried the de-
vice. Further mechanisms to complement the association of user and device
are thus required32.
Conclusion
The identified factors indicate that special care has to be taken in order to turn the-
oretically secure approaches for generating digital evidence into practically secure
and multilaterally acceptable systems. As argued, the main factors relate to the
concrete setting and the particular instantiation of our approach; also several orga-
nizational factors have to be considered. In particular, the binding of device and
user has to be free of doubt in order to generate legally acceptable digital evidence.
This issue requires further research efforts that are beyond the scope of this thesis.
31This was the same expert that was introduced in Section 7.2.3.
32This issue could be approached by a biometric binding of device and user’s identity [165], if a high
reliability of the mechanism is given. Alternatively, electronic tags with a physical binding to the
user, as they are used e.g. in the field of electronic monitoring of law offenders [219], could be
applied. Yet, this type of solution raises additional acceptance issues. In particular, in our scenario
a responder would have to be willing to continuously wear a RFID-enabled wristband or bracelet
in order to support the binding of device and user. Comparable solutions are currently under
investigation e.g. in health-care scenarios [115].
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A general conclusion of the study is that the impact of digital evidence (with lo-
cation traces being just one example) on a court decision is mostly dependent on
the individual case. Especially, its impact has always to be considered in relation
to further available non-digital evidence. In case that e.g. human witnesses can
report on an incident, nowadays judges clearly prefer these. In case that such tra-
ditional piece of evidence is not available to a court, the trustworthiness of digital
evidence is thoroughly assessed. In particular, in order to exclude manipulations
of available digital evidence, one has to assess the relation of the interests and the
costs associated to malicious behavior. In the court case that we reported on, this
issue is e.g. reflected by the imposed constraint that a registration authority should
be independent, in order to mitigate conflicts of interests.
In general, novel technologies have to be established over a long period of time, in
order to be considered acceptable by judges and experts; the relevancy within legal
disputes is thus also a question of habituation. In particular, the unknown side ef-
fects that are often inherent in immature technologies have to be minimized within
the assessment of digital evidence. Foremost, this requires gaining experience.
In turn, we conclude that an application in contexts such as our targeted dispute
resolution setting can prepare the subsequent usage of our proposal also in legally
binding court cases.
7.3.2 Supporting Appropriateness of ABM to End Users
The design of our ABM approach draws from experiences and discussions with po-
tential real users, i.e. first responders, decision makers and trainers from German
police and fire departments as well as relief organizations33. It is beyond the scope
of this thesis to provide a distinct, in-depth usability evaluation of the final proto-
type, yet, we discuss the user study as well the impact on our design decisions.
Iterative Design Process
The design of our proposal to end-to-end secure attribute-based messaging fol-
lowed an iterative approach (cf. Section 2.4.1):
• We presented our initial proposal of an attribute-based messaging scheme and
system for end-to-end confidential emergency communication both to the IT
security research community (in [232]) and to the first response research com-
munity (in [231]).
• The associated prototype was used to initiate discussions and to conduct a
user study with potential real users, based on a cognitive walkthrough34 [21]
of typical emergency communication scenarios.
The study was supported by and executed together with an usability expert of
33This investigation was part of the research project SoKNOS, WWW.SOKNOS.DE.
34A cognitive walkthrough, an usability evaluation method, builds on practical user experiments with
a system.
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Fraunhofer IESE35. The experiments helped to understand how potential real
users prefer to interact by and with an emergency communication system and
ABM concepts, in particular.
• The findings of the study (cf. [251]) contributed to Section 2.4.1 and to our final
ABM design and concept, as published in [237] and presented in this thesis.
In the following sections, we introduce the setting of the user study and describe
the experiments that were executed by the participants. Furthermore, we summa-
rize the received user feedback and the drawn conclusions.
Setting
Our study was part of an end user evaluation session of the project SoKNOS. During
this session, potential real users and domain experts (cf. [250]) were confronted with
prototypes of several novel mechanisms and concepts in the area of ICT-supported
emergency management.
For our part, we recruited a set of 8 domain experts among the participants of the
evaluation session. In particular, the population included:
• three emergency workers of German fire brigades,
• two decision makers of German fire brigades,
• one lecturer of the Deutsche Hochschule der Polizei (DHPol)36,
• one decision maker of a German police authority,
• one executive manager of a software company that develops geographic in-
formation systems (GIS) supporting emergency management.
Each participant was given a printout of the documentation of the study37 [233]
as well as a brief oral introduction to the concept of attribute-based messaging and
its proposed application to the area of emergency communication by a modera-
tor. The participants were seated at a table. A computer screen on the table and a
keyboard and a mouse were provided as input devices. The documentation of the
experiments and discussions was supported by a minute writer.
Experiments
We requested the domain experts to participate in a particular cognitive walkthrough
of emergency communication scenarios. Each participant was confronted with an
35The Fraunhofer Institute for Experimental Software Engineering, (HTTP://WWW.IESE.FRAUNHOFER.DE/),
was a research partner in the project SoKNOS, which hosted the user study.
36The DHPol is an internal German state university for police executives.
37The documentation had also been electronically distributed several days before the user study
among all potential participants.
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Figure 7.11: View of ABM prototype used for experiments
Figure 7.12: View of editor supporting policy deﬁnition
ABM prototype (cf. Figure 7.11) that supported a flexible definition of sending poli-
cies. In the proposed setting, the messaging policies were not restricted to a certain
logical structure. Instead, arbitrary conjunctions and disjunctions could be used to
specify readers. For the definition of policies, the participants were also supported
by an editor (see Figure 7.12) that helped to define nested policies.
After the introduction, the participants were asked by a moderator to execute
several messaging acts and define appropriate policies. Afterwards, the users could
elaborate on the mental and cognitive processes and difficulties and formulate wishes
on the design.
In particular, the experiments included
• executing messaging acts suitable for pre defined situations,
• defining a messaging act that was known to be common due to personal ex-
perience,
• defining a complex, yet still realistic messaging act.
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After executing the tasks, the participants were requested
• to answer questions on their ability to handle the selection of readers by means
of attribute combinations,
• to elaborate on the comprehensibility of the proposed communication con-
cept,
• to identify elementary as well as difficult operations,
• to compare the proposal with known means for emergency communication,
• to state personal preferences for the usage of an ABM system.
Feedback
In the following, we present selected quotes that were given by the participants (cf.
[251]):
• "This is a charming way of addressing communication partners that are not
known by identity."
• "The approach is in accordance to our existing role- and task-based ICT."
• "ABM is very useful to communicate with external specialists."
• "Selecting location attributes directly on a digital map would be favorable".
Conclusions
The overall approach was recognized as a generalization of the concept of messag-
ing lists, that is common in emergency communication38. Thus, ABM was consid-
ered as applicable to the targeted setting and understandable by the available group
of experts.
In general, attribute-based messaging was considered to be easy learnable, given
that messaging acts can be handled by policies that are easy definable. Using dis-
junctions and conjunctions within one policy was considered too complex and too
difficult. Thus, for the design of messaging policies, a compromise of expressiveness
and complexity was favored. Additionally, a selection of location attributes directly
within a digital map was an articulated end user wish, in order to support an in-
tuitive use. Instead of using the proposed editor for defining policies, drop-down
boxes with lists of attributes were preferred.
The received proposals were incorporated into the final design of our attribute-
based messaging approach, as presented in this thesis. In this design, also the re-
source constraints imposed by the mobile devices that commonly used for emer-
gency communication had to be considered.
38Our conclusions relate to German emergency workers.
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Figure 7.13: Types of pseudonyms according to [28]
7.4 Applicability
In the last sections, we supported our claim that the mechanisms proposed in this
thesis are technically feasible, secure and appropriate to certain application settings.
In the following sections, we elaborate on the general applicability of the presented
concepts.
7.4.1 Pseudonyms with Implicit Attributes
Pseudonyms with implicit attributes are a novel approach to multilevel linkable
transaction pseudonyms. Especially, this proposal provides several degrees for flex-
ibly handling the pseudonym-to-identity-mapping.
In [28], Borcea-Pfitzmann et al. distinguish several types of pseudonyms based
on unlinkability, authentication / authorization and usability. This classification is
shown in Figure 7.13. Generally, transaction pseudonyms are basic tools for imple-
menting unlinkability of user actions; they are thus relevant to many applications
that take into account user privacy issues. In addition, many applications also in-
herently require mechanisms for the authentication and authorization of pseudony-
mous users.
In the present work, we proposed mechanisms for a cooperative partial re-identi-
fication of transaction pseudonyms, with applications to audit log analysis. In ad-
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Figure 7.14: Partial re-identiﬁcation in single authority setting
dition, our proposal is also applicable to authentication39 and access control. Yet,
cooperative authentication can represent, differently to our auditing setting, an im-
practical overhead in many settings. In [237], we proposed a technique that also
supports the partial re-identification by a single party. It is described in the next
section.
Single Authority Partial Re-Identiﬁcation
In the following, our novel single authority re-identification method is instantiated
in the same setting as given by the multi authority case (cf. Section 4.1). In partic-
ular, we make use of a single linkability broker (LB) instead of multiple LBs. Some
additional interactions both with the registration authority (RA) and with the au-
thorities that are in possession of the private ElGamal key s are required. The main
steps of the re-identification technique are shown in Figure 7.14.
In step RA1, the RA creates a fingerprinting key z ∈R Zq in order to initialize the
mechanism.
In step RA2, the RA selects all base pseudonyms in the registration list that match
the semantic of a chosen (implicit) attribute, e.g. it selects all base pseudonyms be-
longing to the attribute specialist for X and mixes them in order to set up an autho-
rization set.
39Authentication is yet a (further) type of linkability.
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In step RA3, the authorization set is blinded as follows, in order to produce a blind
reference set:
• Firstly, by raising the first component of each pseudonym ((gr), (hrRVi)) within
the authorization set to the power of z: (gr)z = (grz), in order to derive a partly
processed pseudonym ((grz), (hrRVi)).
• Secondly, by decrypting each of the partly processed pseudonyms (using s) to
blind deterministic fingerprints g−zRVi. This succeeds, since (grz)s = grsz =
grs ∗ gz = hr ∗ gz, which can be used to cancel out the first factor of (hrRVi) via
an algebraic division, hereby computing g−zRVi.
The blind reference sets together with the attached semantic in terms of the implicit
attribute are provided to the single linkability broker.
In step RA4, the linkability broker receives zs ∈ Zq, which is used as a blinded
fingerprinting key. Note that the LB learns nothing about z or s due to this.
The steps RA1 to RA4 can be executed in a prior preparation phase, thus we con-
sider them as offline operations. In particular, step RA1 and step RA4 only have to be
executed once, while step RA3 and RA4 have to executed for every blind reference
set that shall be created.
The following steps can be performed online, i.e. in real time during the operation
of a system that implements our mechanism.
In step LB1, in order to re-identify an implicit attribute of a chosen transaction
pseudonym (gr, hrRV?), i.e. to test whether the information encoded in the pseudonym
is implicitly attached to the semantics of the attribute in question or not, the LB
• raises the first component of the pseudonym to the power of zs:
(gr)zs = (grzs),
• performs an algebraic division in order to produce a blind fingerprint:
(hr ID?)/(grzs) = g−z ID?,
In step LB2, the linkability broker
• executes a fingerprint lookup on the chosen blind reference set, i.e. it com-
pares whether the produced blind deterministic fingerprint is part of this set.
• On success, i.e. if the fingerprint is part of the set, the transaction pseudonym
has been partially re-identified w.r.t. the implicit attribute in question.
Otherwise, the linkability broker may proceed with a lookup on a different
blind reference set.
Application to Authentication and Authorization
Based on the introduced mechanism for single authority partial re-identification,
authentication and authorization of transaction pseudonyms can be realized.
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In this case, a blind reference set technically represents one rule of an access con-
trol policy, analogously to the case of role- or attribute-based access control propos-
als [193, 249]. Thus, our approach can be applied to settings that require both un-
linkability and authentication, e.g. as a cryptographic tool for identity management
approaches [238], electronic citizen cards and several further applications. More
generally, it is applicable to settings and applications that aim at reconciling unlink-
ability and linkability by means of pseudonyms. This is e.g. relevant to privacy-
preserving reputation establishment [238, 153]. Our proposal is especially suitable
for settings with resource constraints, such as RFID applications. In [125], an elabo-
ration on suitable elliptic curve setups is presented.
7.4.2 Multilaterally Secure Auditing
Within this thesis, we presented our novel approach to multilaterally secure audit-
ing especially within the setting of location-based auditing. In particular, we de-
scribed how to support real-world auditing that were motivated by first response
scenarios. In addition, the proposed concepts can also be applied to a range of fur-
ther application scenarios. We summarize them in Table 7.4.
Application Scenario Examples and Features
Traditional audit log settings In operating systems, e.g. UNIX
Real-time intrusion detection Based on single authority
on pseudonymous data sets re-identification mechanism
Pseudonym-based transparency Supporting unlinkable transparency logs
mechanisms and individual access to personal data
Context-aware systems Supporting alert generation
on pseudonymized sensor data
Real-time command and control Real-time attribute
re-identification of units
Table 7.4: Application scenarios of multilaterally secure auditing
In particular, traditional audit log settings, e.g. in operating systems can be ad-
dressed. The application of real-time intrusion detection on pseudonymous data
sets can be supported, harnessing the single authority re-identification mechanism.
The presented pseudonym-based transparency mechanisms can be applied to a
range of further applications that require means for transparency, cf. [98]. Means
for access to personal data are also considered as transparency tools [70]. Our pro-
posed mechanisms for pseudonym-based individual access can e.g. be applied to
identity-management systems [238].
A related application scenario is that of context-aware systems, i.e. pervasive
computing applications that entail some kind of proactive system behavior [11]. On
a technical level, this partly requires that alerts can be generated, e.g. on acquired
sensor data.
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In the application example of first responder tracking, vital data or air pollution
can locally be sensed and also be sent to a control center. The monitoring system can
generate alerts if certain thresholds are exceeded, e.g. if physical parameters indi-
cate injuries. Staff members can react upon such warnings. Adapting our approach
can provide protection in form of transaction pseudonyms on the identifier level,
leaving the content level for real-time alert generation. Also, real-time command
and control can be supported based on partial re-identification of attributes.
7.4.3 Hybrid Encryption Technique
The novel hybrid encryption technique represents a practical approach for integrat-
ing context information into encryption policies.
Application Scenario Examples and Features
Context-based encryption Requires deterministic lock function
for particular type of context information
Application to further encryption Supports hybrid mode encryption
schemes e.g. applicable to IBE
Table 7.5: Application scenarios of hybrid encryption technique
In this thesis, it has been proposed with a focus on GPS-based location infor-
mation. Yet, different types of context information can be included, given that a
deterministic lock function can be realized. Securing context-based content distri-
bution mechanisms is thus a primary field of application. The underlying construc-
tion principle of combining symmetric keys is also applicable to further encryption
schemes that operate in hybrid encryption mode. E.g. it can directly be transferred
to identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes [86]. Table 7.5 summarizes the men-
tioned application scenarios.
7.4.4 End-To-End Secure ABM
End-to-end secure attribute-based messaging supports targeted one-to-many com-
munication with communication partners that are not known by identity.
In the research literature, smart metering and smart grids [127] as well as vehic-
ular networks [110] and health care environments [160], which are considered as
particular instances of dynamic organizations, can be identified as relevant fields
of applications for ABM concepts. In [155], also social messaging applications are
proposed. We summarize the mentioned application scenarios in Table 7.6.
7.5 Summary
In this chapter, we evaluated the main concepts and mechanisms presented by this
thesis. Our evaluation proceeded as follows:
150 7 Evaluation and Discussion
Application Scenario Examples and Features
Smart grids Communication with unknown identities
within utility companies and of mobile users
Smart metering Message warehousing service
Vehicular networks Communication with unknown
and moving vehicles
Health care Dynamic organizations
with frequent changes of people’s
roles and permissions
Social messaging Location-based messaging
with privacy protection
Table 7.6: Application scenarios of end-to-end secure ABM
• As proof of concept, we built prototypes for auditing and attribute-based mes-
saging, including prototype implementations of underlying pseudonymiza-
tion and encryption techniques, in order to show the technical feasibility.
• The prototypes were used to conduct experiments that addressed resource
constraints. We provided practical arguments that the overheads w.r.t. to stor-
age requirements for multilaterally secure location-based auditing and w.r.t.
the runtime of end-to-end secure ABM on mobile devices are reasonable.
• We analyzed in detail the achieved level of security of our proposals. Where
applicable, we reduced the security to computational and organizational as-
sumptions or to the existence of a tamper-resistant hardware component. In
addition, an independent security review of our pseudonymization technique
acknowledged the correctness and trustworthiness of our proposal. We also
described variants for flexibly instantiating our auditing concepts with and
without law enforcement capabilities, as well as with different distributions
of powers.
• We participated in a legal simulation study in order to assess the acceptability
of location traces as evidence. We thus contributed novel insights on the issue
of location accountability to the literature. In particular, within the study we
identified the main factors for leveraging pseudonymous location traces as
legally acceptable evidence. In addition, we compared the legal acceptability
to traditional, non-digital evidence such as human eye witnesses.
• In order to assure the appropriateness of our ABM mechanisms to end users,
we conducted a user study. It made use of an initial ABM prototype. Based
on the results of this study, we contributed to the understanding of a practical
ABM usage; our insights are particularly relevant to the first response domain.
Also, they contributed to our proposal presented in this thesis.
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In addition to the evaluation summarized above, we elaborated on the general
applicability of our presented concepts. In particular, we identified further fields of
application, e.g. in traditional audit settings such as in operating systems as well as
in a range of communication scenarios. Moreover, we contributed a novel method
for single authority partial re-identification of transaction pseudonyms. Based on
this extension, our pseudonymization technique can also be applied to design access
control mechanisms that are compatible with pseudonymous users.
Having evaluated our proposed concepts and mechanisms for multilaterally se-
cure pervasive cooperation, only the final chapter, Chapter 8, is yet to come.

8Summary
Humans are incapable of securely storing high-quality cryptographic keys, and they have
unacceptable speed and accuracy when performing cryptographic operations. [...] But they
are sufficiently pervasive that we must design our protocols around their limitations.
C. Kaufman, R. Perlman and M. Speciner, in [129]
With pervasive computing becoming reality, also privacy and IT security become
more important issues to the individual than ever before. Today, the public percep-
tion of pervasive computing is often dominated by negative connotations.
With this thesis, we demonstrated that carefully devised protection mechanisms
can rather become enablers for multilaterally acceptable and thus trustworthy dig-
ital interactions and cooperations. We denoted this topic as multilaterally secure per-
vasive cooperation.
We summarize the main contributions of this thesis in the next section.
8.1 Contributions
This thesis aimed at enabling two crucial functionalities of cooperative pervasive
systems: real-world auditing in and by pervasive location tracking systems as well
as end-to-end secure communication between a sender and mobile, unknown re-
ceivers.
Motivated by the application scenario of ICT-enhanced emergency response, we
developed a novel integrated approach as well as the supporting security tech-
niques and mechanisms that aim at mitigating acceptance issues of pervasive com-
puting systems in highly demanding real-world application contexts. In particular,
we targeted settings in which highly demanding and conflicting IT security and
privacy requirements had to be fulfilled.
Firstly, this thesis contributed the following security techniques and mechanisms:
• Pseudonyms with implicit attributes are a novel approach to multilevel link-
able transaction pseudonyms. We extended earlier work of Juels and Pappu
[125] on encryption-based transaction pseudonyms, by developing new mech-
anisms for controlled pseudonym linkability. This included mechanisms for
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cooperative, stepwise re-identification as well as individual authentication of
pseudonyms. Our proposal makes use of efficient techniques for secure mul-
tiparty computation and cryptographically secure PRNGs.
• Multilaterally secure location-based auditing is a novel consideration of auditing
mechanism suitable for real-world actions. It harnesses our novel pseudonym
mechanisms in order to support a fair balance of privacy protection and ac-
countability. In contrast to previous work, a cooperative log analysis was in-
troduced that is oriented more closely on stepwise, human-oriented dispute
resolution processes. Within the approach, transparency mechanisms consti-
tuted a second level of accountability; in addition, means that enable indi-
viduals in repudiating false accusation were presented. Our approach can be
flexibly instantiated, including law enforcement capabilities and data protec-
tion officers that support individual users.
• A hybrid encryption technique for expressive policies was introduced. It supports
encryption policies that include a continuous dynamic attribute by leverag-
ing an efficient combination of ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption,
location-based encryption and symmetric encryption according to AES. The
technique was also devised to meet the requirements of resource-constrained
mobile devices.
• End-to-end secure attribute-based messaging constitutes a novel communication
mechanism for end-to-end encrypted one-to-many messaging. It is suitable
even for settings with mobile receivers that are unknown by identity and that
form dynamic groups. Based on our hybrid encryption technique, we de-
scribed how to flexibly support important communication patterns, including
location addressing and notifications of a priori unknown recipients, e.g. ex-
ternal specialists; the proposal also allows querying human sensors. Harness-
ing a novel mechanism for the implicit addressing of communication part-
ners, also location privacy protection of receivers is given. In addition, the
approach was tailored according to the needs of potential end users within
the emergency response domain.
The techniques and mechanisms constituted the major building blocks of our
novel approach to multilaterally secure pervasive cooperation. In particular, we also pro-
vided an integrated architecture that was tailored towards location-aware first re-
sponse. By doing so, we considered location, which represents a primary type of
context information that is leveraged by many pervasive applications, as the central
integrating concept for pervasive interactions and cooperations. In our design, both
communication during rescue missions as well as real-world auditing in the ex-post
phase of an emergency are inherently conceived as being location-based.
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Figure 8.1: Multilaterally secure pervasive cooperation
8.2 Conclusion
This thesis presented novel design proposals towards the realization of privacy-
respecting and moreover multilaterally secure cooperative pervasive systems. In
particular, we depicted how cooperation based on pervasive ICT can support set-
tings that inherently require multilateral security. On the other hand, we also de-
scribed how cooperation can be a key mechanism to implement multilateral security
(cf. Figure 8.1).
On a technical level, we showed that data minimization, in particular the replace-
ment of person-related identifiers must not lead to a confinement of system func-
tionality, if protection mechanisms are carefully designed.
Hence, modern cryptographic mechanisms are required in many parts of a per-
vasive system. Nowadays, standard mobile devices already provide technical plat-
forms that are suitable to host highly complex protection mechanisms, in case the
mechanisms are efficiently designed.
Location privacy protection has become an important issue to many individuals.
We evaluated the complementary aspect of location accountability by means of an
interdisciplinary study and thus added novel practical insights on this issue to the
ongoing scientific discussion.
Unquestionable, the degree of protection provided by the contributions of this
thesis comes at a cost. The cost comprises design and evaluation efforts, hardware as
well as operating expense and storage needs. Also, the availability of cooperating authorities
and individual participation for controlling transparency logs is crucial. Yet, we have
shown that theses factors come at a reasonable cost. In particular, trusted registration
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processes are required. However, a registration is required for most ICT applications,
anyway. We notice that moving a major part of trust into the organizational level is
an inherent issue of securing cooperative systems.
While a profound theoretical and technical knowledge is required to devise secu-
rity mechanisms, additional care has to be taken in order to support a practical use.
While explicit user interfaces tend to disappear within pervasive system, many ad-
ditional interfaces to the real world emerge. In particular, also legal considerations
and individual acceptance factors need to be considered to assure that pervasive
systems can "weave themselves into the fabric of everyday life until they are indis-
tinguishable from it" [243]. Yet, "disappearing computers" [216] still entail (digital)
traces. Arguing and demonstrating that, nevertheless, a fairly balanced use of sen-
sitive data is possible, the present thesis made a step towards the realization of
multilaterally secure and thus multilaterally acceptable pervasive systems.
8.3 Outlook
Having summarized and concluded on our main contributions, we suggest direc-
tions for future research.
Extended pseudonym constructions
The presented approach to pseudonyms with implicit attributes already provides flex-
ible degrees of linkability for several parties. However, harnessing additional prop-
erties of the underlying cryptographic primitives can allow realizing extended func-
tionalities. By exploiting homomorphic encryption, the pseudonym technique could
be extended towards including a statistical function, and thus to realize countable ac-
countable pseudonyms. Such pseudonyms may have applications in novel accounting
and pay-per-transaction methods.
More generally, as already sketched in Section 7.4.1, the present work can be the
basis to define pseudonym-based access control mechanisms. Generalizations of
our blind reference sets may represent access control policies, comparable to ex-
isting role- or attribute-based access control proposals. In case of application to
privacy policies, it seems interesting to investigate whether user-understandable
policies should be defined in terms of anonymity, in terms of attribute semantics, or
based on a combination of both.
Integration with reputation
Establishing reputation histories while protecting privacy requires to reconcile un-
linkability and linkability [152, 153]. Technically, this issue is comparable to the
tradeoff of location privacy protection and accountability that was addressed by this
thesis. Through reputation mechanisms, users can be supported to select reputable
interaction partners, based on aggregated historical trust and reputation values and
8.3 Outlook 157
recommendations. In order to compute reputation scores, it is necessary to estab-
lish interaction histories, i.e. aggregating experiences over past transactions. Based
on an extended application of secure multiparty computation techniques, not only
on the pseudonym level, also reputation values could be assessed. Based on SMPC,
the correctness of the output and privacy of the inputs could be guaranteed, without
relying on a single, external trusted party.
Further mechanisms for multilateral security
This thesis provides a starting point for research on multilateral security in the con-
text of pervasive systems. Following this line of research, the next steps can be to
identify additional and complementary building blocks and mechanisms that con-
stitute design alternatives towards the realization of privacy-respecting and more-
over multilaterally secure pervasive systems.
This may include a broader investigation of accountability and its impact as in-
centive for achieving a fairly balanced state of protection. Especially, a combina-
tion of multiple accountability mechanisms may constitute more effective incentive
mechanisms, especially w.r.t. the handling of sensitive data in pervasive systems.
Here, the principles of audit and transparency logs that allow for an ex-post pe-
nalization of unwelcome behavior could be complemented by giving rewards for
welcome behavior. This could naturally include the consideration of reputation
and economical factors.
Extended mechanisms for secure communication
With end-to-end secure attribute-based messaging, we contributed a novel mechanism
that enables communication in settings, where receivers are unknown by identity;
this is typically found in many cooperative pervasive computing applications. The
following directions for future research concern to broaden the applicability of ABM
mechanisms.
In the setting of this thesis, we assume that the sender of a message is not con-
strained by limited input capabilities or small display sizes. As a next step, re-
search may focus on enabling one-to-many communication in settings in which
the sender herself has only a mobile communication device. Complementary, fur-
ther existing network infrastructures can be considered as communication backbone
for attribute-based messaging. For example, online social networking platforms
may be harnessed to implement some sort of social attribute-based communication
mechanisms.
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